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Abstract	  Hippocampal	   researchers	   have	   recently	   turned	   their	   attention	   to	   the	  computations	  that	  may	  be	  implemented	  by	  the	  hippocampal	  circuit	  (e.g.	  pattern	   separation	   and	   pattern	   completion).	   This	   focus	   on	   the	  representational	   and	   information-­‐processing	   capabilities	   of	   the	  hippocampus	   is	   likely	   to	   be	   important	   in	   resolving	   on-­‐going	   debates	  regarding	   the	   nature	   of	   hippocampal	   contributions	   to	   perception,	  anxiety	  and	  exploration.	  A	  first	  aim	  of	  my	  research	  was	  to	  examine	  how	  context	   representations	   interact	  with	  reward	   to	   influence	  memory	   for	  embedded	  events.	   In	  my	   first	   experiment,	   I	   show	   that	   recollection	   for	  
neutral	  objects	   is	   improved	  by	  sharing	  a	  context	  with	  other	  rewarding	  events.	   To	   further	   examine	   contextual	   influences	   on	   memory,	   I	  conducted	  a	  second	  experiment	   that	  examined	  the	  effect	  of	  contextual	  reward	   itself	  on	  object	  memory.	  Additionally,	   I	  manipulated	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  disambiguation	  should	  rely	  on	  hippocampal	  computations,	  by	  varying	   the	   perceptual	   similarity	   between	   the	   rewarding	   and	   neutral	  contexts.	   Improved	   object	   memory	   was	   only	   observed	   when	   the	  rewarding	   and	   neutral	   contexts	   were	   perceptually	   similar,	   and	   this	  contextual	   memory	   effect	   was	   further	   linked	   to	   co-­‐activation	   of	   the	  hippocampal	   CA3/dentate	   gyrus	   and	   substantia	   nigra/ventral	  tegmental	   area.	   A	   second	  major	   aim	   of	   my	  work	   was	   to	   characterize	  hippocampal	   contributions	   to	   anxiety.	   In	   my	   third	   experiment,	   I	  combine	   a	   novel	   experiment	   with	   fMRI	   to	   show	   that	   hippocampal	  activation	   is	   associated	   with	   behavioural	   inhibition	   rather	   than	  exploratory	  risk	  assessment.	  This	  insight	  is	  important	  because	  a	  major	  theoretical	   perspective	   in	   the	   literature	   conflates	   these	   two	  psychological	   processes.	   In	   my	   final	   experiment,	   I	   employ	   this	   novel	  experimental	  paradigm	  to	  examine	  the	  effect	  of	  exploration	  on	  memory,	  and	  find	  that	  the	  propensity	  to	  explore	  (rather	  than	  the	  act	  of	  exploring	  per	  se)	  leads	  to	  better	  memory	  at	  subsequent	  recall.	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Chapter	  1:	  Introduction	  	  The	   hippocampus	   has	   been	   studied	   for	   many	   decades.	   It	   has	   been	  investigated	   at	   many	   different	   levels,	   and	   perspectives	   regarding	   its	  central	   contribution	   to	   cognition	   have	   evolved	   over	   time.	   Although	  theoretical	   perspectives	   have	   existed	   for	   decades,	   experimentalists	  have	  recently	  turned	  their	  attention	  to	  hypotheses	  that	  explicitly	  focus	  on	   the	   computational	   mechanisms	   that	   are	   supported	   by	   the	  hippocampal	   circuit.	   This	   represents	   an	   exciting	   development	   in	   the	  field,	   given	   that	   experimental	   validation	   of	   these	   computational	  processes	   is	   crucial	   if	   we	   are	   to	   approach	   a	   biophysically	   realistic	  understanding	   of	   how	   networks	   of	   neurons	   in	   the	   hippocampus	   give	  rise	  to	  high-­‐level	  cognitive	  function.	  	  In	   this	   thesis,	   I	   will	   present	   a	   series	   of	   studies	   that	   examine	  hippocampal	   contributions	   to	   context	   representation,	   memory	   and	  anxiety.	   I	   build	   on	   existing	   work	   that	   has	   demonstrated	   an	   up-­‐regulating	   effect	   of	   reward	   on	  memory,	   and	   investigate	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   these	  reward	  effects	  are	  able	   to	  spread	   to	  other	  neutral	   stimuli	  via	  different	  contexts	  (Chapters	  4	  and	  5).	  In	  doing	  so,	  I	  have	  also	  been	  interested	   in	   how	   such	   context-­‐mediated	   effects	   are	   modulated	   by	  certain	  perceptual	  qualities	  of	  the	  contexts	  that	  are	  thought	  to	  influence	  the	  extent	   to	  which	   the	  hippocampus	   is	   important	   for	  disambiguation	  (Chapter	  5).	  I	   was	   also	   interested	   to	   examine	   the	   hippocampus’	   contribution	   to	  anxiety,	   because	   this	   represents	   a	   line	   of	   work	   within	   the	   field	   of	  hippocampus	   research	   that	   has	   not	   yet	   been	   incorporated	   with	   the	  current	  ideas	  about	  hippocampal	  computations	  (e.g.	  pattern	  separation	  and	  pattern	  completion).	  In	  Chapter	  6,	  I	  aimed	  to	  separate	  hippocampal	  contributions	   to	   anxiety	   and	   exploration,	   using	   a	   novel	   experimental	  paradigm	   that	   explicitly	   controls	   for	   hippocampal	   contributions	   to	  certain	  non-­‐emotional	  variables	  that	  have	  been	  poorly	  controlled	  for	  in	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the	   literature	   (most	   notably,	   spatial	   processing).	   Lastly,	   Chapter	   7	  employs	   the	   novel	   experimental	   paradigm	   developed	   in	   Chapter	   6	   to	  examine	  how	  memory	  is	  modulated	  by	  exploration.	  	  The	  work	  in	  this	  thesis	  is	  framed	  around	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  hippocampus	  is	  best	  understood	  for	  its	  representational	  and	  information-­‐processing	  capabilities,	   rather	   than	   as	   a	   module	   for	   particular	   psychological	  domains.	   First,	   I	   provide	   a	   literature	   review	   pertaining	   to	   this	  understanding	  of	  hippocampal	  function	  (Chapter	  2)	  and	  an	  overview	  of	  the	   methodological	   techniques	   used	   in	   the	   experimental	   chapters	  (Chapter	  3).	  This	  is	  followed	  by	  four	  experimental	  chapters	  (Chapters	  4	  -­‐	   7)	   and	   finishes	   with	   a	   general	   discussion	   about	   study	   implications,	  limitations	  and	  ideas	  for	  future	  work	  (Chapter	  8).	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Chapter	  2:	  Literature	  review	  	  
2.1:	  The	  hippocampus	  in	  mental	  
representation	  	  The	  hippocampus	  has	  typically	  been	  associated	  with	  the	  psychological	  domains	   of	   episodic	   memory	   and	   spatial	   navigation.	   In	   the	   course	   of	  attempts	  to	  delineate	  hippocampal	  contributions	  to	  these	  abilities	  with	  greater	   specificity,	   the	   hippocampus	   has	   come	   to	   be	   implicated	   in	  representing	  space	  and	  time	  (Howard	  and	  Eichenbaum,	  2013;	  Howard	  and	   Kahana,	   2002;	   O’Keefe	   and	   Nadel,	   1978),	   novelty	   detection	  (Kumaran	   and	   Maguire,	   2006,	   2007,	   2009)	   and	   constructing	   mental	  representations	  of	   fictitious	  (Hassabis	  et	  al.,	  2007a,	  2007b)	  and	  future	  experiences	   (Addis	   et	   al.,	   2009;	   Schacter	   and	  Addis,	   2009;	   Schacter	   et	  al.,	   2012).	   These	   discrete	   findings	   have	   often	   been	   interpreted	   in	   the	  context	   of	   a	   centrally	   mnemonic	   or	   centrally	   spatial	   role	   for	   the	  hippocampus.	   For	   example,	   novelty	   signals	   in	   the	   hippocampus	   were	  interpreted	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  importance	  in	  switching	  from	  retrieval	  to	  encoding,	   in	   episodic	   memory.	   As	   researchers	   concerned	   with	   space	  have	   come	   into	   prominence	   in	   the	   field,	   it	   has	   subsequently	   been	  suggested	   that	   the	   hippocampus	   is	   important	   to	   episodic	   memory	  
precisely	  because	  such	  memories	  occur	  in	  physical	  space	  (Maguire	  and	  Mullally,	  2013;	  O’Keefe	  and	  Nadel,	  1978).	  	  Other	  findings	  that	  have	  emerged	  over	  the	  years	  are	  harder	  to	  reconcile	  with	   a	   centrally	   mnemonic	   spatial	   understanding	   of	   hippocampal	  function.	   Studies	   have	   found	   evidence	   of	   hippocampal	   involvement	   in	  attentional	  processing	  (Dudukovic	  et	  al.,	  2011;	  Muzzio	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Reas	  and	   Brewer,	   2013),	   reward	   processing	   (Adcock	   et	   al.,	   2006;	  Wimmer	  and	   Shohamy,	   2012;	   Wimmer	   et	   al.,	   2012;	   Wolosin	   et	   al.,	   2013),	  incidental	   sequence	   learning	   (Chun	   and	   Phelps,	   1999;	   Curran,	   1997;	  Durrant	   et	   al.,	   2013;	   Harrison	   et	   al.,	   2006;	   Manns	   and	   Squire,	   2001;	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Schapiro	   et	   al.,	   2012;	   Turk-­‐Browne	   et	   al.,	   2009),	   probabilistic	  reinforcement	   learning	   (Bornstein	   and	   Daw,	   2012;	   Dickerson	   et	   al.,	  2011;	   Foerde	   et	   al.,	   2006),	   and	   transitive	   inference	   (Dusek	   and	  Eichenbaum,	   1997;	   Kumaran	   et	   al.,	   2012).	   The	   wide	   range	   of	  psychological	  functions	  that	  have	  implicated	  the	  hippocampus	  highlight	  the	   insufficiency	   of	   theories	   of	   the	   hippocampus	   that	   are	   solely	  concerned	  with	  particular	  psychological	  domains,	  such	  as	  the	  idea	  that	  the	   hippocampus	   is	   a	   module	   for	   explicit	   (but	   not	   implicit	   or	  procedural)	   memory,	   or	   the	   notion	   that	   the	   hippocampus	   is	   solely	  concerned	  with	  space	  (Maguire	  and	  Mullally,	  2013;	  O’Keefe	  and	  Nadel,	  1978).	   As	   such,	   researchers	   have	   begun	   to	   look	   towards	   theoretical	  perspectives	  that	  emphasize	  the	  nature	  of	  hippocampal	  representations	  and	   the	   information	   processing	   capabilities	   of	   this	   neural	   structure,	  rather	   than	   focusing	  on	   the	  manner	   in	  which	  memory	   is	  expressed	  or	  on	  the	  high-­‐level	  psychological	  abilities	  involved.	  	  	  2.1.1:	  The	  hippocampus	  and	  memory	  as	  a	  discrete	  function	  	  	  	  	  Ever	  since	  the	  patient	  H.M.,	  episodic	  memory	  has	  been	  intrinsically	  tied	  to	  the	  medial	  temporal	  lobe	  (Scoville	  and	  Milner,	  1957a;	  Squire,	  2009).	  Before	  H.M.,	  the	  ability	  to	  retain	  information	  in	  memory	  was	  generally	  thought	   to	   be	   distributed	   throughout	   the	   cortex,	   integrated	   with	  intellectual	   and	   perceptual	   functions	   that	   could	   be	   categorized	   into	  discrete	  domains.	  Within	  this	  context,	  the	  nature	  of	  H.M.’s	  forgetfulness	  –	   extending	   across	   various	   domains	   and	   sensory	   modalities,	  accompanied	  by	  otherwise	  normal	  cognitive	  function	  –	  helped	  establish	  the	  principle	  of	  memory	  as	  a	  distinct	   cognitive	  ability,	   separable	   from	  other	  perceptual	  and	  intellectual	  functions.	  Several	  decades	  of	  work	  has	  since	   further	   clarified	   the	   nature	   of	   hippocampal	   contributions	   to	  memory.	  Episodic	  memories	  are	  thought	  to	  be	  retrieved	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  either	  recollective	  or	  familiarity-­‐based	  processes.	  Recollection	  reflects	  a	  process	  of	  active	  retrieval,	  whereby	  details	  of	  an	  experienced	  event	  are	  accessed.	   Familiarity-­‐based	   retrieval,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   is	   thought	   to	  reflect	  a	  signal	  detection	  process	  wherein	  stimulus	  recency	  is	  assessed.	  While	   the	   dynamics	   between	   these	   mnemonic	   processes	   are	   yet	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debated	   (Wixted,	  2009),	   these	   two	  mnemonic	  processes	   are	   generally	  thought	   to	   be	   separable	   on	   both	   psychological	   (Diana	   et	   al.,	   2006;	  Yonelinas,	   2001)	   and	   neural	   levels	   (Diana	   et	   al.,	   2010;	   Montaldi	   and	  Mayes,	  2010).	  Recollection	   is	   thought	   to	  rely	  on	   the	  hippocampus	  and	  parahippocampal	   cortex,	   whereas	   familiarity	   depends	   on	   cortical	  regions	  outside	  the	  hippocampus,	  and	  is	  thought	  to	  be	  a	  by-­‐product	  of	  repeated	   neural	   processing	   during	   encoding	   rather	   than	   an	   active	  search	   process	   (Brown	   and	   Aggleton,	   2001;	   Eichenbaum	   et	   al.,	   2007;	  Montaldi	  and	  Mayes,	  2010;	  Yonelinas	  et	  al.,	  1998,	  2002).	  	  The	  profound	  importance	  of	  the	  hippocampus	  for	  mnemonic	  functions	  presents	   a	   challenge	   to	   researchers	   who	   have	   begun	   to	   examine	   the	  non-­‐mnemonic	  abilities	  that	  relate	  to	  the	  hippocampus.	   	  On	  a	  practical	  level,	  the	  completion	  of	  experimental	  tasks	  inevitably	  requires	  subjects	  to	  encode	  and	  retain	  information,	  and	  researchers	  are	  thus	  at	  pains	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  their	  (non-­‐mnemonic)	  effects	  are	  not	  a	  mere	   artefact	   of	   differences	   in	   retention.	   Nevertheless	   careful	  experimental	   design	   has	   allowed	   scientists	   to	   document	   the	  hippocampus’	   role	   in	   constructing	   and	   maintaining	   mental	  representations,	   above	   and	   beyond	   the	   demands	   on	  memory	   that	   are	  imposed	  by	  their	  experimental	  tasks.	  	  2.1.2:	  The	  hippocampus	  in	  the	  visual	  processing	  hierarchy	  	   	  One	   intriguing	   idea	   in	   the	   informational’	   perspective	   of	   the	  hippocampus	   is	   that	   the	   hippocampus	   represents	   the	   highest	   level	   in	  the	  hierarchy	  of	   visual	  processing	   regions	   (i.e.	   as	   the	  end-­‐point	  of	   the	  ventral	  visual	  processing	  stream;	  Barense	  et	  al.,	  2010,	  2012;	  Cowell	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Lee	  et	  al.,	  2005a;	  Nadel	  and	  Hardt,	  2011;	  Nadel	  and	  Peterson,	  2013;	  Saksida	  and	  Bussey,	  2010).	  The	  visual	  processing	   stream	  refers	  to	  a	  hierarchy	  of	   interconnected	  areas	   in	  occipitotemporal	   cortex	   that	  transforms	  retinal	   inputs	   into	  coherent	  visual	  experiences.	  As	   the	  raw	  inputs	  move	  through	  successive	  groups	  of	  neurons	  (i.e.	  moving	  up	  the	  hierarchy),	   each	   successive	  area	   takes	   its	   input	   and	  performs	   specific,	  discrete	   component	   computations	   on	   it	   (e.g.	   orientation	   detection).	  Through	   the	   application	   of	   these	   successive	   computations,	   retinal	  
23	  
inputs	   are	   transformed	   into	   low-­‐level	   representations	   (e.g.	   reflecting	  orientation,	  spatial	  frequency),	  features	  (e.g.	  mid-­‐level	  contours,	  motion	  vectors),	  and	   finally	   into	  high-­‐level	  representations	  of	  objects	   that	  can	  be	   semantically	   identified.	   Although	   the	   hippocampus	   is	   not	   typically	  thought	  of	  as	  a	  visual	  area,	  it	  has	  long	  been	  assumed	  to	  lie	  at	  the	  top	  of	  this	   hierarchy,	   described	   in	   Felleman	   and	   Van	   Essen's	   (1991)	   classic	  wiring	   diagram	   that	   describes	   connectivity	   starting	   with	   the	   primary	  sensory	   cortices.	   Memory	   researchers	   had	   previously	   viewed	   the	  hippocampus	  within	   this	   hierarchy	   as	   a	   “convergence	   zone”	   in	  which	  multimodal	   information	  was	  bound	   into	  a	   single	  engram	  (Marr,	  1971;	  McClelland	   et	   al.,	   1995;	   Teyler	   and	   DiScenna,	   1986).	   Viewing	   the	  hippocampus	  as	  part	  of	  the	  visual	  processing	  hierarchy	  subtly	  extends	  this	  view,	  however.	  Within	  this	   framework,	  the	  hippocampus	  uniquely	  enables	  information	  of	  a	  certain	  kind	  to	  be	  represented	  in	  the	  brain.	  An	  important	  implication	  of	  this	  perspective	  is	  that	  cognitive	  functions	  that	  recruit	   this	   level	  of	   information	  are	   likely	   to	  engage	   the	  hippocampus,	  independent	  of	  the	  psychological	  ability	  that	  is	  being	  exercised	  (Fuster,	  2008;	  Nadel	  and	  Peterson,	  2013;	  Saksida	  and	  Bussey,	  2010).	  Framed	   in	   this	  manner,	   it	   becomes	   imperative	   to	   ask	  questions	   about	  the	  unique	  contribution	  that	  the	  hippocampus	  makes	  to	  the	  formation	  of	   a	   coherent	  percept.	  What	  qualities	  of	  perception	  are	  present	   in	   the	  hippocampus	   but	   absent	   in	   up-­‐stream	   neurons,	   and	   what	   perceptual	  features	  are	  omitted	   from	  processing	  given	  hippocampal	  damage?	  We	  know	  from	  previous	  work	  that	  several	  forms	  of	  fairly	  high-­‐level	  visual	  processing	   do	   not	   depend	   on	   the	   hippocampus:	   for	   example,	   the	  processing	   of	   objects	   appears	   to	   depend	   on	   the	   perirhinal	   cortex	  (Barense	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Burke	  et	  al.,	  2012),	  and	  even	  the	  representation	  of	  scenes	   appears	   to	   be	   supported	   upstream	   of	   the	   hippocampus,	   in	  parahippocampal	   regions	   (Epstein	   and	   Kanwisher,	   1998).	   A	   long-­‐standing	  and	  influential	  idea	  is	  that	  the	  hippocampus	  uniquely	  indexes	  such	   extra-­‐hippocampal	   representations,	   which	   effectively	   links	   these	  extra-­‐hippocampal	   representations	   at	   the	   level	   of	   the	   hippocampal	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ensemble	  and	  allows	   individual	  components	   to	  serve	  as	  retrieval	  cues	  for	   each	   other	   later	   on	   (Nadel	   and	   Moscovitch,	   1997;	   Teyler	   and	  DiScenna,	   1986;	   Teyler	   and	   Rudy,	   2007).	   Other	   researchers	   have	  extended	   this	   function	   beyond	   mere	   indexing,	   and	   argued	   that	   the	  hippocampus	  explicitly	  frames	  the	  conjunctive	  and	  spatial	  relationships	  between	   the	   various	   elements	   of	   an	   experience	   (Cohen	   and	  Eichenbaum,	   1993;	   Maguire	   and	   Mullally,	   2013;	   Nadel	   and	   Peterson,	  2013).	  	  2.1.3:	  Spatial	  representation	  	  One	   relatively	   limited	   version	   of	   this	   representational	   view	   of	   the	  hippocampus	   is	   that	   the	   hippocampus	   is	   centrally	   involved	   with	  constructing	   spatially	   coherent	   scenes.	   Evidence	   for	   this	   view	   comes	  from	   data	   that	   suggests	   that	   patients	   with	   selective	   bilateral	  hippocampal	   damage	   cannot	   construct	   spatially	   coherent	   scenes	  (Hassabis	   and	   Maguire,	   2009;	   Hassabis	   et	   al.,	   2007b;	   Mullally	   et	   al.,	  2012).	   Such	   a	   deficit	   per	   se	   need	   not	   be	   interpreted	   within	   such	   a	  strictly	   ‘spatial’	   perspective:	   impairments	   in	   the	   (hippocampally-­‐mediated)	  ability	   to	  retrieve	  memories	  and	  recombine	  them	  to	   form	  a	  fictitious	   representation	   of	   the	   cued	   scene	   could	   also	   produce	   this	  pattern	   of	   behaviour	   (known	   as	   the	   constructive	   episodic	   simulation	  hypothesis;	   see	  Schacter	  et	  al.,	  2012	   for	  review).	  Alternatively,	  deficits	  in	  the	  ability	  to	  bind	  individual	  components	  within	  the	  mental	  percept	  (also	   thought	   to	   be	   hippocampally	  mediated;	   Cohen	   and	   Eichenbaum,	  1993;	   Eichenbaum	  and	  Cohen,	   2001;	  Konkel,	   2009;	  Ranganath,	   2010)	  could	  also	  produce	  such	  an	  effect.	  These	  existing	  explanations	  are	   less	  able	  to	  account	  for	  more	  unambiguously	  perceptual	  findings,	  however,	  such	  as	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  boundary	  extension	  effect	  in	  hippocampally-­‐damaged	  patients.	  The	  boundary	  extension	  effect	  relies	  on	  an	  ability	  to	  construct	  extended	  scene	  representations,	  but	  does	  not	  require	  subjects	  to	   recollect	   or	   recombine	   new	   information.	   In	   boundary	   extension	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tasks,	  healthy	  subjects	  are	  presented	  consecutively	  with	  the	  exact	  same	  scene,	  and	  consistently	  judge	  the	  second	  scene	  to	  be	  closer	  up	  than	  the	  first	   scene,	   even	   though	   the	   two	   scenes	   are	   identical.	  The	   effect	   is	  thought	  to	  depend	  on	  subjects	  automatically	  building	  an	  internal	  scene	  representation	  that	  is	  more	  spatially	  extended	  than	  the	  provided	  cue,	  so	  that	   comparison	   of	   the	   same	   stimuli	   with	   the	   extended	   mental	  representation	   (at	   the	   second	   presentation)	   results	   in	   an	   erroneous	  judgement.	   Mullally	   et	   al.	   (2012)	   demonstrated	   that	   patients	   with	  selective	  bilateral	  hippocampal	  damage	  and	  amnesia	  did	  not	  show	  this	  effect	  (i.e.	  they	  were	  more	  accurate	  than	  healthy	  controls	  in	  judging	  the	  presented	  scenes	  to	  be	  the	  same),	  and	  were	  further	  unable	  to	  construct	  and	  visualize	  extended	  scenes	  when	  probed	  with	  a	  more	  limited	  scene	  cue	   (despite	   being	   able	   to	   generate	   semantically	   consistent	  components).	  	  	  2.1.4:	  Beyond	  the	  spatial	  domain	  	  While	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  hippocampus	  in	  representing	  space	  is	  not	  disputed,	   it	   seems	   likely	   that	   the	   hippocampus’	   contribution	   to	  cognition	   extends	   beyond	   the	   spatial	   domain,	   given	   that	   researchers	  have	   demonstrated	   that	   hippocampal	   firing	   is	   influenced	   by	  fundamentally	   non-­‐spatial	   considerations,	   such	   as	   motivational	   state	  (Kennedy	   and	   Shapiro,	   2009),	   learned	   expectations	   (Skaggs	   and	  McNaughton,	  1998)	  and	  task	  strategy	  (Eschenko	  and	  Mizumori,	  2007).	  As	   such,	   other	   researchers	   have	   focused	   on	   more	   domain-­‐general	  characteristics	   (and	   their	   associated	   processing	   steps)	   as	   key	   to	   the	  hippocampus’	  contribution	  to	  visual	  representation.	  Although	  many	  of	  these	  researchers	  have	  used	  scene	  stimuli	  as	  well,	  the	  emphasis	  in	  these	  studies	   is	  on	   the	  perceptual	  qualities	  of	   the	  stimuli	   themselves,	   rather	  than	   the	  modality	  of	   the	   stimuli	  per	   se.	  These	   researchers	  have	   found	  that	   selective	  hippocampal	  damage	   can	   result	   in	   impairments	   in	  high-­‐level	   scene	  perception	   (Barense	   et	   al.,	   2010;	   Lee	   et	   al.,	   2005a,	   2005b;	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Warren	   et	   al.,	   2012).	   These	   studies	   required	   hippocampal-­‐damaged	  patients	   to	   disambiguate	   highly	   similar	   pictures	   of	   scenes	   that	   are	  distinguished	   from	   each	   other	   solely	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   spatial	   relations	  among	  the	  component	  parts	  (e.g.	  Figure	  2-­‐1A,	  right,	  adapted	  from	  Aly	  et	  al.,	  2013;	  note	  that	  other	  studies	  have	  just	  used	  scene	  pictures	  in	  which	  the	   locations	   of	   discrete	   cues	   had	   been	   changed,	   without	   adding	   or	  removing	  individual	  items	  to	  the	  scene).	  Because	  the	  same	  features	  are	  included	   within	   the	   two	   scene	   pictures,	   disambiguation	   requires	  subjects	   to	   encode	   the	   conjunctive	   spatial	   relationships	   between	   the	  different	   components.	   Importantly,	   these	   similar	   stimuli	   were	   often	  presented	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   any	   temporal	   delay,	   which	   enabled	  researchers	   to	   exclude	   the	   possibility	   that	   any	   resulting	   deficits	   may	  have	   emerged	   due	   to	   poor	   retention	   of	   the	   scenes	   themselves.	   In	  addition	   to	   data	   from	   hippocampal-­‐damaged	   patients,	   successful	  performance	  in	  these	  scene	  discrimination	  tasks	  by	  healthy	  controls	  is	  additionally	   associated	   with	   greater	   hippocampal	   activation,	   which	  further	   supports	   the	   idea	   that	   the	   hippocampal	   computations	   are	  necessary	   for	   their	   disambiguation	   (Barense	   et	   al.,	   2010;	   Lee	   and	  Rudebeck,	   2010;	   Lee	   et	   al.,	   2005b,	   2008,	   2012,	   2013;	   Mundy	   et	   al.,	  2013).	   These	   findings	   have	   led	   researchers	   to	   propose	   that	   the	  hippocampus	   is	   important	   for	   the	   representation	   of	   complex	  conjunctive	  (Graham	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Lee	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  Saksida	  and	  Bussey,	  2010)	  or	  relational	  (Cohen	  and	  Eichenbaum,	  1993)	  information,	  in	  the	  service	  of	  both	  memory	  and	  visual	  perception.	  Within	  this	  view,	  scene	  construction	   could	   depend	   on	   the	   hippocampus	   because	   such	   stimuli	  often	  involve	  complex	  conjunctions	  of	  multiple	  elements.	  While	   intriguing,	   the	   evidence	   for	   such	   a	   hippocampal	   role	   in	  perception	   has	   been	   decidedly	   mixed	   (Shohamy	   and	   Turk-­‐Browne,	  2013;	  Suzuki,	  2009).	  Attempts	  to	  replicate	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  studies	  either	  directly	  or	  using	  different	  paradigms	  that	  more	  explicitly	  control	  for	  memory	  have	   failed	   to	   find	  reliable	  perceptual	   impairments	   in	   the	  face	   of	   hippocampal	   damage	   (Hartley	   et	   al.,	   2007;	   Kim	   et	   al.,	   2011;	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Knutson	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  Shrager	  et	  al.,	  2006).	  The	  exact	  reasons	  for	  these	  discrepancies	  in	  the	  literature	  is	  both	  unclear	  and	  hard	  to	  revisit	  given	  the	  diversity	  of	  potential	  factors	  (e.g.	  differences	  in	  the	  extent	  of	  tissue	  damage,	  experimental	  task	  and	  the	  perceptual	  characteristics	  of	  stimuli;	  	  Baxter,	   2009;	   Jeneson	   and	   Squire,	   2012;	   Kim	   et	   al.,	   2011;	   Lee	   et	   al.,	  2012),	   but	   it	   has	   been	   suggested	   that	   a	   failure	   to	   show	   hippocampal	  involvement	  may	  occur	  if	  subjects	  are	  able	  to	  rely	  on	  individual	  features	  to	   disambiguate	   the	   similar	   scenes,	   thus	   bypassing	   the	   relational	   or	  complex	   conjunctive	   processing	   demands	   that	   are	   critical	   for	  hippocampal	   involvement	   (Baxter,	   2009;	   Lee	   et	   al.,	   2012;	   Yonelinas,	  2013).	   Experimental	   support	   for	   this	   explanation	   comes	   from	  a	   study	  by	   Aly	   et	   al.	   (2013),	   which	   used	   signal-­‐detection-­‐based	   analysis	   to	  differentiate	  between	  disambiguation	  that	  is	  based	  on	  the	  strength	  with	  which	   the	   overall	   perceptual	   ensembles	   match	   (termed	   ‘strength	  based’),	   compared	   to	  disambiguation	   that	  relies	  on	   feature	  search	  (i.e.	  scanning	   a	   scene	   for	   the	   presence	   of	   a	   particular	   disambiguating	  feature;	   termed	   ‘state	   based’).	   State-­‐based	   and	   strength-­‐based	  components	   of	   discrimination	   can	   be	   separated	   by	   having	   subjects	  parametrically	   rate	   their	   confidence	   in	   the	   similarity	   of	   stimuli	   pairs	  (Figure	  2-­‐1A),	  and	  fitting	  a	  curve	  to	  points	  that	  map	  the	  probability	  of	  true	   hits	   (i.e.	   where	   two	   different	   stimuli	   are	   correctly	   judged	   to	   be	  different)	   to	   the	   probability	   of	   false	   alarms	   (i.e.	   where	   two	   identical	  stimuli	  are	  incorrectly	  judged	  to	  be	  different),	  given	  a	  range	  of	  different	  thresholds	  (e.g.	  1-­‐6,	  as	  shown	   in	  Figure	  2-­‐1A).	  Figure	  2-­‐1B	  shows	  this	  analytical	   process:	   yellow	   crosses	   indicate	   a	   hypothetical	   subject’s	   hit	  and	   false	   alarm	   rates	   for	   a	   range	   of	   thresholds	   (i.e.	   1-­‐6),	  whereas	   the	  yellow	  line	  indicate	  the	  best-­‐fit	  curve.	  The	  grey	  reference	  line	  indicates	  pure	  chance	  performance,	  where	   the	  hit	   rate	   is	  equivalent	   to	   the	   false	  alarm	   rate,	   and	   performance	   is	   thus	   a	   pure	   function	   of	   the	   subject’s	  internal	   response	   criteria	   (i.e.	   their	   general	   propensity	   to	   rate	   the	  stimuli	  as	  the	  same)	  rather	  than	  his	  or	  her	  evaluation	  of	  the	  stimuli	  at	  hand.	   The	   green	   curve	   indicates	   a	   pattern	   of	   performance	   where	  strength-­‐based	   discrimination	   is	   poorer	   than	   in	   the	   yellow	   curve	   (i.e.	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the	   apex	   of	   the	   curve	   closer	   to	   the	   grey	   line,	   resulting	   in	   a	   shallower	  curve),	   but	   state-­‐based	   discrimination	   is	   left	   unchanged	   (Figure	   2-­‐1B,	  right).	  In	  contrast,	  the	  purple	  curve	  indicates	  performance	  where	  state-­‐based	  discrimination	  is	  greatly	  improved,	  compared	  to	  the	  performance	  depicted	  in	  the	  yellow	  curve.	  The	  state-­‐based	  component	  is	  indicated	  by	  the	   y-­‐intercept	   of	   the	   curve,	   and	   does	   not	   change	   as	   subjects	   adjust	  their	  internal	  response	  criterion	  for	  what	  level	  of	  similarity	  constitutes	  a	  match	  (i.e.	  a	  subject	  who	  manages	  to	  spot	  the	  disambiguating	  feature	  is	   immediately	  and	  absolutely	   sure	  of	   their	   judgement,	   and	  would	  not	  be	  less	  likely	  to	  return	  a	  correct	  response	  if	  he	  or	  she	  were	  to	  adopt	  a	  stricter	   threshold	   for	   considering	   the	   stimuli	   to	   be	   a	  match).	   Aly	   and	  colleagues	   reasoned	   that	   state-­‐based	   discrimination	   relies	   on	  perceptual	   search	   rather	   than	   the	   subject’s	   ability	   to	   represent	   the	  perceptual	   ensemble	   as	   a	   whole,	   and	   should	   thus	   not	   require	   the	  hippocampus.	   In	   contrast,	   disambiguation	   that	   cannot	   be	   executed	   in	  this	  way	  should	  require	  subjects	  to	  represent	  and	  compare	  the	  overall	  conjunctive	   ensemble,	   and	   should	   thus	   be	   sensitive	   to	   hippocampal	  damage	  (if	   this	  ability	   is	  hippocampal-­‐dependent).	   Indeed	  this	   is	  what	  the	   authors	   found:	   hippocampal-­‐damaged	   patients	   were	   impaired	   in	  strength-­‐based	   disambiguation	   alone,	   as	   characterized	   by	   the	   relative	  flatness	  of	  their	  fitted	  curve	  and	  a	  reduction	  in	  the	  strength-­‐based	  (but	  not	  the	  state-­‐based)	  parameter	  estimate,	  relative	  to	  controls	  (Figure	  2-­‐1C).	   In	   addition	   to	   clarifying	   the	   behavioural	   ability	   that	   the	  hippocampus	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  responsible	  for	  in	  perception	  (i.e.	  strength-­‐based	   perceptual	   comparison),	   these	   results	   provide	   an	   important	  explanation	   for	   the	   conflicting	   results	   in	   the	   literature.	   Firstly,	   they	  indicate	   that	   experiments	   in	   which	   subjects	   are	   able	   to	   bypass	  representing	   the	   conjunctive	   ensemble	   (i.e.	   by	   engaging	   in	   feature	  search)	   may	   be	   unsuitable	   for	   tapping	   into	   hippocampal-­‐dependent	  processes	   in	   perception.	   Secondly,	   the	   authors	   point	   out	   that	   if	   even	  subjects	   are	   relying	   on	   (hippocampal-­‐dependent)	   ‘strength-­‐based’	  disambiguation	  (i.e.	   they	  have	   to	  represent	   the	  conjunctive	  perceptual	  ensemble),	  false	  negatives	  may	  arise	  in	  experiments	  where	  researchers	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collect	   only	   binary	   responses	   (i.e.	   omitting	   confidence	   ratings,	   as	  was	  often	   the	   case	   in	   previous	   paradigms).	   If	   subjects	   internally	   opt	   for	  extremely	  lax	  response	  criteria	  (i.e.	  a	  low	  threshold	  for	  considering	  two	  stimuli	  to	  be	  the	  same,	  thus	  leading	  to	  a	  greater	  number	  of	  hits	  but	  also	  a	   greater	  number	  of	   false	   alarms)	  or	   extremely	   strict	   ones	   (i.e.	   a	   high	  threshold	   for	  considering	  two	  stimuli	   to	  be	  the	  same,	   leading	  to	   fewer	  hits	  but	  also	   fewer	   false	  alarms),	  researchers	  may	  subsequently	   fail	   to	  detect	  a	  difference	  in	  performance	  even	  if	  one	  exists	  (indicated	  by	  light	  
Figure	   2-­‐1:	   Signal	   detection	   analysis	   of	   perceptual	   scene	   comparison.	  	  Perceptual	  discrimination	  can	  be	  based	  on	  two	  kinds	  of	  information	  (A;	  adapted	  from	  Aly,	  Ranganath	  and	  Yonelinas,	  2013):	  states	  of	  perceiving	  local	  differences	  (left	   pair,	   in	   which	   a	   single	   discrete	   feature	   can	   be	   used	   to	   discriminate	  disambiguate	  the	  scenes,	  marked	  by	  red	  arrows),	  or	   the	  global	  strength	  of	   the	  relational	  match	  (right	  pair,	   in	  which	  discrete	   feature-­‐based	  disambiguation	  is	  not	  possible,	   and	  subjects	  must	   then	  compare	  the	  extent	   to	  which	  two	  overall	  ensembles	   match	   in	   the	   two	   pictures).	   ‘State’	   versus	   ‘strength’	   based	  components	  of	  discrimination	  can	  be	  separated	  using	  signal	  detection	  analysis	  of	  discrimination	  performance	  (B;	  see	  main	  text	  for	  detail;	  blue	  arrows	  indicate	  internal	  detection	   thresholds	   that	  would	   fail	   to	  detect	  differences	   in	   strength-­‐based	  perception	  between	  the	  green	  and	  yellow	  curves,	  even	  where	  one	  exists).	  Damage	   to	   the	   hippocampus	   was	   found	   to	   selectively	   impair	   strength-­‐based	  discrimination	   relative	   to	   healthy	   controls,	   while	   leaving	   state-­‐based	  discrimination	  intact	  (C,	  adapted	  from	  Aly	  et	  al.,	  2013).	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and	  dark	  blue	  arrows	  respectively	   in	  Figure	  2-­‐1B).	  This	   insight,	  which	  earlier	  work	  on	   the	   topic	  had	   failed	   to	  consider,	  may	   in	   fact	  be	  key	   to	  resolving	  the	  inconsistency	  of	  findings	  in	  the	  experimental	  literature.	  	  There	  remains	  work	  to	  be	  done	  in	  characterizing	  the	  perceptual	  deficits	  that	   result	   from	   selective	   hippocampal	   damage.	   However,	   it	   seems	  likely	   that	   the	   hippocampus	   does	   play	   some	   part	   in	   supporting	  representations	  of	  conjunctive	  ensembles,	  although	  behavioural	  deficits	  may	   be	   masked	   by	   the	   use	   of	   other	   compensatory	   strategies	   for	  disambiguation	   (e.g.	   systematic	   feature	   search).	   The	   ideas	   and	  experimental	   evidence	   surrounding	   this	   issue	   have	   progressed	   in	  tandem,	   as	   researchers	   have	   emphasized	   different	   perceptual	  characteristics	   that	   might	   be	   key	   to	   hippocampal	   dependence	   (or	  different	   experimental	   variables	   that	   require	   consideration),	   and	  experimentalists	   have	   then	   sought	   to	   control	   for	   these	   factors	   in	  subsequent	   research.	  Recent	  developments	   in	  our	   thinking	  about	  how	  representations	   are	   processed	   by	   the	   hippocampal	   circuit	   itself	   have	  also	  fruitfully	  thrown	  a	  spotlight	  on	  its	  key	  contributions	  to	  perceptual	  representation,	   by	   presenting	   convergent	   evidence	   regarding	   how	  hippocampal	   computations	   might	   support	   this	   role	   in	   perceptual	  disambiguation.	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2.2:	  Hippocampal	  circuitry	  and	  computation	  	  The	  controversy	  in	  the	  literature	  regarding	  hippocampal	  contributions	  to	   perception	   have	   led	   to	   greater	   scrutiny	   of	   the	   perceptual	  characteristics	   that	   might	   lead	   to	   hippocampal	   dependence.	   Over	   the	  years,	   convergent	   thinking	   regarding	   (a)	   the	   circuit	   properties	   of	   the	  hippocampus,	   and	   (b)	   the	   types	   of	   functions	   that	   a	   memory	   system	  might	  need	  have	  led	  to	  the	  development	  of	  some	  intriguing	  ideas	  about	  how	  hippocampal	   function	  might	   contribute	   to	   cognitive	   function	   and	  mental	  representation.	  	  	  2.2.1:	  Feed-­‐forward	  circuitry	  of	  the	  hippocampus	  	  	  Researchers	   in	   this	   area	   have	   taken	   their	   inspiration	   from	   the	  anatomical	  characteristics	  of	  the	  hippocampal	  circuit.	  The	  hippocampus	  itself	  consists	  of	  three	  major	  groups	  of	  excitatory	  cells:	  granule	  cells	  in	  the	   dentate	   gyrus	   (DG),	   pyramidal	   neurons	   in	   CA3,	   and	   pyramidal	  neurons	  in	  CA1	  (Figure	  2-­‐2).	  Information	  from	  many	  different	  sensory	  modalities	  enters	  the	  hippocampus	  from	  the	  entorhinal	  cortex	  into	  the	  DG,	  via	  the	  perforant	  path.	  This	  information	  is	  then	  passed	  from	  the	  DG	  to	   CA3	   via	   the	   mossy	   fibres,	   and	   then	   on	   from	   CA3	   to	   CA1	   via	   the	  schaffer	   collaterals	   (Amaral	   and	  Witter,	   1989;	  Witter,	   1993).	  This	   last	  projection	   from	   CA1	   synapses	   onto	   neurons	   in	   the	   subiculum,	   and	  information	   is	   carried	   out	   to	   the	   entorhinal	   cortex	   and	   subcortical	  structures	   through	   the	   fornix.	   Collectively,	   the	   circuit	   comprising	   the	  DG,	  CA3	  and	  CA1	  sub-­‐regions	  are	  known	  as	  the	  trisynaptic	   loop	  of	  the	  hippocampus,	  and	  is	  generally	  reported	  to	  be	  feed-­‐forward	  (Ishizuka	  et	  al.,	  1990;	  Witter,	  1993).	  Aside	  from	  these	  major	  cell	  groups,	  anatomical	  regions	  of	  CA2	  (consisting	  of	  neurons	  receiving	  both	  schaffer	  collateral	  and	  mossy	   fibre	   input)	  and	  CA4	   (consisting	  of	   cells	   in	   the	  hilus	  of	   the	  dentate	  gyrus)	  have	  also	  been	  identified,	  but	  they	  receive	  less	  attention	  in	  the	  literature	  due	  to	  their	  relatively	  small	  size.	  The	  CA1	  subfield	  also	  
32	  
	  
receives	  projections	  directly	   from	  the	  entorhinal	  cortex,	  which	  has	   led	  some	  researchers	  to	  propose	  that	  it	  may	  serve	  to	  compare	  signals	  from	  the	  entorhinal	  cortex	  with	  output	  from	  the	  CA3	  (Gray,	  1987;	  Hasselmo	  and	   Schnell,	   1994;	   Hasselmo	   and	   Wyble,	   1997).	   Aside	   from	   direct	  inputs	   from	   the	   entorhinal	   cortex,	   the	   hippocampus	   also	   receives	  dopaminergic,	   cholinergic,	   glutamatergic	   and	   GABAergic	   innervation	  from	   subcortical	   structures	   such	   as	   the	   midbrain	   dopamine	   neurons	  and	  the	  medial	  septum.	  	  
	  
	  2.2.2:	  Pattern	  separation	  and	  completion	  	  Unlike	  most	  cells	  in	  the	  brain,	  the	  pyramidal	  cells	  in	  the	  CA3	  subregion	  are	  predominantly	  connected	  to	  themselves,	  receiving	  less	  than	  a	  third	  of	  their	  inputs	  from	  other	  cell	  populations	  (Amaral	  et	  al.,	  1990).	  Such	  a	  highly	  convergent	  system	  is	  contrasted	  with	  the	  parallel	  point-­‐to-­‐point	  projections	  between	  layer	  III	  of	  entorhinal	  cortex,	  CA1,	  and	  subiculum	  
Figure	  2-­‐2:	  Hippocampal	  circuit.	  Information	  enters	  the	  hippocampus	  from	  the	  entorhinal	  cortex	  to	   the	  DG,	  and	   is	   thought	  to	  flow	  unilaterally	  through	  the	  CA3	  and	  CA1	   before	   arriving	   in	   the	   subiculum,	  where	   it	   returns	   to	   the	   cortex	   (top).	  	  Typical	  locations	  of	  the	  different	  hippocampal	  subfields	  are	  shown	  on	  a	  coronal	  slice	   through	   the	   anterior	   hippocampus	   in	   a	   single	   subject	   on	   a	   T2*-­‐weighted	  anatomical	   image	   acquired	   on	   a	   7T	   MRI	   scanner	   (bottom).	   Anatomical	   figure	  courtesy	  of	  David	  Berron,	  University	  of	  Magdeburg.	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(Witter	  et	  al.,	  2000),	  and	  has	  led	  several	  researchers	  to	  suggest	  that	  CA3	  may	   act	   as	   an	   auto-­‐associative	   network	   that	   allows	   degraded	   or	  incomplete	   representations	   to	   induce	   instantiation	   of	   the	   entire	  previously-­‐stored	  representation	  (Marr,	  1971;	  McNaughton	  and	  Morris,	  1987;	  Treves	  and	  Rolls,	  1992;	  see	  Rolls,	  2013	   for	  recent	  review).	  This	  process,	  termed	  pattern	  completion,	  allows	  for	  accurate	  generalization	  in	  the	  face	  of	  noisy	  or	  partial	  sensory	  input	  (Kesner	  and	  Hopkins,	  2006;	  Leutgeb	   and	   Leutgeb,	   2007;	   Marr,	   1971;	   Norman	   and	   O’Reilly,	   2003;	  O’Reilly	  and	  McClelland,	  1994),	  and	  is	  necessary	  for	  successful	  retrieval	  of	  stored	  memories	  (i.e.	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  partial	  cues).	  	  Pattern	   completion	   is	   balanced	   against	   pattern	   separation,	   a	  computational	   process	   that	   renders	   partially	   overlapping	   neuronal	  patterns	   more	   dissimilar.	   The	   DG	   is	   thought	   to	   perform	   pattern	  separation	   on	   entorhinal	   inputs,	   resulting	   in	   orthogonalized	  representations	   (i.e.	   which	  minimally	   overlap)	   that	   are	  maintained	   at	  the	   level	   of	   the	   CA3.	   This	   idea	   is	   inspired	   by	   the	   sparsity	   of	   DG	  activation	  patterns:	  DG	  cells	   fire	   infrequently,	  being	  mostly	  dominated	  by	  inhibition	  (Myers	  and	  Scharfman,	  2009,	  2011),	  which	  allows	  objects	  that	   share	   features	   (and	   whose	   representations	   would	   typically	  overlap)	  to	  be	  represented	  by	  non-­‐overlapping	  granule	  cell	  populations	  (Treves	  and	  Rolls,	  1992).	  This	  sparse	  DG	  code	  is	  subsequently	  imposed	  on	  CA3	  pyramidal	  neurons	  via	  the	  strong	  mossy	  fibre	  connections.	  The	  pattern	   separation	   abilities	   of	   the	   hippocampus	   are	   thought	   to	   be	  important	   at	  memory	  encoding,	   in	   allowing	   the	  hippocampus	   to	   store	  new	  memories	   in	  manner	   that	   leads	   to	  minimal	   overlap	  with	   existing	  ones.	   This	   allows	   the	   brain	   to	   store	   a	   large	   number	   of	   memories	  efficiently;	  were	  such	  orthogonalization	  to	  be	  omitted,	  new	  information	  would	   effectively	   overwrite	   previously	   stored	   information	   that	   was	  similar,	   leading	   to	   catastrophic	   interference	   in	   which	   different	  memories	   that	  share	  perceptual	   features	  cannot	  be	  uniquely	  retrieved	  independently	   of	   each	   other	   (i.e.	  when	   cued	  with	   the	   shared	   feature)	  (Nicoll	  and	  Schmitz,	  2005;	  Rolls,	  2010).	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2.2.3:	  Evidence	  for	  pattern	  separation	  and	  completion	  	  Evidence	  from	  the	  rodent	  literature	  has	  largely	  been	  consistent	  with	  the	  notion	   that	   pattern	   separation	   and	   completion	   are	   respectively	  implemented	   by	   the	   DG	   to	   CA3	   projections	   and	   the	   CA3	   recurrent	  collaterals.	  Some	  of	  this	  evidence	  relies	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  pattern	  separation	   is	   important	   during	   encoding,	   while	   successful	   retrieval	  relies	   on	   pattern	   completion.	   Inactivation	   of	   mossy	   fibres	   interferes	  with	   new	   learning	  while	   leaving	   recall	   intact	  (Lee	   and	   Kesner,	   2004),	  whereas	   lesioning	   the	   perforant	   path	   input	   directly	   to	   CA3	   impairs	  retrieval	   but	   spares	   encoding	  (Lassalle	   et	   al.,	   2000).	   	   Researchers	  working	   with	   humans	   have	   only	   recently	   turned	   their	   attention	  towards	   delineating	   the	   distinct	   contributions	   of	   the	   different	  hippocampal	   subfields,	   motivated	   in	   part	   by	   the	   relatively	   recent	  advances	  in	  high-­‐resolution	  functional	  imaging	  and	  the	  development	  of	  acquisition	   and	   analysis	   protocols	   that	   would	   allow	   for	   such	   fine	  localization	   (Bakker	   et	   al.,	   2008;	   Bonnici	   et	   al.,	   2012;	   Doeller	   et	   al.,	  2008,	   2010;	   Ekstrom	   et	   al.,	   2009;	  Weiskopf	   et	   al.,	   2006;	  Wisse	   et	   al.,	  2012;	  for	  review,	  see	  Deuker	  et	  al.,	  2014;	  Yassa	  and	  Stark,	  2009;	  though	  note	   that	  many	   studies	   do	   not	   separate	   DG	   and	   CA3,	   and	   also	   ignore	  CA2	  and	  CA4).	   	  While	   some	  studies	  have	   found	  evidence	   for	  a	  greater	  CA3	  role	  in	  encoding	  than	  retrieval	  (Suthana	  et	  al.,	  2011;	  Zeineh,	  2003;	  for	  review,	  see	  Carr	  et	  al.,	  2010),	  or	  subsequent	  memory	  effects	  that	  are	  specific	   to	   CA2/3/DG	   (Carr	   et	   al.,	   2013;	   Eldridge,	   2005;	   Olsen	   et	   al.,	  2009),	  other	  studies	  have	  noted	  encoding	  effects	  that	  are	  not	  restricted	  to	  CA3	  (Chen	  et	  al.,	  2011;	  Duncan	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  More	   direct	   evidence	   for	   pattern	   separation	   and	   completion	   (i.e.	   as	  computational	   processes)	   has	   come	   from	   research	   that	   explicitly	  examines	   how	   hippocampal	   subfield	   representations	   change	   in	  response	   to	   changes	   in	   the	   sensory	   environment.	   The	   competition	  between	   pattern	   separation	   and	   pattern	   completion	   processes	   is	  thought	   to	   result	   in	   a	   sigmoidal	   transfer	   function	   in	   CA3	   (Figure	   2-­‐3;	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Guzowski	   et	   al.,	   2004;	   McClelland	   and	   Goddard,	   1996),	   wherein	   (a)	  small	  changes	  in	  input	  to	  the	  hippocampus	  (via	  DG)	  result	  in	  a	  reduced	  change	  in	  the	  signal	  observed	  in	  CA3	  (i.e.	  pattern	  completion	  processes	  maintaining	  the	  overall	  representation	  in	  the	  face	  of	  partial	  degradation	  or	   noise;	   left	   half	   of	   graph	   in	   Figure	   2-­‐3),	   and	   (b)	   input	   changes	   that	  pass	   a	   certain	   threshold	   of	   dissimilarity	   result	   in	   a	   CA3	   signal	   that	  exaggerates	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  patterns	  (i.e.	  minimization	  of	  representational	   overlap	   via	   pattern	   separation;	   right	   half	   of	   graph	   in	  Figure	   2-­‐3).	   In	   support	   of	   a	   pattern	   completion	   function,	   Lee	   et	   al.	  (2004)	   varied	   the	   mismatch	   between	   proximal	   and	   distal	   cues	   in	   a	  circular	   track	   after	   rats	   had	   been	   extensively	   familiarized	   with	   the	  original	  positions	  of	  the	  ensemble,	  and	  found	  that,	  when	  the	  magnitude	  of	   the	   mismatch	   was	   small	   (≤	   45°	   rotation),	   the	   CA3	   ensemble	  maintained	   signals	   that	   were	   similar	   to	   the	   original.	   Similarly	  Vazdarjanova	   et	   al,	   (2004)	   found	   a	   high	   degree	   of	   overlap	   in	   CA3	  representations	  of	  an	  environment	   that	  was	  either	   in	   its	  original	  state	  compared	   to	   having	   a	   small	   number	   of	   changes	   in	   the	   identity	   or	  configuration	  of	  cues.	  This	   latter	  study	  also	  observed	  a	  greater	  degree	  of	   CA3	  overlap	   (compared	   to	  CA1)	   in	   response	   to	   such	   small	   changes	  (indicative	   of	   pattern	   completion),	   alongside	   a	   smaller	   degree	   of	   CA3	  overlap	   compared	   to	   CA1	  when	   rats	  were	   exposed	   to	   two	   completely	  different	  environments	  (indicative	  of	  pattern	  separation;	  also	  observed	  by	  Leutgeb,	  2004).	  Researchers	   working	   with	   humans	   have	   faced	   a	   greater	   challenge	   in	  demonstrating	   the	   canonical	   sigmoid	   transfer	   function	   depicted	   in	  Figure	   2-­‐3,	   due	   to	   (a)	   relatively	   poor	   access	   to	   ensemble	   patterns	   in	  CA3	   and	   CA1	   (given	   the	   spatial	   resolution	   and	   other	   limitations	   of	  fMRI),	   and	   (b)	   the	   cognitive	   flexibility	   of	   human	   subjects,	   which	   can	  make	   it	   difficult	   to	   linearly	   manipulate	   sensory	   inputs.	   As	   such,	  researchers	   have	   employed	   indirect	   means	   to	   look	   for	   evidence	   of	  pattern	   separation	   and	   completion	   in	   the	   brain.	   Evidence	   of	   pattern	  completion	   has	   come	   from	   researchers	   studying	   implicit	   statistical	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learning:	  an	  MVPA	  study	  by	  Schapiro	  et	  al.	  (2012)	  presented	  fractals	  in	  random	  versus	  weak	  or	  	  	  
	  
	  strong	   paired	   orders	   (i.e.	   where	   one	   fractal	   either	   occasionally	   or	  always	   followed	   a	   particular	   other,	   in	   weak	   and	   strong	   pairs	  respectively),	   and	   examined	   how	   the	   similarity	   of	   subfield	  representations	  varied	  as	  a	  function	  of	  temporal	  proximity	  between	  the	  fractal	   pairs	   (comparing	   initial	   and	   late	   stages	   of	   scanning).	   Strong	  
Figure	   2-­‐3:	   Transfer	   functions	   indicating	   pattern	   completion	   and	  
pattern	  separation.	  	  	  Dynamic	  competition	  between	  pattern	  completion	  and	   pattern	   separation	   processes	   in	   the	   CA3	   network	   result	   in	   a	  sigmoidal	   input-­‐output	   function.	   The	   CA3	   output	   signal	   is	   resistant	   to	  small	   changes	   in	   input	   (i.e.	   	   pattern	   completion	   wins	   out),	   but	   shift	  radically	  in	  response	  to	  larger	  changes	  (i.e.	  pattern	  separation	  wins	  out).	  While	  pattern	  completion	  minimizes	  the	  impact	  of	  input	  changes,	  pattern	  completion	  emphasizes	  these	  changes,	  and	  minimizes	  the	  overlap	  in	  two	  representations.	   In	   contrast,	   CA1	   is	   shown	   here	   to	   respond	   linearly	   to	  changes	   in	   inputs	  (though	  under	  other	   conditions,	  e.g.	  novelty,	  different	  response	   profiles	   may	   be	   observed).	   Figure	   adapted	   from	   Guzowski,	  Knierim	  and	  Moser	  (2004).	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fractal	   pairs	   were	   found	   to	   have	   greater	   representational	   similarity	  compared	   to	   weak	   pairs	   and	   non-­‐pairs	   in	   many	   of	   the	   hippocampal	  subregions	   later	   in	   the	   session	   (i.e.	   after	   learning	   had	   occurred),	   but	  only	   the	   CA2/3/DG	   displayed	   a	   forward-­‐looking	   similarity	   effect	  (where	   the	   first	  of	   a	  pair	   leads	   to	   reinstatement	  of	   the	   second	  part	  of	  the	  pair,	   resulting	   in	   greater	  pattern	   similarity,	   but	  not	   the	  other	  way	  around).	   This	   study	   provides	   support	   for	   both	   the	   notion	   that	   CA3	   is	  involved	   in	   forming	   arbitrary	   associations	   (e.g.,	   between	   previously	  unrelated	  fractals),	  but	  also	  suggests	  that	  after	  encoding,	  CA3	  uses	  parts	  of	   the	   newly	   formed	   association	   to	   retrieve	   the	   complete	   pattern,	   i.e.,	  pattern	  completion.	  fMRI	   evidence	   for	   pattern	   separation	   has	   typically	   involved	   repeated	  exposure	   to	   different	   versions	   of	   a	   stimulus,	   and	   scrutiny	   of	   pattern	  information	   in	   the	   different	   hippocampal	   subfields.	   The	   first	   of	   these	  studies	  (Bakker	  et	  al.,	  2008)	  used	  a	  task	  within	  which	  subjects	  viewed	  a	  series	  of	  objects	   that	  were	  presented	  once	  or	  repeated	  at	  a	   later	   time.	  On	  some	  trials,	  similar	  (but	  not	  identical)	  versions	  of	  the	  pictures	  were	  presented	   during	   the	   2nd	   repeat	   (termed	   lures).	   The	   researchers	   then	  examined	  the	  BOLD	  response	  to	  these	  similar	  lures	  to	  look	  for	  evidence	  of	  pattern	  separation.	  In	  doing	  so,	  they	  capitalized	  on	  the	  propensity	  of	  the	  BOLD	  signal	  to	  show	  repetition-­‐induced	  suppression	  (Krekelberg	  et	  al.,	   2006),	   	   reasoning	   that	   regions	   that	   treated	   these	   similar	   lures	   as	  being	   different	   from	   the	   initial	   presentation	   should	   not	   demonstrate	  such	  suppression.	  Only	  the	  DG/CA3	  subregion	  showed	  activity	  that	  was	  consistent	  with	  pattern	  separation:	  while	  repetitions	  of	  an	  already-­‐seen	  stimulus	  produced	  signal	  suppression	  in	  this	  region,	  presentation	  of	  the	  lures	   (that	   were	   correctly	   recognized	   as	   being	   non-­‐identical	   to	   the	  original	  presentations)	  induced	  no	  such	  suppression	  effect.	  Subsequent	  researchers	  have	  attempted	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  transfer	  function	  of	  the	  hippocampal	   subfields,	   by	   parametrically	   varying	   the	   change	   in	   input	  (i.e.	  similarity)	  and	  examining	  the	  response	  in	  CA1	  and	  DG/CA3	  (Lacy	  et	  al.,	   2011;	   Motley	   and	   Kirwan,	   2012)	   .	   In	   one	   such	   study,	   Lacy	   et	   al.	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(2011)	   demonstrated	   that	   the	   DG/CA3	   showed	   a	   stepwise	   transfer	  function	  (i.e.	  large	  changes	  in	  response	  to	  small	  changes	  in	  input)	  that	  is	  consistent	  with	  pattern	  separation,	  whereas	  responses	  in	  CA1	  changed	  in	  a	  graded	  fashion	  in	  response	  to	  increases	  in	  the	  change	  in	  input.	  The	  authors	  argued	  that	  this	  demonstrates	  that	  both	  subregions	  have	  access	  to	   the	   necessary	   sensory	   information,	   but	   have	   different	   transfer	  functions	   in	   response	   to	   changes	   in	   input,	   as	   predicted	  by	  McClelland	  and	   Goddard	   (1996;	   Figure	   2-­‐3).	   Other	   researchers	   have	   employed	  MVPA	   approaches	   to	   interrogate	   representational	   information	   that	   is	  available	  in	  the	  different	  hippocampal	  subfields.	  For	  example,	  (Bonnici	  et	   al.,	   2012)	   used	   MVPA	   to	   decode	   representations	   in	   the	   different	  subfields	   while	   subjects	   were	   viewing	   ambiguous	   scene	   morphs	   (i.e.	  that	  had	  to	  be	  classified	  as	  being	  closer	  to	  one	  of	   two	  exemplars),	  and	  found	   greater	   decoding	   accuracy	   of	   the	   classified	   exemplar	   in	   CA3	   as	  compared	  to	  DG.	  	  The	   recent	   focus	  on	  computational	  operations	   that	  may	  be	  performed	  by	   the	  hippocampal	   circuit	  has	  brought	   clarity	   to	   the	  question	  of	  how	  the	  hippocampus	  may	  support	  mental	  representations.	  Aside	   from	  the	  correlational	   data	   of	   neuroimaging,	   researchers	   have	   also	   begun	   to	  apply	   these	   ideas	   to	   develop	   more	   tightly	   controlled	   experimental	  paradigms	  for	  use	  with	  hippocampal-­‐damaged	  patients.	  Leveraging	  on	  fMRI	   findings	   that	   implicate	  pattern	   completion	   in	   statistical	   learning,	  Schapiro	   and	   colleagues	   (2014)	   have	   demonstrated	   that	   hippocampal	  damage	  results	   in	  deficits	   in	   the	  ability	   to	  detect	   temporal	  regularities	  in	   object	   sequences,	   which	   is	   not	   traditionally	   thought	   to	   be	  hippocampal	   dependent.	   Other	   researchers	   have	   focused	   on	   pattern	  separation,	   and	   developed	   experimental	   paradigms	   that	   should	   be	  hippocampal	   dependent	   by	   virtue	   of	   the	   perceptual	   similarity	   of	   the	  stimuli	  used,	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  stimulus	  modality	  or	  memory	  retention	   requirements	   (Duff	   et	   al.,	   2012;	   Kirwan	   et	   al.,	   2012).	   These	  experiments	   have	   employed	   non-­‐spatial	   stimuli	   (objects,	   abstract	  tangrams)	  that	  are	  highly	  similar	  or	  overlapping	  in	  individual	  features,	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and	   their	   authors	   have	   reasoned	   that	   the	   neural	   representations	   for	  these	   similar	   stimuli	   are	   likely	   to	   be	   highly	   overlapping	   and	   thus	  dependent	   on	   pattern	   separation	   for	   reliable	   disambiguation.	  Hippocampal-­‐damaged	   patients	   in	   these	   studies	   have	   indeed	   shown	  deficits	   in	   the	   disambiguation	   of	   similar	   stimuli,	   even	   in	   the	   face	   of	  intact	  task	  performance	  or	  recognition	  memory	  for	  control	  stimuli	  that	  are	   unique	   and	   non-­‐overlapping	   with	   others	   in	   the	   experimental	  session.	  On	  the	  basis	  of	  current	  evidence,	  therefore,	  it	  seems	  likely	  that	  the	  hippocampus’	  unique	  contribution	  to	  hierarchical	  visual	  processing	  involves	  its	  ability	  to	  compute	  and	  maintain	  complex	  neural	  patterns	  in	  the	   face	   of	   interference.	   This	   unique	   ability	   of	   the	   hippocampus	  may	  then	   further	   allow	   it	   to	   play	   a	   role	   in	   maintaining	   flexible	   and	   high-­‐dimensional	  mental	   representations	   that	   can	   be	   used	   in	   spatial	   scene	  construction,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  wider	  cognition.	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2.3:	  Hippocampal	  representations	  in	  
cognitive	  function	  	  If	   the	   hippocampus	   serves	   to	   construct	   and	   maintain	   such	   high-­‐level	  representations,	  how	  do	  these	  representations	  interact	  with	  other	  brain	  regions,	   and	   what	   are	   these	   representations	   used	   for?	   The	  hippocampus	   is	   well	   placed	   anatomically	   to	   allow	   for	   its	  representations	   to	   participate	   in	   disparate	   cognitive	   functions.	   The	  hippocampus	  possesses	  strong	  anatomical	  connections	  with	  many	  parts	  of	  the	  brain	  (Figure	  2-­‐4),	  including	  the	  visual	  cortex	  (Felleman	  and	  Van	  Essen,	  1991),	   lateral	  parietal	  cortex	  (Rockland,	  1999),	  temporal	  cortex	  (Suzuki	   and	   Amaral,	   1994),	   dorsolateral	   prefrontal	   cortex	  (DLPFC;	  Goldman-­‐Rakic	   et	   al.,	   1984),	   and	   the	   midbrain	   and	   striatum	  (Shohamy	   and	   Adcock,	   2010).	   The	   hippocampus	   also	   possesses	  bilateral	   connections	   with	   regions	   that	   are	   responsible	   for	  neuromodulatory	   influence	   on	   wider	   neural	   circuits,	   such	   as	   the	  dopaminergic	  midbrain	  (Lisman	  and	  Grace,	  2005).	  	  2.3.1:	  Hippocampal	  modulation	  of	  processing	  in	  wider	  neural	  circuits	  	  Hippocampal	   representations	   and	   computations	   have	   the	   ability	   to	  influence	   the	   structure	   of	   knowledge	   stored	   in	   the	   cortex,	   with	  significant	   consequences	   for	   future	   behaviour.	   The	   hippocampus	   is	  thought	  to	  rapidly	  encode	  a	  new	  experience,	  and	  these	  representations	  are	   	   then	   thought	   to	  be	  gradually	   consolidated	   into	   the	  cortex	   (Squire	  and	  Zola-­‐Morgan,	  1991;	  Tambini	  et	  al.,	  2010;	  Ben-­‐Yakov	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  In	  this	   process,	   hippocampally-­‐mediated	   associative	   links	   between	  individual	   components	   of	   the	   memory	   are	   likely	   to	   be	   key	   in	  determining	   the	  eventual	  organization	  of	   information	   that	   is	   stored	   in	  cortical	  networks.	  In	  this	  manner,	  links	  that	  are	  represented	  in	  the	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  hippocampal	   ensemble	   may	   come	   to	   determine	   the	   emergence	   of	  schemas	  in	  the	  long	  run.	  This	  schematic	  organization	  of	  information	  in	  cortical	  networks	  may	  then	  further	  determine	  the	  types	  of	  information	  that	  are	  allowed	  to	  be	  rapidly	  integrated	  into	  the	  cortex	  (i.e.	  becoming	  independent	   of	   the	   hippocampus)	   in	   the	   future	   (van	   Kesteren	   et	   al.,	  2012;	  McClelland,	  2013;	  Wang	  and	  Morris,	  2010).	  Hippocampal	   representations	   may	   also	   modulate	   the	   operation	   of	  wider	   neural	   systems	   on	   a	   shorter	   time	   scale.	   These	   representations,	  which	   may	   contain	   information	   from	   the	   immediate	   environment	   as	  well	  as	   from	  the	  past,	  may	  bias	  processes	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  brain,	   thus	  exerting	   a	   modulatory	   influence	   rather	   than	   contributing	   a	   crucial	  processing	  step	   (Shohamy	  and	  Turk-­‐Browne,	  2013).	  The	  ability	  of	   the	  hippocampus	  to	  retrieve	  and	  maintain	  representations	  (i.e.	  via	  pattern	  completion)	   from	   beyond	   the	   immediate	   environment	   may	   indeed	  explain	   why	   the	   hippocampus	   has	   been	   implicated	   in	   prediction	  
Figure	   2-­‐4:	   Connectivity	   of	   the	   hippocampus	   with	   wider	   neural	   circuits.	   The	  hippocampus	   is	   highly	   interconnected	   with	   several	   other	   cortical	   and	   subcortical	  regions,	  including	  regions	  traditionally	  thought	  to	  support	  separate	  memory	  systems.	  Figure	  adapted	  from	  Shohamy	  and	  Turk-­‐Browne	  (2013).	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(Bornstein	  and	  Daw,	  2012;	  Dickerson	  et	  al.,	  2011;	  Foerde	  et	  al.,	  2006),	  reward	   generalization	   (Wimmer	   and	   Shohamy,	   2012;	   Wimmer	   et	   al.,	  2012)	  and	  transitive	  inference	  (Dusek	  and	  Eichenbaum,	  1997;	  Kumaran	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  More	  broadly,	  the	  hippocampus	  is	  thought	  to	  maintain	  the	  spatial	  or	  abstract	  ‘context’	  for	  task	  performance,	  which	  can	  serve	  as	  a	  disambiguating	   cue	   in	   situations	   where	   multiple	   actions	   or	  interpretations	  may	   be	   appropriate	   (Bannerman	   et	   al.,	   2014;	   Lee	   and	  Lee,	  2013;	  Smith	  and	  Bulkin,	  2014).	  	  This	  form	  of	  hippocampal	  control	  differs	  from	  subtle	  modulation	  of	  extra-­‐hippocampal	  processing,	  in	  that	  the	   content	   of	   the	   hippocampal	   representations	   serves	   to	   gate	  competing	   memories	   or	   responses.	   A	   wealth	   of	   studies	   from	   context	  conditioning	  paradigms	  (where	  ‘context’	  is	  defined	  more	  strictly,	  as	  the	  spatiotemporal	  environment)	  have	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  hippocampus	  is	  necessary	   for	  an	  animal	   to	  perform	  successfully	   in	  situations	  where	  the	  appropriate	  action	  is	  context	  sensitive	  (Freeman	  et	  al.,	  1997;	  Good	  and	  Honey,	  1991;	  Honey	  and	  Good,	  1993;	  Penick	  and	  Solomom,	  1991;	  Smith	   et	   al.,	   2004).	   Importantly,	   hippocampal	   signals	   continue	   to	  discriminate	  between	   situations	   that	  differ	   in	  behavioural	   rather	   than	  spatial	   contexts	   (Eschenko	   and	   Mizumori,	   2007;	   Ferbinteanu	   and	  Shapiro,	  2003;	  Kelemen	  and	  Fenton,	  2010;	  Smith	  and	  Mizumori,	  2006).	  Hippocampal	  firing	  patterns	  have	  also	  been	  observed	  to	  transit	  through	  representational	   states	   as	   rodents	   learn	   a	   reinforcement	   schedule	  (Dupret	   et	   al.,	   2013)	   or	   transition	   between	   different	   behavioural	  contexts	   (Jezek	   et	   al.,	   2011).	   Several	   researchers	   have	   suggested	   that	  the	   hippocampus	   is	   important	   in	   such	   context	   modulation	   effects	  because	   its	   computations	   are	   required	   if	   an	   animal	   is	   to	   successfully	  overcome	   interference	   from	   competing	   memories	   or	   actions	  (Bannerman	   et	   al.,	   2012,	   2014;	   Smith	   and	   Bulkin,	   2014).	   Indeed,	  interference	  is	  a	  prominent	  characteristic	  of	  many	  tasks	  that	  have	  been	  demonstrated	   to	   rely	   on	   the	   hippocampus;	   these	   paradigms	   often	  require	   subjects	   to	   respond	   appropriately	   to	   a	   cue	   that	   has	   been	  rewarded	  some	  times	  and	  not	  others	  (Agster	  et	  al.,	  2002;	  Fortin	  et	  al.,	  2002;	   Rajji	   et	   al.,	   2006;	   Smith	   et	   al.,	   2004),	   or	   require	   subjects	   to	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separate	  memory	  for	  the	  current	  trial	   from	  experiences	  from	  previous	  trials	   (Olton	   and	   Papas,	   1979),	   or	   select	   between	   competing	   or	  overlapping	  memories	   (Bannerman	  et	   al.,	   2012;	  Butterly	   et	   al.,	   2012).	  Discussions	   of	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   hippocampus	   for	   overcoming	  interference	  have	  occasionally	  alluded	  to	  pattern	  separation,	  but	  a	  clear	  account	  of	  how	  such	  computational	  processes	  may	  be	  applied	  to	  stored	  or	   self-­‐generated	   neural	   patterns	   (i.e.	   that	   would	   not	   enter	   the	  hippocampus	   via	   the	   typical	   visual	   processing	   routes)	   remains	   to	   be	  developed.	  	  	  2.3.2:	  Context	  representations	  and	  reward	  	  In	   cases	  where	   the	   context	   itself	   comes	   to	   be	   associated	  with	   reward,	  hippocampal	  representations	  may	  play	  an	  even	  more	  direct	  role.	  In	  this	  scenario,	   context	   does	   not	   serve	   to	   disambiguate,	   but	   rather	   directly	  drives	   reward-­‐related	   responding	   elsewhere	   in	   the	   brain.	   The	   above-­‐mentioned	  findings	  regarding	  the	  perceptual	  characteristics	  that	  make	  for	   hippocampal	   dependence	   (i.e.	   perceptual	   overlap)	   are	   likely	   to	   be	  important	   in	   determining	   the	   hippocampus’	   role	   in	   context	  conditioning.	   Specifically,	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   reinforcement	   status	   is	  discernible	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  extra-­‐hippocampal	  representations	   is	   likely	  to	   govern	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   hippocampal	   representations	   drive	  reward-­‐related	  responses	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  brain.	  For	  contexts	  that	  are	  spatiotemporal	   in	   nature,	   situations	   in	   which	   the	   conjunctive	   spatial	  relationships	  between	  objects	   defines	   the	   context	   (i.e.	   rather	   than	   the	  absence	   or	   presence	   of	   discrete	   objects	   themselves),	   or	   in	   which	   the	  context	   is	   highly	   similar	   to	   distractors,	   are	   likely	   to	   be	   particularly	  hippocampal	   dependent,	   since	   reward-­‐disambiguating	   features	   of	   the	  context	   are	   likely	   to	   be	   represented	   in	   the	   hippocampus,	   but	   not	   in	  lower-­‐level	   representations	   in	   the	   hierarchy	   (e.g.	   in	   entorhinal	   or	  parahippocampal	  cortex).	  In	  such	  situations,	  reward-­‐related	  responses	  in	  structures	  like	  the	  dopaminergic	  midbrain	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  driven	  by	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hippocampal	   representations,	   and	   reliable	   learning	   is	   thus	   likely	   to	  depend	   on	   projections	   from	   the	   hippocampus	   to	   dopaminergic	  midbrain	   (Lisman	   and	   Grace,	   2005;	   Luo	   et	   al.,	   2011).	   In	   contrast,	  situations	  where	  the	  reward	  status	  of	   the	  context	  can	  be	  discerned	  on	  the	   basis	   of	   a	   single	   cue	   are	   likely	   to	   rely	   on	   extra-­‐hippocampal	  ‘elemental’	  processing	  (Iordanova	  et	  al.,	  2009),	  even	  if	  the	  stimulus	  that	  is	  subject	  to	  conditioning	  is	  spatial	  in	  nature.	  	  	  2.3.3:	  Hippocampal	  representations	  and	  memory	  stabilization	  	  	  Aside	   from	   exerting	   control	   on	   other	   areas,	   hippocampal	  representations	   are	   themselves	   subject	   to	   modulation	   from	   other	  neural	  regions.	  Most	  notably,	  interaction	  between	  the	  hippocampus	  and	  the	   dopaminergic	   midbrain	   have	   been	   highlighted	   as	   important	   for	  determining	  the	  persistence	  of	  long-­‐term	  memory.	  Several	  experiments	  have	  demonstrated	  that	  associating	  an	  event	  with	  reward	  increases	  the	  probability	   that	   it	   will	   subsequently	   be	   remembered	   (Adcock,	  Thangavel,	  Whitfield-­‐Gabrieli,	   Knutson,	  &	  Gabrieli,	   2006;	  Wittmann	   et	  al.,	   2005),	   a	   phenomenon	   that	   has	   been	   linked	   to	   a	   reward-­‐related	  activation	   of	   the	   hippocampus	   and	   the	   substantia	   nigra/ventral	  tegmental	  area	   (Lisman,	  Grace,	  &	  Düzel,	  2011).	  Memories	  are	   thought	  to	   be	   stored	   in	   changes	   in	   the	   strengths	   of	   synaptic	   connections	  between	   hippocampal	   neurons,	   via	   the	   phenomenon	   of	   long-­‐term	  potentiation	   (LTP).	   In	   LTP,	   repeated	   stimulation	   of	   a	   neuron	  (presumably	  via	  upstream	  neurons,	   in	  natural	  neural	  circuits)	   leads	  to	  an	  enhanced	  response	  in	  the	  downstream	  neuron,	  which	  is	  reflective	  of	  a	   strengthening	   of	   the	   intervening	   synaptic	   connection.	   LTP	   can	   be	  divided	   into	   an	  early	  phase	   (which	   lasts	   less	   than	  3	  hours)	   and	  a	   late	  phase	  (which	  occurs	  4-­‐6	  hours	  after	  the	  initial	  encoding	  event;	  Frey	  and	  Morris,	   1997),	   and	   is	   thought	   to	   reflect	   a	   process	   of	   stabilization	   that	  allows	  transient	  percepts	  to	  persist	  in	  long-­‐term	  memory.	  Dopamine	  is	  critical	  for	  the	  late	  phase	  of	  LTP,	  which	  allows	  memories	  to	  persist	  over	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longer	  periods	  of	  time	  (O’Carroll	  et	  al.,	  2006).	  According	  to	  the	  synaptic	  tag-­‐and-­‐capture	   hypothesis,	   early	   LTP	   results	   in	   the	   setting	   of	   a	  synaptic	   ‘tag’	   that	   marks	   the	   synapse	   as	   having	   been	   active	   within	   a	  particular	   time	   window.	   Under	   subsequent	   processes	   of	   cellular	  consolidation,	   this	   tag	   is	   then	   converted	   into	   a	   long-­‐term	  stabilization	  trace	   (representing	   a	   conversion	   of	   early-­‐LTP	   into	   late-­‐LTP;	   Frey	   and	  Morris,	   1997;	   Redondo	   and	   Morris,	   2011).	   Importantly,	   dopamine	   is	  required	   for	   this	   conversion	   from	   early-­‐LTP	   to	   late-­‐LTP,	   because	  dopamine	   triggers	   the	   synthesis	   of	   plasticity-­‐related	   proteins	   at	  hippocampal	   synapses	   that	   allows	   for	   such	   conversion	   to	   take	   place	  (Bethus	   et	   al.,	   2010).	   In	   this	   manner,	   events	   that	   trigger	   dopamine	  release	   are	   thus	   also	   able	   to	   improve	   subsequent	   memory,	   via	   the	  effects	   of	   dopamine	   on	   long-­‐term	   trace	   stabilization.	   In	   addition	   to	  improving	  memory	  for	  reward-­‐predicting	  events,	  dopamine	  is	  thought	  to	   additionally	   stabilize	   memory	   traces	   for	   neutral	   events	   that	   occur	  within	  the	  same	  temporal	  window,	  because	  the	  resultant	  availability	  of	  plasticity	  related	  proteins	  allows	  for	  stabilization	  of	  synaptic	  changes	  of	  these	  neutral	  events	  (which	  have	  been	  synaptically	  ‘tagged’)	  as	  well.	  	  2.3.4:	  Hippocampal	  representations	  in	  anxiety	  and	  exploration	  	  The	   importance	  of	   the	  hippocampus	   for	  episodic	  memory	   is	   relatively	  easy	  to	  reconcile	  with	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  hippocampus	  may	  be	  centrally	  involved	  in	  maintaining	  complex	  representations	  of	  events.	  Less	  easy	  to	  reconcile	  with	  this	  view	  however	  is	  the	  line	  of	  evidence	  that	  implicates	  the	   hippocampus	   in	   anxiety	   and	   behavioural	   inhibition.	   Prior	   to	  suggestions	   that	   the	  hippocampus	   served	  as	   a	   cognitive	  map	   (O’Keefe	  and	  Nadel,	  1978),	  and	  prior	  still	  to	  Scoville	  and	  Milner’s	  assertions	  that	  the	  hippocampus	  served	  declarative	  memory	  (on	  the	  basis	  of	  studies	  on	  the	   patient	  H.M.,	   (Corkin	   et	   al.,	   1997;	  Milner	   et	   al.,	   1998;	   Scoville	   and	  Milner,	   1957b),	   the	   consensus	   regarding	   the	  hippocampus	  was	   that	   it	  was	   a	   central	   part	   of	   the	   behavioural	   inhibition	   system	   in	   the	   brain	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(Clark	   and	   Isaacson,	   1965;	   Douglas,	   1967;	   Gray,	   1987;	   Jarrard	   and	  Isaacson,	  1965;	  Kimble	  and	  Kimble,	  1965).	  This	  view	  was	  bolstered	  by	  rodent	   data	   that	   showed	   that	   hippocampal	   lesions	   resulted	   not	   in	  deficits	   in	   task	   acquisition	   (i.e.	   indicative	   of	  mnemonic	   impairments),	  but	   rather	   in	   the	   ability	   to	   suppress	   learned	   responses	   that	   are	   no	  longer	   appropriate.	   Lesioned	   animals	   showed	   difficulty	   in	   reversal	  learning	  (Kimble	  and	  Kimble,	  1965),	  and	  responded	  perseveratively	  or	  excessively	   in	   experiments	   where	   reinforcement	   was	   gradually	  withdrawn	   or	   made	   extinct	   (Clark	   and	   Isaacson,	   1965;	   Jarrard	   and	  Isaacson,	   1965).	   Even	   as	   hippocampal	   researchers	   have	   shifted	   their	  focus	  to	  episodic	  memory	  and	  spatial	  functions,	  evidence	  has	  continued	  to	   implicate	   the	   hippocampus	   in	   anxiety	   and	   behavioural	   inhibition	  (Bannerman	  et	  al.,	  2002,	  2003;	  Good	  and	  Honey,	  1997;	  Kjelstrup	  et	  al.,	  2002;	  McHugh	  et	  al.,	  2004;	  McNish	  et	  al.,	  1997;	  Richmond	  et	  al.,	  1999),	  culminating	  in	  recent	  re-­‐assertions	  of	  the	  hippocampus’	  importance	  for	  anxiety	   and	   aversive	   emotional	   processing	   (Bannerman	   et	   al.,	   2004,	  2014;	  Canteras	  and	  Graeff,	  2014;	  Gray	  and	  McNaughton,	  2000).	  	  One	  recurring	  attempt	  to	  reconcile	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  hippocampus	  for	  space,	  memory	  and	  anxiety	  has	  been	  to	  suggest	  that	  such	  functions	  may	   be	   segregated	   along	   the	   longitudinal	   axis	   of	   the	   hippocampus	  (Bannerman	   et	   al.,	   2004;	   Fanselow	   and	   Dong,	   2010;	   Poppenk	   et	   al.,	  2013).	   Such	   propositions	   are	   based	   on	   data	   that	   demonstrate	   clear	  differences	   in	   the	  effects	  of	  dorsal	   and	  ventral	  hippocampal	   lesions	   in	  rats	  (corresponding	  to	  the	  posterior	  and	  anterior	  sections	  in	  primates).	  Lesions	   to	   the	   dorsal	   (posterior)	   hippocampus	   generally	   result	   in	  impairments	   in	   spatial	  memory	   (Bannerman	   et	   al.,	   2002;	   Kjelstrup	   et	  al.,	   2002;	   McHugh	   et	   al.,	   2004;	   Moser	   et	   al.,	   1993,	   1995),	   whereas	  lesions	   to	   ventral	   (anterior)	   regions	   generally	   reduce	   the	   animals’	  expression	   of	   fear	   in	   conditioned	   foot-­‐shock	   paradigms	   (Good	   and	  Honey,	   1997;	   McNish	   et	   al.,	   1997;	   Richmond	   et	   al.,	   1999)	   and	   other	  ecological	   tests	   of	   rodent	   anxiety	   (e.g.	   elevated	   plus	  maze	   tasks,	   open	  field	  test;	  Bannerman	  et	  al.,	  2002,	  2003;	  Kjelstrup	  et	  al.,	  2002;	  McHugh	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et	  al.,	  2004).	  While	  such	  clear	  data	   is	  harder	  to	  come	  by	   in	  the	  human	  literature	  (given	  the	  diversity	  of	  psychological	  domains	  studied,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  absence	  of	  such	  clear	  lesion	  data),	  recent	  reviews	  point	  towards	  a	  similar	   functional	   organization	   in	   humans	   as	   well	   (Poppenk	   et	   al.,	  2013).	   The	   suggestions	   of	   such	   functional	   segregation	   within	   the	  hippocampus	  are	  likely	  to	  hold	  some	  truth,	  especially	  given	  the	  marked	  differences	  in	  afferent	  and	  efferent	  connectivity	  between	  posterior	  and	  anterior	   regions	   (Poppenk	   et	   al.,	   2013;	   Siegel	   and	   Tassoni,	   1971;	  Swanson	  and	  Cowan,	  1977;	  Witter,	  1986).	  Such	  reconciliation	  remains	  a	   partial	   solution,	   however,	   allowing	   one	   only	   to	   infer	   that	   findings	  about	   the	  hippocampus	   should	  be	   interpreted	   in	   a	  more	   anatomically	  restricted	   manner	   (e.g.	   restricting	   conclusions	   about	   hippocampal	  contributions	   to	   representation	   to	   posterior	   regions).	   Another	  significant	   unexplored	   possibility	   is	   that,	   in	   anxiety,	   hippocampal	  representations	  of	  the	  spatiotemporal	  context	  are	  imbued	  with	  aversive	  qualities	   via	   signals	   from	   the	   amygdala	   (which	   is	   more	   commonly	  associated	   with	   fear	   processing;	   Adhikari,	   2014;	   Canteras	   and	   Graeff,	  2014;	   Duvarci	   and	   Pare,	   2014).	   Such	   a	   possibility,	   which	   reduces	   the	  hippocampus’	  role	  to	  representational	  rather	  than	  emotional,	  is	  hard	  to	  rule	  out,	  given	  that	  past	  experiments	  have	  tended	  to	  use	  experimental	  paradigms	   with	   a	   very	   significant	   spatiotemporal	   component.	   It	   is	  worth	  noting	  however,	  that	  amygdala	  and	  hippocampal	  lesions	  appear	  to	  have	  different	  effects	  on	  defensive	  responses.	  In	  particular,	  amygdala	  lesions	   do	   not	   appear	   to	   have	   any	   effect	   on	   measures	   of	   ecological	  rodent	  anxiety,	   such	  as	  performance	  on	   the	  elevated	  plus	  maze	  or	   the	  black/white	  2-­‐compartment	  box	   test	   (Decker	  et	  al.,	  1995;	  Kjelstrup	  et	  al.,	   2002;	   Sommer	   et	   al.,	   2001;	   Treit	   and	   Menard,	   1997;	   Treit	   et	   al.,	  1993a,	  1993b;	  for	  review,	  see	  McHugh	  et	  al.,	  2004).	  The	  exact	   functions	  that	  are	  supported	  by	  the	  hippocampus	  in	  anxiety	  have	  been	  somewhat	  hard	  to	  identify.	  An	  influential	  model	  by	  Gray	  and	  colleagues	  endows	  it	  with	  three	  roles:	  monitoring	  for	  conflict	  between	  impulses	   to	   approach	   and	   avoid;	   and,	   if	   such	   conflict	   is	   detected,	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inhibiting	   ongoing	   behaviour	   and	   initiating	   exploration	   to	   determine	  the	   best	   course	   of	   action	   (Gray	   and	   McNaughton,	   2000;	   McNaughton	  and	   Corr,	   2004).	   This	   view	   of	   its	   functionality	   is	   reminiscent	   of	   other	  work	   that	   frames	   the	   hippocampus	   as	   serving	   a	   comparator	   function	  (Vinogradova,	   2001),	   as	   well	   as	   of	   the	   general	   view	   that	   the	  hippocampus	  gates	  out	  redundant	  stimuli	  from	  the	  control	  of	  behaviour	  (Douglas,	   1967).	   On	   a	   psychological	   level,	   however,	   it	   conflates	  behavioural	   inhibition	   and	   exploratory	   risk	   assessment	   as	   responses	  that	  an	  animal	  might	  display	  in	  response	  to	  an	  anxious	  situation.	  While	  it	   is	   certainly	   possible	   that	   the	   hippocampus	   is	   involved	   both	   in	  inhibiting	   ongoing	   motor	   plans	   as	   well	   as	   in	   initiating	   exploratory	  impulses,	   experimental	   work	   in	   animals	   has	   tended	   to	   ignore	   the	  difference	   between	   these	   two	   processes,	   perhaps	   in	   part	   due	   to	   the	  sheer	   difficulty	   of	   indexing	   risk	   assessment	   independently	   from	  behavioural	   inhibition	   in	   experimental	   animals	   (since	   behavioural	  freezing	  in	  rodents	  may	  reflect	  either	  or	  both	  of	  these	  components).	  As	  such,	   the	  extent	   to	  which	  the	  hippocampus	   is	   important	   for	  avoidance	  as	  distinct	  from	  exploration	  remains	  somewhat	  unclear.	  	  It	   is	   possible	   that	   the	   hippocampus’	   importance	   to	   perceptual	  disambiguation	   and	   anxiety	   may	   be	   linked	   at	   the	   level	   of	   circuit	  computations.	   In	   particular,	   the	   conservation	   of	   internal	   anatomical	  organization	  along	  the	  longitudinal	  axis	  of	  the	  hippocampus	  (i.e.	  shared	  lamellar	  organization	  and	  characteristic	   trisynaptic	   circuitry)	   suggests	  a	   common	   hippocampal	   algorithm	   or	   operation	   that	   is	   performed	  throughout	   the	   hippocampal	   subregions	   (functional	   segregation	   along	  the	   longitudinal	   axis	   notwithstanding;	   Bannerman	   et	   al.,	   2014).	  Relatively	  little	  work	  has	  been	  done	  so	  far	  that	  explicitly	  compares	  the	  computational	   mechanisms	   that	   might	   operate	   in	   anxiety	   versus	  memory,	  however.	  Such	  gaps	  in	  the	  literature	  represent	  an	  exciting	  and	  promising	  prospect	  for	  future	  work.	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Chapter	  3:	  Methods	  	  	  In	  addition	  to	   traditional	  statistical	  procedures,	  behavioural	  modelling	  was	   used	   in	   this	   thesis	   to	   characterize	   behaviour	   and	   the	   underlying	  psychological	   processes.	   Behavioural	   analysis	   was	   combined	   with	  functional	   magnetic	   resonance	   imaging	   to	   study	   the	   instantiation	   of	  these	  processes	  in	  the	  human	  brain.	  	  	  
3.1	  Computational	  modelling	  of	  behaviour	  	  Computational	   modelling	   represents	   an	   expansion	   of	   the	   available	  statistical	  methods	  with	  which	   experimentalists	   are	   able	   to	   approach	  their	  data.	  A	  great	  strength	  of	  behavioural	  modelling	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  it	   permits	   the	   estimation	   of	   subjective	   psychological	   quantities	   (e.g.	  expectation	  violation)	  that	  underlie	  behaviour,	  but	  might	  otherwise	  not	  be	   directly	   observable	   using	   traditional	   behavioural	   indices	   (Daw,	  2011).	   In	   doing	   so,	   behavioural	  modelling	   has	   allowed	   researchers	   to	  focus	  on	  informational	  quantities	  that	  might	  be	  theoretically	  important	  in	   generating	   behaviour,	   rather	   than	   focusing	  merely	   on	   the	   eventual	  behaviour	  itself.	  	  	  3.1.1	  Model	  estimation	  	  Models	   consist	   of	   a	   number	   of	   parameters	   describing	   hypothesized	  interactions	   between	   different	   experimental	   and	   latent	   variables.	  Because	  of	   the	  high	  degree	  of	   freedom	   in	  model	  building,	   conventions	  and	   protocols	   have	   been	   developed	   to	   allow	   researchers	   to	   assess	  model	   evidence,	   and	   in	   so	   doing	   evaluate	   the	   merits	   of	   candidate	  behavioural	   models.	   Model	   development	   typically	   progresses	   in	   two	  stages:	  model	  estimation	  (involving	  parameter	  estimation),	  and	  model	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comparison.	  In	  parameter	  estimation,	  statistical	  algorithms	  are	  used	  to	  calculate	  a	   set	  of	  parameter	  values,	  θ,	   under	  a	   given	  model,	  M,	   that	   is	  the	   most	   suitable	   given	   a	   fixed	   data	   set,	   y.	   While	   several	   different	  methods	  of	  parameter	  estimation	  exist,	  they	  can	  be	  broadly	  divided	  into	  classical	   and	   Bayesian	   approaches.	   The	   former	   approach	   makes	  minimal	   assumptions	   regarding	   the	   distribution	   of	   parameter	   values	  (both	   on	   within-­‐	   and	   between-­‐subject	   levels),	   whereas	   the	   latter	  assumes	  certain	  distributions	  of	  parameter	  values.	  	  In	   this	   thesis,	   parameter	   estimation	   was	   conducted	   using	   Maximum	  Likelihood	   estimation,	   which	   is	   a	   well-­‐established	   statistical	   method	  that	  selects	  the	  set	  of	  parameter	  values	  that	  maximizes	  the	  likelihood	  of	  the	   observed	   data	   under	   the	   candidate	   model.	   Maximum	   Likelihood	  procedures	   are	   optimal	   in	   the	   asymptomatic	   case	   (assuming	   large	  sample	   sizes),	   and	   are	   an	   efficient	   way	   of	   arriving	   at	   unbiased	  parameter	   estimates.	   After	   the	   likelihood	   function	   [i.e.	   p(y|	   θ,	   M)]	   is	  specified,	  one	  is	  able	  to	  observe	  how	  the	  likelihood	  of	  the	  data	  changes	  in	  response	  to	  varying	  combinations	  of	  parameter	  values	  θ,	  for	  a	  given	  subject.	  Statistical	  algorithms	  are	  then	  used	  to	  iteratively	  search	  for	  the	  value	   of	   θ	   for	   which	   the	   likelihood	   of	   y	   is	   at	   its	   peak.	   Because	   such	  algorithms	  often	  conduct	  a	  local	  search,	  and	  because	  likelihood	  surfaces	  may	  have	  multiple	  peaks,	  such	  algorithms	  often	  are	  not	  guaranteed	  to	  find	  the	  globally	  optimum	  fit	  (i.e.	  at	  which	  point	  the	  likelihood	  of	  y	  is	  at	  its	   true	   peak).	   To	   overcome	   this	   issue	   of	   local	   minima,	   parameter	  estimation	   procedures	   were	   initiated	   multiple	   times	   from	   different,	  randomly	   chosen	   starting	   points,	   which	   increases	   the	   odds	   of	   an	  optimum	  solution	  being	  found.	  Parameters	  are	  estimated	  on	  a	  subject-­‐by-­‐subject	  basis	  (with	  the	  assumption	  that	  each	  subject	  is	  independent	  in	  their	  behaviour,	  and	  drawn	  at	  random	  from	  the	  population),	  and	  the	  overall	   likelihood	   of	   the	   group’s	   data	   (specifically,	   the	   sum	   of	   the	   log	  likelihoods	  of	  each	  subject’s	  behaviour)	  serves	  as	  an	  index	  for	  how	  well	  a	   candidate	   model	   M	   is	   able	   to	   explain	   the	   observed	   data.	   This	  procedure	   allows	   for	   some	   degree	   of	   between-­‐subject	   variability	   (i.e.	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subjects	   can	   have	   different	   parameter	   values),	   while	   assuming	   a	  common	   underlying	   computational	   structure	   (specified	   by	   the	  relationships	  between	  experimental	  and	  latent	  variables).	  	  Maximum	   likelihood	   allows	   for	   estimation	   of	   how	   well	   a	   particular	  model	   (i.e.	   a	   certain	   set	   of	   hypothesized	   relationships	   between	  experimental	   variables)	   is	   able	   to	   account	   for	   measured	   behaviour,	  given	  a	  certain	  set	  of	  subject-­‐specific	  parameter	  values.	  To	  evaluate	  the	  suitability	   of	   a	   given	   candidate	  model,	   one	  must	   further	   compare	   the	  performance	   of	   different	   candidate	   models	   with	   each	   other.	   In	   this	  thesis,	   Bayesian	   Information	   Criterions	   are	   used	   to	   implement	  model	  selection.	   BIC	   values	   are	   calculated	   on	   a	   subject-­‐by-­‐subject	   basis,	   for	  each	  candidate	  model,	  as	  follows:	  	  𝐵𝐼𝐶 =   −2   ln 𝐿 y θ,𝑀 + 𝑘 ln𝑁	  where	  L	  is	  the	  likelihood	  of	  the	  data,	  y,	  given	  the	  candidate	  model	  M	  and	  the	  best-­‐fitting	  parameter	  values	  θ,	  k	  is	  the	  number	  of	  free	  parameters	  (i.e.	   that	  allowed	  to	  vary	  in	  model	  estimation),	  and	  N	  is	  the	  number	  of	  trials	  or	  data	  points	  that	  are	  used	  to	  calculate	  the	  likelihood.	  The	  sum	  of	  all	  subjects’	  BIC	  values	  then	  serves	  as	  the	  model’s	  BIC	  value.	  The	  use	  of	  BIC	   values	   penalizes	   for	   the	   number	   of	   parameters,	   which	   prevents	  over-­‐fitting,	   in	   which	   unnecessary	   parameters	   are	   included	   in	   the	  model	  (leading	  to	  apparently	  high	  likelihoods	  but	  poor	  generalizability	  of	  the	  model).	  As	  such,	  use	  of	  BIC	  values	  in	  model	  selection	  defines	  the	  ‘best’	  model	  as	  the	  one	  that	  is	  the	  most	  probable	  (i.e.	  best	  explains	  the	  observed	   data),	   while	   taking	   into	   account	   the	   need	   for	   parsimony	   in	  explanation.	  	  It	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that	   this	   procedure	   of	   model	   estimation	   and	  model	   comparison	   is	   best	   suited	   to	   allow	   for	   hypothesis	   testing	   and	  comparison	   of	   different	   competing	   candidate	   models.	   The	   ‘winning’	  model	  (which	  has	  the	  lowest	  associated	  BIC	  value)	  is	  inferred	  to	  be	  the	  best	   (i.e.	   most	   likely,	   most	   parsimonious)	   of	   all	   considered	   candidate	  models	   in	   explaining	   the	   observed	   pattern	   of	   behaviour.	   It	   is	   thus	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possible	   to	   construct	   a	   model	   that	   ‘best’	   explains	   the	   observed	  behaviour	   but	   still	   poorly	   describes	   the	   generative	   structures	  underlying	   it,	   if	  other	  plausible	  generative	  structures	  are	  not	   included	  in	   the	   model	   space.	   Simulated	   data	   (i.e.	   behaviour	   predicted	   by	   the	  winning	   model)	   can	   usefully	   help	   one	   evaluate	   if	   the	   hypothesized	  generative	   structures	   are	   able	   to	   reproduce	   the	   patterns	   of	   observed	  behaviour.	  For	  example,	  if	  behaviour	  predicted	  by	  the	  winning	  model	  is	  qualitatively	  different	  from	  the	  observed	  behaviour,	  an	  expansion	  of	  the	  model	   space	   may	   be	   called	   for.	   More	   objective	   (and	   interpretable)	  indices	  of	  model	  performance	  have	  also	  been	  developed,	   though	   their	  use	  may	   remain	   appropriate	   only	   to	   the	   specific	   fields.	   In	   the	   field	   of	  decision-­‐making,	   for	   example,	   it	   is	   often	   possible	   to	   compute	   the	  likelihood	   of	   the	   observed	   data	   under	   chance	   (i.e.	   assuming	   random	  choice),	  which	  then	  allows	  one	  to	  calculate	  a	  measure	  of	  the	  fractional	  gain	   in	  predictability	  afforded	  by	  the	  model,	  or	  pseudo-­‐r2	  (Camerer	  &	  Ho,	  1999):	  
𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑢𝑑𝑜  𝑟! = 1− 𝐿𝑅	  where	   L	   is	   the	   log	   likelihood	   of	   the	   observed	   data	   under	   the	  winning	  model	   and	   R	   is	   the	   log	   likelihood	   of	   the	   observed	   data	   under	   pure	  chance.	   Exponentiating	   these	   log-­‐likelihood	   measures	   [i.e.	   exp(L/R)]	  further	   produces	   a	   probability	   that	   is	   easily	   interpretable	   as	  performance	  relative	  to	  chance,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  decision-­‐making	  tasks	  (Daw,	  2011).	  	  3.1.2	  Hierarchical	  Bayesian	  procedures	  of	  model	  estimation	  	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  above	  fixed-­‐effects	  procedures,	  hierarchical	  Bayesian	  (random-­‐effects)	   procedures	   were	   also	   used	   to	   implement	   model	  estimation.	   This	   approach	   differs	   from	   conventional	   procedures	   in	   its	  use	  of	  population-­‐level	  parameter	  distributions	  to	  constrain	  un-­‐reliable	  parameter	   estimates	   that	   occur	   at	   the	   individual	   level,	   via	   the	  application	   of	   a	   penalty	   to	   the	   likelihood	   term.	   This	   procedure	   uses	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maximum	  likelihood	  to	  fit	  simple	  distributions	  for	  higher-­‐level	  statistics	  of	   the	   parameters	   (Guitart-­‐Masip	   et	   al.,	   2012;	   Huys	   et	   al.,	   2011),	   and	  uses	  expectation-­‐minimization	  to	  fit	  ’hidden’	  parameter	  values	  for	  each	  individual	   subject,	   assuming	   a	   single	   distribution	   for	   all	   subjects,	   and	  employing	   the	   posterior	   group	   estimates	   from	   each	   iteration	   as	   the	  prior	   for	   likelihood	   estimation	   in	   the	   next	   iteration.	   Parameter	  estimation	   thus	   proceeds	   over	   several	   iterations	   across	   all	   subjects,	  with	   the	   algorithm	   only	   halting	   its	   search	   when	   the	   group-­‐level	  statistics	   fail	   to	   show	  supra-­‐threshold	   changes	   for	   a	   given	  group-­‐level	  iteration	  compared	  to	  the	  previous	  one.	  	  Researchers	   have	   begun	   shifting	   from	   fixed	   effects	   methods	   to	   such	  random-­‐effects	   modelling	   procedures,	   in	   part	   because	   these	  hierarchical	  approaches	  offer	  the	  distinct	  advantage	  of	  down-­‐weighting	  the	  contribution	  of	  unreliable	  subjects	  who	  may	  show	  atypical	  (for	  the	  group)	  behaviour.	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  this	  method	  does	  assume	  that	  parameter	   estimates	   are	   normally	   distributed	   at	   the	   group	   level,	  however,	  and	  also	   that	   these	  methods	  are	  relatively	  costly	   in	   terms	  of	  time	   and	   computational	   demand	   (since	   individual	   subjects	   undergo	  parameter	  estimation	  many	  times,	  until	  convergence	  at	  the	  group	  level	  is	   attained).	   Nevertheless,	   hierarchical	   fit	   procedures	   were	   employed	  for	  model	  selection	  in	  this	  thesis.	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3.2:	  Functional	  Magnetic	  Resonance	  Imaging	  	  3.2.1:	  Functional	  Magnetic	  Resonance	  Imaging	  	  	  Functional	   magnetic	   resonance	   imaging	   (fMRI)	   is	   commonly	   used	   to	  non-­‐invasively	   measure	   neural	   responses	   in	   human	   subjects.	   fMRI	  measures	   blood-­‐oxygenation	   level	   dependent	   (BOLD)	   contrast,	   which	  serves	  as	  a	  proxy	  for	  neuronal	  activity,	  by	  assuming	  a	  tight	  relationship	  between	  neural	   spiking	  activity	   and	   regional	  brain	  perfusion.	  Because	  neurons	   do	   not	   have	   their	   own	   energy	   reserves,	   spiking	   activity	   by	   a	  specific	  population	  of	  neurons	  causes	  changes	   in	   the	   local	  demand	   for	  oxygen.	  Through	  a	  process	  known	  as	  the	  haemodynamic	  response,	  the	  vascular	  system	  responds	  to	  this	  local	  demand	  for	  oxygen	  by	  releasing	  oxygenated	   blood	   to	   this	   region	   at	   a	   greater	   rate	   (compared	   to	   other	  regions	   comprising	   inactive	   neurons).	   Because	   oxygenated	   and	  deoxygenated	   blood	   exhibit	   differences	   in	  magnetic	   susceptibility	   (i.e.	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  material	  is	  magnetized	  in	  response	  to	  an	  applied	  magnetic	   field),	   the	   haemodynamic	   response	   (itself	   triggered	   by	   true	  neuronal	  activity)	  produces	  variation	  in	  the	  magnetic	  signal	  that	  can	  be	  detected	   by	   an	   MRI	   scanner	   (Ogawa	   et	   al.,	   1990a,	   1990b).	   Multiple	  repetitions	  of	  the	  same	  thought,	  action	  or	  cognitive	  process	  times	  in	  the	  scanner	   thus	  produce	  statistically	  detectable	  variation	   in	   the	  magnetic	  signal	  that	  allows	  for	  inferences	  about	  underlying	  neuronal	  activity.	  Several	  methodological	   and	   interpretive	   constraints	  must	   be	   noted	   in	  the	   use	   of	   fMRI,	   however.	   Because	   the	   haemodynamic	   response	   lags	  behind	   changes	   in	   neuronal	   activity	   by	   several	   seconds,	   fMRI	   suffers	  from	  poor	   temporal	   resolution.	  Methods	   for	   analysing	   fMRI	  data	  have	  directly	  dealt	  with	  this	  issue	  by	  explicitly	  modelling	  the	  haemodynamic	  response	  of	  hypothesized	  neuronal	  activity	  (see	  later	  section).	  Another	  key	   interpretive	   constraint	   is	   that,	   although	   increases	   in	   the	   BOLD	  signal	   could	   be	   driven	   by	   an	   overall	   increase	   in	   the	   spiking	   rate	   of	  neurons	   in	   a	  microcircuit,	   such	   increases	   in	  BOLD	   could	   also	  occur	   in	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other	  situations	  that	  do	  not	  correspond	  to	  a	  mere	  increase	  in	  excitatory	  activity	   (e.g.	   a	   proportional	   increase	   in	   excitatory	   and	   inhibitory	  neuronal	   firing,	   or	   even	   an	   increase	   in	   firing	   of	   inhibitory	   neurons	  alone;	  Logothetis,	  2008).	  Despite	  these	  limitations,	  however,	  fMRI	  has	  a	  number	  of	  strengths	  that	  make	  it	  a	  useful	  experimental	  technique,	  in	  particular	  for	  the	  questions	  asked	   in	   this	   thesis.	   Firstly,	   the	   ability	   of	   fMRI	   to	   capture	   neural	  responses	  across	  the	  entire	  brain	  at	  multiple	  points	  in	  time	  makes	  it	  a	  powerful	  tool	   for	  analysing	  functional	  networks	   in	  the	  brain	  (the	  focus	  of	   Chapter	   5).	   Additionally,	   being	   able	   to	   ethically	   study	   neural	  responses	   in	   human	   subjects	   allows	   for	   much	   greater	   psychological	  specificity	   in	   experimentation,	   which	   allowed	   me	   to	   approach	   an	  important	   theoretical	   issue	   regarding	   hippocampal	   contributions	   to	  anxiety	  in	  Chapter	  6.	  	  3.2.2:	  Data	  preparation	  (preprocessing)	  	  	  A	   typical	   fMRI	  experiment	  produces	  several	  hundred	  volumes	  of	  data,	  consisting	  of	  many	  different	  3-­‐dimensional	  image	  volumes	  collected	  at	  different	   time-­‐points	   in	   the	   experimental	   session.	   Five	   pre-­‐processing	  steps	   were	   implemented	   to	   the	  whole	   time	   series	   of	   data	   (i.e.	   before	  analytical	   methods	   for	   statistical	   inference	   were	   applied)	   to	   reduce	  variability	   in	   the	   data	   that	   was	   associated	   with	   known	   MRI	   artifacts	  rather	   than	   the	   experimental	   task:	   bias	   correction,	   intra-­‐modal	  realignment	   and	   unwarping,	   inter-­‐modal	   co-­‐registration,	   smoothing	  and	   spatial	   normalization.	   These	   pre-­‐processing	   steps	   are	   standardly	  used	   in	   the	   analysis	   of	   fMRI	   data	   under	   the	   SPM	   pipeline,	   with	   the	  exception	   of	   specialized	   spatial	   normalization	   protocols	   that	   were	  employed	   to	  allow	   for	   localization	   to	  hippocampal	   subfields	   (see	   later	  section	  on	  spatial	  normalization).	  Aside	   from	  spatial	  normalization,	  all	  fMRI	   preprocessing	   and	   data	   analysis	  was	   conducted	   using	   Statistical	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Parametric	  Mapping	  (SPM8;	  Wellcome	  Trust	  Centre	  for	  Neuroimaging,	  London,	  UK,	  http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm).	  
Bias	   correction	   	   	   For	   all	   fMRI	   studies	   reported,	   fMRI	   images	   were	  acquired	  using	  a	  32-­‐channel	  head	  coil,	  which	  can	  result	  in	  biased	  signal	  intensity	  around	  the	  edges	  of	  the	  volume	  (due	  to	  inhomogeneities	  in	  the	  magnetic	  field).	  A	  bias	  correction	  step	  was	  thus	  first	  implemented	  on	  all	  functional	  scans,	  in	  which	  image	  intensity	  values	  were	  ‘flattened’	  using	  a	  multiplicative	  factor.	  	  
Re-­‐alignment	  and	  unwarping	  	  	  The	  first	  six	  images	  acquired	  during	  each	  fMRI	   session	   were	   discarded	   to	   allow	   longitudinal	   magnetization	   to	  reach	  a	  steady	  state.	  All	  functional	  (EPI)	  images	  in	  the	  time	  series	  were	  then	   re-­‐aligned	   to	   the	   first	   volume	   (after	   the	  discarded	   images)	   using	  six	  rigid	  body	  transformations	  (three	  translations	  and	  three	  rotations),	  to	   correct	   for	   inter-­‐scan	   movement	   and	   align	   the	   brain	   in	   the	   same	  position	   for	   the	   entire	   time-­‐series	   of	   images	   acquired	   from	   the	   same	  subject.	   Because	   inter-­‐scan	   movement	   can	   combine	   with	  inhomogeneities	  in	  the	  magnetic	  field	  to	  produce	  non-­‐linear	  distortions	  in	   the	   images,	   subject-­‐specific	   field-­‐maps	   (which	   measure	   the	   field	  inhomogeneities	   in	   the	   scanner)	   were	   also	   used	   to	   implement	  ‘unwarping’,	   to	   allow	   for	  movement-­‐correction	   that	   take	   into	   account	  the	  potential	  non-­‐linearities	  (Andersson	  et	  al.,	  2001).	  	  
Co-­‐registration	   and	   spatial	   smoothing	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Mean	   motion-­‐corrected	  functional	   images	   were	   co-­‐registered	   to	   the	   individual	   subject’s	  structural	   (T1-­‐weighted)	   image,	   using	   a	   12-­‐parameter	   affine	  transformation.	  The	  fMRI	  images	  are	  spatially	  smoothed	  (a)	  to	  improve	  the	   signal-­‐to-­‐noise	   ratio	   and	   (b)	   ensure	   that	   the	   data	   conditions	  conform	  to	  the	  assumptions	  of	  Gaussian	  random	  field	  theory	  (necessary	  for	   later	   steps	   of	   the	   analysis;	   see	   later	   section	   regarding	   multiple	  comparisons	   corrections).	   Smoothing	  was	   implemented	  by	   convolving	  images	   with	   a	   Gaussian	   kernel	   with	   full-­‐width	   at	   half-­‐maximum	  (FWHM)	  of	  4	  or	  6	  mm.	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Spatial	   normalization	   	   	   Spatial	   normalization	   aims	   to	   align	   images	  between	   different	   subjects	   to	   a	   common	   standard	   space.	  While	   initial	  analyses	   relied	   on	   the	   SPM	   normalization	   protocols	   to	   implement	  spatial	  normalization,	   these	  procedures	  were	  subsequently	  discovered	  (via	   inspection	  of	  the	   inverse	  mapping	  maps	  from	  group-­‐level	  clusters	  to	   subjects’	   native	   space)	   to	   be	   insufficiently	   precise	   for	   consistent	  localization	   to	   specific	   hippocampal	   sub-­‐regions.	   Advanced	  normalization	   Tools	   was	   thus	   used	   instead	   to	   implement	   spatial	  normalization	   (Avants	   et	   al.,	   2011).	   Using	   this	   procedure,	   a	   group	  template	   brain	   is	   first	   constructed	   using	   the	   structural	   T1-­‐weighted	  images	   of	   all	   participants	   (ANTS:	   buildtemplate.sh),	   and	  transformations	   (affine	   and	   3D	   diffeomorphic	   vector	   field	  transformations)	  mapping	  between	  each	  participants	  native	  space	  and	  the	   group	   template	   are	   then	   calculated.	   These	   transformations	   were	  then	  used	   to	  bring	   the	   first-­‐level	   statistical	  maps	   (first-­‐level	   contrasts,	  obtained	   by	   running	   the	   first-­‐level	   models	   on	   the	   un-­‐normalized	   but	  otherwise	   preprocessed	   data)	   from	   each	   subject	   into	   the	   group	  template	   space	   (using	  ANTS:	  WarpImageMultiTransform),	   to	   allow	   for	  generation	  of	  the	  second-­‐level	  statistical	  activation	  maps.	  The	  inverse	  of	  these	  transformations	  were	  then	  used	  to	  map	  clusters	  from	  group	  space	  back	  to	  the	  native	  space	  of	  each	  individual	  participant,	  to	  check	  whether	  clusters	   in	   individual	   subjects’	   native	   space	   matched	   the	   pattern	   of	  results	   (i.e.	   hippocampal	   subfield	   localization)	   in	   the	   group-­‐level	  results.	   This	   procedure,	   while	   able	   to	   produce	   much	   more	   accurate	  normalization	  results	  for	  the	  hippocampal	  subfields,	  did	  however	  mean	  that	  none	  of	  the	  results	  were	  normalized	  to	  standard	  anatomical	  space	  (e.g.	  MNI	  space).	  As	  such,	  all	  coordinates	  reported	   in	   this	   thesis	  are	   in	  arbitrary,	  group	  space.	  	  	  3.2.3	  Statistical	  inference	  in	  fMRI	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The	   most	   common	   way	   of	   analyzing	   fMRI	   data	   is	   a	   mass	   univariate	  approach,	  in	  which	  the	  entire	  time	  series	  for	  each	  voxel,	  Y,	  is	  modelled	  independently	  (i.e.	  ignoring	  covariance	  between	  pairs	  of	  voxels)	  using	  a	  General	  Linear	  Model	  (GLM):	  	  𝑌 = 𝛽 ∗   𝑥 +   𝜀	  This	  model	  proposes	  that	  the	  time	  series	  of	  activation	  in	  that	  particular	  voxel,	  Y,	  is	  a	  function	  of	  the	  experimental	  manipulation	  x,	  multiplied	  by	  a	  β	  parameter	   that	  governs	   the	   size	  of	   the	  experimental	  manipulation	  on	   the	   data,	   plus	   some	   residual	   error	   ε.	   Thus,	   this	   approach	   aims	   to	  determine,	   on	   a	   voxel-­‐by-­‐voxel	   basis,	   whether	   the	   experimental	  manipulation	  has	  a	  ‘significant’	  effect	  on	  the	  observed	  data	  (i.e.	  against	  the	   null	   hypothesis	   that	   the	   estimated	   effect	   size	   of	   the	   individual	  regressor,	  β,	  is	  0).	  In	  addition	  to	  the	  experimental	  effects	  of	  interest,	  the	  subject-­‐level	   (‘first-­‐level’)	   GLM	  will	   often	   include	   regressors	   relate	   to	  other	  ‘nuisance’	  variables	  that	  are	  not	  scientifically	  of	  interest,	  but	  must	  nonetheless	  be	  controlled	  for	  in	  the	  analysis.	  Often	  this	  includes	  session	  effects,	   subject	   movement	   parameters,	   button	   presses	   and	   the	  presentation	   other	   information	   (e.g.	   presentation	   of	   the	   outcome).	   To	  compensate	   for	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   hypothesized	   neuronal	   effects,	  while	  theoretically	   immediate,	   would	   produce	   BOLD	   effects	   that	   lag	   behind	  stimulus	  onsets	  (due	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  haemodynamic	  response),	  the	  experimental	   regressors	   are	   further	   convolved	   with	   a	   canonical	  haemodynamic	   response	   function	   (HRF;	   Friston	   et	   al.,	   1998),	   which	  mimics	  the	  shape	  and	  temporal	  dynamics	  of	  the	  blood	  flow	  changes	  in	  response	   to	   changes	   in	   neuronal	   activity.	   The	   same	   GLM	   is	   used	   for	  every	  single	  voxel	  in	  every	  subject,	  and	  the	  resulting	  t	  statistics	  for	  each	  voxel-­‐wise	   test	   (i.e.	   for	   a	   non-­‐zero	   value	   of	   β)	   is	   collected	   into	   a	  statistical	  parametric	  map	  (SPM)	   for	  each	  subject.	  SPMs	   for	   individual	  subjects	  are	  then	  combined	  to	  form	  a	  group-­‐level	  SPM,	  for	  second-­‐level	  analysis.	   Using	   the	   group-­‐level	   SPM,	   one	   can	   then	   employ	   classical	  inference	  to	  ask	  if	  there	  are	  regionally-­‐specific	  significant	  effects	  of	  the	  experimental	  manipulation	  of	  interest	  (Friston	  et	  al.,	  1994).	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This	   mass	   univariate	   approach	   involves	   modelling	   the	   several	  thousands	  of	  voxels	   in	   the	  brain	  as	   independent	   from	  each	  other.	  One	  serious	   hazard	   of	   using	   this	   approach	   alongside	   classical	   statistical	  inference	   is	   the	   problem	   of	   false	   positives	   that	   inevitably	   arises	   from	  multiple	   comparisons.	   The	   classical	   way	   of	   adjusting	   the	   significance	  threshold	   (to	   control	   for	   Type	   1	   error)	   in	   the	   face	   of	   multiple	  comparisons	  is	  to	  use	  a	  Bonferroni	  correction,	  in	  which	  the	  significance	  threshold	  (e.g.	  p=0.05)	  is	  divided	  by	  the	  number	  of	  statistical	  tests	  that	  are	   performed.	   In	   practice,	   however,	   the	   large	   number	   of	   voxels	  involved	   in	   fMRI	   analysis	   (often	   around	   20,000)	   means	   that	   such	   an	  adjustment	  would	  result	  in	  so	  conservative	  a	  statistical	  threshold	  as	  to	  dramatically	   increase	   the	   chance	   of	   Type	   II	   error.	   Because	   voxels	   are	  
not,	   in	   practice,	   independent	   of	   each	   other	   (e.g.	   due	   to	   neighbouring	  voxels	  often	  belonging	  to	  the	  same	  anatomical	  structure,	  or	  due	  to	  the	  use	   of	   spatial	   smoothing),	   Random	   Field	   Theory	   is	   used	   in	   the	   SPM	  framework	   to	   adjust	   the	   p-­‐value	   threshold	   in	   a	   statistically	   valid	  manner	   that	   allows	   for	   a	   balance	   between	   Type	   I	   and	   Type	   II	   error	  probabilities	   (Frackowiak,	   2004;	   Friston	   et	   al.,	   1997,	   1994).	  Additionally,	  small-­‐volume	  correction	  (SVC)	  may	  be	  used	  to	  correct	  for	  multiple	   comparisons,	   in	   situations	   where	   the	   researcher	   expects,	   a	  priori,	  to	  find	  activation	  only	  in	  a	  limited	  region	  of	  the	  brain.	  Anatomical	  masks	   may	   be	   used	   to	   control	   for	   multiple	   corrections	   where	   the	  experimental	   hypotheses	   are	   anatomically	   specific.	   Otherwise,	  contrasts	  that	  are	  orthogonal	  to	  the	  comparison	  of	  interest	  may	  be	  used	  to	  define	  the	  search	  volume	  to	  be	  used	  in	  SVC,	  to	  restrict	  comparisons	  only	   to	   voxels	   that	   show	   broadly	   task-­‐relevant	   activations	  (Kriegeskorte	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Vul	  and	  Kanwisher,	  2010).	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Chapter	  4:	  Sharing	  a	  context	  
with	  other	  rewarding	  events	  
increases	  the	  probability	  that	  
neutral	  events	  will	  be	  
recollected	  (Experiment	  I)	  
	  
4.1:	  Summary	  
	  Although	   reward	   is	   known	   to	   enhance	  memory	   for	   reward-­‐predicting	  events,	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  such	  memory	  effects	  are	  allowed	  to	  spread	  to	   neighbouring	   neutral	   events	   is	   unclear.	   Using	   a	   between-­‐subject	  design,	  we	  examined	  how	  sharing	  a	  background	  context	  with	  rewarding	  events	   influenced	   memory	   for	   motivationally	   neutral	   events	   (tested	  after	   a	   five	   day	   delay).	  We	   found	   that	   sharing	   a	   visually	   rich	   context	  with	   rewarding	   objects	   increased	   the	   probability	   that	   neutral	   objects	  would	   be	   successfully	   recollected,	   as	   opposed	   to	   recognized	   on	   the	  basis	   of	   familiarity.	   In	   contrast,	   such	   an	   effect	  was	  not	   seen	  when	   the	  context	  was	   not	   explicitly	   demarcated	  with	   a	   background	  picture	   and	  all	   objects	   were	   presented	   against	   a	   blank	   black	   background.	   These	  qualitative	   changes	   in	   memory	   were	   observed	   in	   the	   absence	   of	   any	  effects	   on	   overall	   recognition	   (as	   measured	   by	   d’).	   Additionally,	   a	  follow-­‐up	   study	   failed	   to	   find	   any	   evidence	   to	   suggest	   that	   the	   mere	  presence	   of	   a	   context	   picture	   in	   the	   background	   during	   encoding	   (i.e.	  without	   the	   reward	   manipulation)	   produced	   any	   such	   qualitative	  changes	   in	   memory.	   These	   results	   suggest	   that	   reward	   enhances	  recollection	   for	   rewarding	   objects	   as	   well	   as	   other	   non-­‐rewarding	  events	  that	  are	  representationally	  linked	  to	  the	  same	  context.	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4.2:	  Introduction	  	  Reward	   associations	   are	   known	   to	   enhance	   memory	   for	   the	   reward-­‐predicting	   event	   (Adcock,	   Thangavel,	   Whitfield-­‐Gabrieli,	   Knutson,	   &	  Gabrieli,	   2006;	   Wittmann	   et	   al.,	   2005),	   a	   phenomenon	   that	   has	   been	  linked	   to	   a	   reward-­‐related	   activation	   of	   the	   hippocampus	   and	   the	  substantia	   nigra/ventral	   tegmental	   area	   (see	   Lisman,	   Grace,	   &	   Düzel,	  2011,	  for	  review).	  Dopamine	  released	  from	  the	  substantia	  nigra/ventral	  tegmental	   area	   is	   thought	   to	   bring	   about	   such	  mnemonic	   benefits	   by	  stabilizing	   synaptic	   plasticity	   in	   hippocampal	   neurons,	   thus	   rendering	  newly-­‐formed	   memories	   long-­‐lasting	   (Bethus,	   Tse,	   &	   Morris,	   2010;	  Chowdhury,	   Guitart-­‐Masip,	   Bunzeck,	   Dolan,	   &	   Düzel,	   2012;	   Frey	   &	  Morris,	  1997;	  for	  review	  see	  Redondo	  &	  Morris,	  2011,	  Lisman,	  Grace,	  &	  Düzel,	   2011	   and	   Shohamy	  &	   Adcock,	   2010).	   In	   addition	   to	   improving	  memory	   for	   reward-­‐predicting	   events,	   dopamine	   is	   thought	   to	  additionally	   stabilize	   memory	   traces	   for	   neutral	   events	   that	   occur	  within	  the	  same	  temporal	  window,	  because	  the	  resultant	  availability	  of	  plasticity	  related	  proteins	  allows	  for	  stabilization	  of	  synaptic	  changes	  of	  these	  neutral	  events	  as	  well	  (a	  phenomena	  known	  as	  synaptic	  tag-­‐and-­‐capture;	  see	  Redondo	  &	  Morris,	  2011,	  for	  review).	  	  Although	  the	  synaptic	   tag-­‐and	  capture	  hypothesis	  predicts	  such	  cross-­‐stimulus	   memory	   enhancement,	   the	   evidence	   for	   such	   an	   effect	   in	  humans	   is	   unclear.	   While	   some	   researchers	   have	   found	   improved	  memory	  for	  neutral	  stimuli	  that	  are	  presented	  immediately	  prior	  to	  the	  reward-­‐predicting	  event	  (Murayama	  and	  Kitagami,	  2014),	  others	  have	  found	  that	  reward	  fails	  to	  improve	  memory	  for	  neutral	  stimuli	  that	  are	  presented	  in	  close	  temporal	  proximity	  to	  other	  reward-­‐predicting	  ones	  (Wittmann	   et	   al.,	   2011).	   One	   possibility	   is	   that	   the	   extent	   of	   cross-­‐stimulus	   memory	   enhancement	   may	   rely	   on	   the	   associative	   links	  between	   the	   rewarding	  and	  neutral	   event,	   rather	   than	   strict	   temporal	  co-­‐occurrence.	  Consistent	  with	  this	  hypothesis,	  reward	  has	  been	  shown	  to	   selectively	   benefit	  memory	   for	  neutral	   stimuli	   that	   are	   in	   the	   same	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semantic	   category	   (e.g.	   fish)	   as	   other	   rewarded	   stimuli,	   despite	  presentation	   of	   the	   rewarding	   and	   neutral	   stimuli	   being	   temporally	  spread	   out	   over	   the	   course	   of	   the	   experimental	   session	   (Imai	   et	   al.,	  2014).	   Similar	   effects	   have	   been	   demonstrated	   in	   the	   domain	   of	  decision	   making,	   wherein	   choices	   between	   two	   neutral	   options	   is	  influenced	  by	  each	  options’	   indirect	   (i.e.	  via	  other	   intervening	  stimuli)	  associations	   with	   reward	   (Wimmer	   and	   Shohamy,	   2012).	   As	   such,	  neutral	  objects	  that	  are	  embedded	  within	  the	  same	  background	  context	  as	  reward-­‐predicting	  ones	  may	  be	  linked	  at	  a	  representational	  level,	  so	  that	  mechanisms	  that	  lead	  to	  improved	  memory	  of	  the	  rewarding	  event	  (e.g.	   enhanced	   consolidation)	   inadvertently	   lead	   to	   enhanced	  memory	  for	  the	  entire	  mnemonic	  ensemble.	  In	   this	  study,	  we	  set	  out	   to	  examine	   if	  memory	   for	  neutral	  events	  was	  improved	   by	   having	   shared	   a	   visually	   rich	   background	   context	   with	  separate	   rewarded	   events	   (versus	   being	   presented	   against	   a	   blank	  black	   background).	   Additionally,	   we	   examined	   if	   the	   similarity	   of	   the	  background	  context	  had	  any	  effect	  on	  memory	  or	  any	  context-­‐mediated	  effects	  of	  reward.	   In	  our	  paradigm,	  we	  defined	  similarity	  as	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  perceptual	  overlap	  between	  our	  contextual	  scene	  pictures:	  novel	  stimuli	   were	   created	   for	   this	   purpose,	   wherein	   a	   ‘similar’	   scene	   pair	  consisted	  of	   two	  pictures	  of	   the	  same	  scene,	   in	  which	  elements	  within	  the	   scene	   had	   their	   locations	   changed	   (without	   adding	   or	   removing	  individual	   objects	   within	   the	   scene).	   As	   such,	   discrimination	   of	   the	  ‘similar’	   pictures	   required	   subjects	   to	   represent	   the	   conjunctive	  ensemble,	   whereas	   disambiguation	   of	   dissimilar	   pictures	   imposed	   no	  such	  cognitive	  demand.	  	  	  We	   hypothesized	   that	   the	   presence	   of	   a	   shared	   background	   picture	  would	  improve	  memory	  for	  neutral	  objects	  that	  were	  embedded	  in	  the	  same	   context	   as	   rewarding	   ones,	   and	   that	   the	   similarity	   of	   the	  background	   context	   might	   further	   modulate	   such	   context-­‐mediated	  effects,	   given	   the	   demonstrated	   necessity	   of	   the	   hippocampus	   in	  supporting	   reliable	   disambiguation	   of	   similar	   contexts	   that	   cannot	   be	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disambiguated	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   single	   features	   (Graham	   et	   al.,	   2006;	  McHugh	   et	   al.,	   2007;	   Neunuebel	   and	   Knierim,	   2014).	   Two	   groups	   of	  subjects	   made	   semantic	   judgments	   to	   trial-­‐unique	   object	   pictures,	  where	   the	   semantic	   category	   of	   the	   object	   (man-­‐made	   or	   natural)	  indicated	   whether	   they	   were	   able	   to	   win	   money	   on	   that	   trial	   or	   not	  (Experiment	   1A).	   In	   one	   group	   (context	   condition;	   Figure	   4-­‐1A,	  bottom),	  these	  objects	  were	  presented	  against	  a	  backdrop	  of	  repeating	  context	   pictures	   (two	   similar,	   two	   dissimilar).	   In	   the	   other	   group	   (no	  context	  condition;	  Figure	  4-­‐1A,	   top),	   the	  objects	  were	  presented	  alone	  against	   a	   blank	   black	   background	   without	   any	   explicit	   background	  context.	   In	   addition	   to	   analysing	   different	   memory	   measures	  independently,	   we	   also	   directly	   compared	   remember	   and	   know	   type	  memories	  to	  see	  if	  our	  experimental	  manipulation	  had	  any	  effect	  on	  the	  quality	  of	  subsequent	  memory.	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4.3:	  Experiment	  1A	  Methods	  	  	  4.3.1:	  Subjects	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Thirty-­‐two	  subjects	  (19	  female,	  mean	  age=23.13,	  SD=3.21)	  participated	  in	  Experiment	  1A,	  randomly	  divided	  across	  the	  context	  and	  no	  context	  condition	  (i.e.	  between-­‐subject	  design).	  2	  subjects	  were	  excluded	  from	  analysis	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   misunderstanding	   of	   instructions	   for	   the	  memory	  test,	  producing	  n=14	  and	  n=16	  for	  the	  context	  and	  no	  context	  conditions	   respectively.	   All	   subjects	   were	   recruited	   from	   the	   local	  population	  via	  departmental	  subject	  recruitment	  pools,	  had	  normal	  or	  corrected-­‐to-­‐normal	   visual	   acuity,	   and	   reported	   no	   history	   of	  neurological	   or	   psychiatric	   conditions,	   or	   significant	   medications.	   All	  experiments	   were	   run	   with	   each	   subject’s	   written	   informed	   consent	  and	  according	  to	  the	  local	  ethics	  clearance	  (University	  College	  London,	  London,	   UK).	   Subjects	   were	   compensated	   for	   their	   time	   at	   a	   rate	   of	  £6/hour,	  plus	  additional	  money	  to	  be	  won	  on	  the	  task	  itself.	  	  	  4.3.2:	  Experimental	  procedure	  	  	  	  	  The	  experiment	  included	  4	  separate	  stages	  that	  were	  completed	  by	  all	  subjects	   in	   both	   conditions.	   During	   the	   first	   stage	   (thresholding),	  subjects	   made	   speeded	   responses	   to	   30	   object	   pictures,	   specifying	  whether	  each	  object	  was	  man-­‐made	  or	  natural	  (i.e.	  non-­‐man-­‐made;	  15	  objects	   in	   each	   category).	   Each	   object	  was	   repeated	   twice,	   to	  make	   a	  total	   of	   60	   trials	   in	   this	   stage.	   Response	   times	   (RTs)	   from	   this	  thresholding	   task	   were	   used	   to	   determine	   the	   threshold	   for	   ‘quick’	  responses	  in	  all	  other	  stages	  of	  the	  experiment,	  calculated	  as	  the	  mean	  plus	   the	   standard	   deviation	   of	   all	   RTs	   where	   the	   subjects	   responded	  correctly	  in	  the	  semantic	  categorization	  task.	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Figure	   4-­‐1:	   Experimental	   design.	   (A)	   Trial	   sequences	   for	   the	   reward-­‐learning	   and	  encoding	   stage,	   for	   the	   no	   context	   (top)	   and	   context	   condition	   in	   Experiment	   1A	   (B)	  Context	   pictures	   used	   in	   the	   context	   condition.	   Each	   subject	   saw	   four	   unique	   context	  pictures	  (left),	  consisting	  of	  one	  similar	  and	  one	  dissimilar	  picture	  pair	  (see	  Methods	  for	  more	  detail).	  To	   counterbalance	   the	  exact	   context	  pictures	  used,	  each	  subject’s	   similar	  and	  dissimilar	  picture	  pairs	  were	  chosen	  by	  drawing	  a	  randomly	  from	  the	  overall	  pool	  of	  context	  pictures	  (right)	  (C)	  Memory	  test	  procedure	  (identical	  for	  all	  subjects)	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  The	   second	   and	   third	   stages	   of	   the	   experiment	   (reward-­‐learning	   and	  encoding	  stages,	  respectively)	  differed	  for	  subjects	  in	  the	  context	  versus	  no	  context	  conditions.	   In	   the	  second	  stage	  of	   the	  experiment	  (reward-­‐learning	   stage),	   all	   subjects	   learned	   via	   trial	   and	   error	   which	   object	  category	  was	  associated	  with	  reward,	  and	  which	  category	  was	  not.	  The	  particular	   semantic	   category	   that	   was	   associated	   with	   reward	   was	  counterbalanced	  across	  all	  subjects.	  For	  all	  subjects,	  the	  object	  semantic	  category	   probabilistically	   predicted	   reward	   availability	   (with	   a	   1/8	  chance	  of	  a	  category-­‐incongruent	  outcome).	  Subjects	   in	  the	  no	  context	  condition	   viewed	   a	   fixation	   cross	   (1000	   ms),	   followed	   by	   an	   object	  picture	   presented	   for	   2000	  ms	   in	   one	   of	   the	   four	   quadrants	   onscreen	  (Figure	   4-­‐1A,	   top).	   Like	   in	   the	   previous	   stage,	   subjects	   made	   quick	  semantic	  categorization	  responses	  to	  each	  object,	  and	  then	  were	  given	  feedback	   regarding	  whether	   they	   had	  won	  money	   or	   not,	   or	  whether	  their	  response	  had	  been	  inaccurate	  or	  too	  slow.	  Subjects	  were	  told	  that	  one	  of	  the	  object	  categories	  was	  to	  be	  associated	  with	  reward,	  while	  the	  other	  was	  not.	  If	  the	  object	  category	  indicated	  an	  availability	  of	  reward	  on	   that	   trial,	   they	   would	   then	   win	   that	   reward	   by	   being	   quick	   and	  accurate	  in	  the	  semantic	  judgments	  made	  to	  the	  objects.	  Subjects	  in	  the	  context	   condition	   viewed	   trials	   that	   were	   similar	   to	   that	   in	   the	   no	  context	  condition,	  except	  that	  an	  additional	  context	  stimulus	  was	  briefly	  presented	   by	   itself	   for	   2000	   ms	   after	   the	   fixation	   cross,	   and	   stayed	  onscreen	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  trial,	  with	  the	  object	  stimulus	  and	  outcome	  presented	   on	   top	   of	   this	   context	   picture	   that	   remained	   in	   the	  background	   (Figure	   4-­‐1A,	   bottom).	   Subjects	   were	   told	   to	   ignore	   the	  context	   stimuli	   as	   there	   was	   no	   relationship	   between	   the	   context	  picture	  and	  reward,	  or	  anything	  else	  in	  the	  task.	  All	  subjects	  completed	  64	   trials	   of	   their	   respective	   tasks,	   involving	   20	   object	   stimuli	   (each	  repeated	   approximately	   3	   times,	   not	   subject	   to	   memory	   test)	   and	   4	  context	  pictures	  (for	  the	  context	  condition	  only;	  Figure	  4-­‐1B,	  left;	  each	  picture	  repeated	  16	  times).	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In	   addition	   to	   having	   subjects	   learn	  which	   object	   category	  went	  with	  reward	   prior	   to	   encoding	   (i.e.	   the	   next	   stage	   of	   the	   experiment),	   this	  initial	  reward-­‐learning	  phase	  also	  served	  to	  pre-­‐expose	  subjects	  to	  the	  context	   stimuli,	   so	   as	   to	   prevent	   the	   occurrence	   of	   contextual	  novelty	  effects	  on	  memory.	   Subjects	  were	   told	   to	   respond	  during	  every	   single	  trial,	   regardless	   of	   whether	   there	   was	   money	   to	   be	   won	   or	   not,	   and	  were	   also	   instructed	   that	   a	   proportion	   of	   the	   total	   amount	   of	   money	  that	   they	  won	  during	   the	  entire	  experiment	  would	  be	  paid	   to	   them	   in	  addition	  to	  the	  money	  that	  they	  would	  receive	  as	  compensation	  for	  the	  time	   spent.	   Verbal	   report	   confirmed	   that	   all	   subjects	   had	   accurately	  determined	  which	  object	  category	  was	  associated	  with	  reward,	  by	   the	  end	  of	   this	   session.	  The	   third	   stage	  of	   the	   experiment	   (encoding)	  was	  identical	   to	   the	   second	   stage	   (Figure	   4-­‐1A),	   except	   that	   the	   object	  stimuli	   presented	   during	   this	   stage	   of	   the	   experiment	   were	   entirely	  trial-­‐unique.	   Like	   before,	   subjects	   in	   the	   no	   context	   condition	   saw	  objects	  onscreen	  without	  any	  context	  stimuli	  shown	  in	  the	  background,	  while	   subjects	   in	   the	   context	   condition	   saw	   context	   pictures	   first	  presented	  alone,	  and	  then	  with	  objects	  overlaid	  on	  top	  of	  them.	  None	  of	  the	  object	   stimuli	   from	   the	  previous	   two	  stages	  were	   repeated	  during	  this	  or	  any	  other	   stages	  of	   the	  experiment.	  240	   trials	  of	   this	   encoding	  stage	   were	   completed.	   Subjects	   were	   not	   explicitly	   told	   that	   their	  memory	   for	   the	   objects	   would	   be	   tested	   later,	   but	   were	   instead	  instructed	  to	  continue	  performing	  the	  task	  to	  the	  best	  of	  their	  ability	  as	  they	  had	  in	  the	  previous	  stage.	  	  During	  Stage	  4	  of	   the	  experiment	  (memory	   test,	  Figure	  4-­‐1C;	   identical	  for	   both	   the	   context	   and	   no	   context	   conditions),	   conducted	   five	   days	  later,	  subjects	  then	  saw	  360	  object	  pictures	  on	  a	  computer	  screen	  (240	  of	   which	   they	   had	   seen	   before	   in	   Stage	   3	   of	   the	   experiment,	   120	   of	  which	  were	  new),	  and	  for	  each	  object	  had	  to	  decide	  whether	  it	  was	  old	  (i.e.	   if	   they	  had	  seen	   it	  before	   in	   the	  experiment)	  or	  new.	   If	   the	  object	  was	   deemed	   to	   be	   old,	   subjects	   were	   then	   asked	   if	   they	   “knew”	   or	  “remembered”	  the	  object.	  Following	  this	  judgment,	  subjects	  were	  asked	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to	  indicate	  whether	  their	  memory	  for	  the	  object	  was	  “strong”	  or	  “weak”.	  We	   followed	   standard	   procedures	   in	   instructing	   subjects	   about	  remember	   and	   know	   judgments	   (Tulving,	   1985);	   specifically,	   subjects	  were	   instructed	   to	   give	   a	   ‘remember’	   response	   if	   they	   could	   recollect	  any	  other	  details	  from	  when	  they	  had	  initially	  seen	  the	  object,	  and	  were	  instructed	  to	  respond	  with	   ‘know’	  if	  they	  could	  not	  recollect	  any	  other	  details	   about	   the	   object,	   and	  merely	   had	   a	   sense	   of	   it	   being	   familiar.	  Detailed	   instructions	   regarding	   this	   distinction	   were	   relayed	   to	  subjects,	   along	   with	   examples	   of	   each	   memory	   type	   as	   one	   would	  encounter	   them	   in	   daily	   life,	   to	   ensure	   that	   subjects	   understood	   how	  they	   should	   respond	   in	   the	   task.	   Lastly,	   subjects	   then	   had	   to	   indicate	  which	   quadrant	   of	   the	   screen	   they	   had	   previously	   seen	   the	   object	   in	  (position	   recall),	   if	   they	  had	  earlier	   indicated	   that	  object	   to	  be	  old.	  All	  responses	  in	  this	  stage	  of	  the	  experiment	  were	  self-­‐paced.	  	  	  4.3.3:	  Stimuli	  and	  design	  	  	  	  	  	  Object	  stimuli	  consisted	  of	  colour	  images	  assembled	  from	  a	  database	  of	  object	   stimuli	   (Brady	   et	   al.,	   2008),	   as	  well	   as	   some	   additional	   images	  from	   the	   internet,	   and	   were	   balanced	   in	   terms	   of	   semantic	   category	  (man-­‐made	   versus	   natural).	   The	   context	   stimuli	   used	   in	   the	   context	  condition	   consisted	   of	   grayscale	   pictures	   of	   offices	   and	   living	   rooms	  with	   no	   human	   beings	   in	   them.	   Each	   subject	   saw	   4	   unique	   context	  stimuli,	   repeated	   randomly	   over	   the	   course	   of	   the	   experiment,	   which	  consisted	  of	  a	   ‘similar’	   context	  pair	  and	  a	   ‘dissimilar’	  pair.	  The	  similar	  context	  stimuli	  were	  pictures	  of	  the	  same	  room	  wherein	  the	  position	  of	  the	  furniture	  had	  been	  noticeably	  altered	  (without	  adding	  or	  removing	  any	   elements	   in	   the	   scene),	   while	   the	   dissimilar	   context	   stimuli	  consisted	   of	   two	  pictures	   of	   entirely	   different	   rooms	   that	   belonged	   to	  the	   same	   semantic	   category	   (office	   or	   living	   room).	   The	   exact	   context	  stimuli	   used	   for	   each	   subject	   was	   counterbalanced	   across	   the	   entire	  group,	  by	  creating	  a	  pool	  of	  four	  similar	  context-­‐picture	  pairs	  (2	  living	  
69	  
room	   and	   2	   office;	   Figure	   4-­‐1B,	   right),	   and	   drawing	   different	   similar-­‐dissimilar	   permutations	   of	   the	   context	   stimuli	   from	   the	   original	   four	  similar	   context-­‐pairs	   for	   each	   subject	   (Figure	   4-­‐1B).	   The	   similar	   and	  dissimilar	   context	   pairs	   were	   included	   in	   this	   study	   to	   enable	   us	   to	  determine	  if	  the	  context	  similarity	  (and	  implicit	  pattern-­‐separation	  load	  involved	   in	   discrimination)	   had	   any	   influence	   on	   the	   memory	   effects	  anticipated.	  	  	  4.3.4:	  Behavioural	  measures	  and	  analyses	  	  	  	  	  Accuracy	   scores	   and	  RTs	   of	   the	   semantic	   judgments	  made	   during	   the	  encoding	   stage	   were	   analysed	   with	   a	   mixed	   2	   x	   2	   ANOVA	   (context	  condition	  x	  valence;	  context	  condition,	  between-­‐subject:	  context	  versus	  no	   context;	   valence,	  within-­‐subject:	   reward	  vs	  neutral),	   to	  verify	  good	  learning	   of	   the	   object-­‐category	   and	   reward	   associations.	   All	   memory	  measures	  (e.g.	  remember	  rate)	  were	  corrected	  for	  false	  alarms,	  except	  for	   position	   recall	   accuracy,	   which	   was	   calculated	   as	   the	   number	   of	  objects	   for	   which	   position	   was	   correctly	   recalled,	   divided	   by	   the	  number	   of	   objects	   that	   were	   recognized	   to	   be	   old.	   Position	   recall	  accuracy	  was	  computed	  in	  this	  way	  so	  as	  to	  compensate	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  memory	  for	  the	  position	  was	  only	  tested	  on	  trials	  in	  which	  subjects	  had	  recognized	   the	   object	   to	   be	   old.	   To	   compare	   different	   types	   of	  memories,	   remember	   and	  know	   rates	  were	   analysed	  with	   a	  2	   x	   2	   x	   2	  (memory	   type	   x	   context	   condition	   x	   valence)	   ANOVA.	   Associative	  memory	  and	  d’	  memory	  scores	  were	  also	  analysed	   individually	  with	  a	  mixed	  2x2	  (context	  condition	  x	  valence)	  ANOVA	  (same	  factors	  as	  with	  the	  encoding-­‐stage	  data).	  	  To	   examine	   the	   effect	   of	   context	   similarity	   and	   object	   reward	   on	  performance,	  we	  analysed	  data	  from	  the	  context	  condition	  only	  with	  a	  repeated	   measures	   2x2	   ANOVA	   (similarity:	   similar	   vs	   dissimilar;	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valence:	   reward	   vs	   neutral).	   Encoding-­‐stage	   accuracy	   scores,	   RTs	   and	  all	  memory	  scores	  were	  analysed	  using	  this	  same	  procedure.	  	  	  
4.4:	  Experiment	  1A	  Results	  	  4.4.1:	  Encoding-­‐stage	  performance	  	  	  All	   subjects	   accurately	   reported	   which	   object	   category	   had	   been	  associated	  with	  reward,	  after	  the	  reward-­‐learning	  stage.	  	  When	  subjects	  in	  the	  context	  condition	  were	  explicitly	  asked	  if	  they	  had	  observed	  any	  relationship	  between	  the	  background	  pictures	  and	  the	  objects’	  reward	  status,	   none	   of	   the	   subjects	   reported	   having	   noticed	   any	   such	  relationship.	   Subjects	   in	   both	   conditions	  were	   quicker	   to	   respond	   for	  objects	  where	  reward	  was	  available,	  compared	  to	  objects	  where	  reward	  was	  not	  (Figure	  4-­‐2A;	  Main	  effect	  of	  valence,	  F(1,28)=11.05,	  p=0.002).	  No	   main	   effect	   of	   context	   condition	   or	   valence	   by	   context	   condition	  interaction	   was	   observed	   in	   the	   RT	   data	   (both	   p>0.4).	   Overall,	   mean	  accuracy	   of	   semantic	   judgments	   was	   high	   (mean	   accuracy=0.98,	  std=0.04),	  and	  though	  no	  main	  effect	  of	  context	  condition	  or	  condition	  by	   valence	   interaction	   was	   observed	   (both	   p>0.5),	   a	   main	   effect	   of	  reward	  was	  observed	  (F(1,28)=4.42,	  p=0.045),	  with	  higher	  accuracy	  in	  the	   reward	   condition	   as	   compared	   to	   the	   neutral	   one	   (Figure	   4-­‐2A).	  This	  main	  effect	  of	   valence	  opens	  up	   the	  possibility	   that	   subjects	  may	  have	   been	   paying	   more	   attention	   to	   the	   objects	   when	   they	   were	  rewarding	  as	  opposed	  to	  when	  they	  were	  not.	  This	  effect	  is	  surprising,	  however,	   given	   that	   subjects	   would	   have	   had	   to	   process	   the	   objects	  semantically	   in	   order	   to	   discern	   their	   reward	   status	   (having	   not	  received	   any	   preceding	   cues	   to	   indicate	   the	   reward	   status	   of	   the	  upcoming	   object	   that	   might	   have	   enabled	   them	   to	   disengage	  attentionally).	   As	   such,	   it	   seems	   likely	   that	   subjects	   may	   have	   been	  more	  prone	   to	   respond	  with	   the	   rewarding	  object-­‐category,	   since	   this	  response	   involved	   potential	   gain	   with	   no	   penalty	   for	   incorrect	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responses.	   Nevertheless,	   to	   mitigate	   the	   effects	   that	   such	   attentional	  errors	   may	   have	   on	   the	   memory	   results,	   all	   memory	   scores	   were	  calculated	   by	   excluding	   any	   objects	   that	   had	   received	   an	   incorrect	  response	  during	  the	  encoding	  stage.	  	  4.4.2:	  Sharing	  a	  context	  with	  rewarded	  objects	  increases	  the	  probability	  that	  neutral	  objects	  will	  be	  recollected	  as	  opposed	  to	  recognized	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  familiarity	  	  	  Memory	  scores	  (mean	  and	  SD)	  for	  each	  condition	  and	  memory	  type	  are	  shown	   in	   Table	   4-­‐1.	   When	   analysed	   separately,	   none	   of	   the	   memory	  scores	  (d’,	  remember,	  know,	  sure-­‐remember	  rates,	  sure-­‐know	  rates	  or	  position	   recall	   accuracy)	   showed	   any	   significant	   effects	   of	   object	  valence,	  the	  context	  condition,	  or	  by	  the	  interaction	  between	  the	  two	  (d’	  and	  position	  recall	  accuracy	  shown	  in	  Figure	  4-­‐2B;	  all	  main	  effects	  and	  interaction,	   p>0.094).	   Comparing	   remember	   and	   know	   rates	   with	   a	  mixed	  2	  x	  2	  x	  2	   (memory	   type	  x	   context	   condition	  x	  valence)	  ANOVA,	  however,	   found	   both	   a	   main	   effect	   of	   memory	   type	   (F(1,28)=11.30,	  
p=0.002)	   which	   reflected	   higher	   rates	   of	   ‘remember’	   compared	   to	  ‘know’	  memories,	  as	  well	  as	  a	   three-­‐way	   interaction	  between	  memory	  type,	  context	  condition	  and	  valence	  (F(1,28)=6.79,	  p=0.015).	  Table	  4-­‐1:	  Memory	  performance	  (mean	  and	  SD)	  by	  condition	  	  	  	   Context	   No	  Context	  
	   Reward	   Neutral	   Reward	   Neutral	  
d'	   1.03	  (0.45)	   0.94	  (0.37)	   1.01	  (0.49)	   0.97	  (0.35)	  
Sure	  
recognition	   0.23	  (0.12)	   0.22	  (0.12)	   0.24	  (0.11)	   0.22	  (0.09)	  
Remember	   0.24	  (0.15)	   0.24	  (0.14)	   0.22	  (0.08)	   0.17	  (0.09)	  
Know	   0.13	  (0.09)	   0.10	  (0.06)	   0.11	  (0.11)	   0.15	  (0.09)	  
Sure	  
Remember	   0.18	  (0.13)	   0.17	  (0.13)	   0.17	  (0.08)	   0.14	  (0.08)	  
Sure	  Know	   0.05	  (0.06)	   0.05	  (0.04)	   0.07	  (0.06)	   0.08	  (0.06)	  
Position	  
recall	  	   0.16	  (0.05)	   0.14	  (0.04)	   0.16	  (0.05)	   0.16	  (0.04)	  	  	  To	  clarify	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  three-­‐way	  interaction,	  2x	  2	  (memory	  type	  x	  object	   valence)	  ANOVAs	  were	   run	   separately	  on	   remember	   and	  know	  
72	  
	  
rates	  in	  each	  context	  condition	  (Figure	  4-­‐2C;	  all	  statistics	  listed	  in	  Table	  4-­‐2).	  This	  analysis	  indicated	  that	  the	  three-­‐way	  interaction	  was	  driven	  by	  high	  rates	  of	  remembering	  for	  rewarding	  objects	  in	  the	  no	  context	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Figure	  4-­‐2:	  Results	  from	  Experiment	  1A.	  (A)	  Encoding-­‐stage	  task	  accuracy	  and	  RTs	  (B)	  Accuracy	  of	  recognition	  memory	  and	  position	  recall	  at	  memory	  test	   	   (C)	  Rates	  of	  remember	  and	  know	  responses	  for	  recognized	  objects	  (D)	  In	  the	  context	  condition,	  no	  relationship	   was	   observed	   (across	   all	   subjects)	  between	   the	   drop	   in	   encoding-­‐stage	  accuracy	   and	   the	   tendency	   for	   subjects	   to	   remember	   neutral	   objects	   (as	   opposed	   to	  know).	  All	  error	  bars	  are	  +/-­‐	  1	  SE.	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condition,	   and	   high	   rates	   of	   remembering	   for	   rewarding	   as	   well	   as	  
neutral	  objects	  in	  the	  context	  condition.	  The	  three-­‐way	  interaction	  was	  driven	  by	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  memory	  type	  x	  valence	  interaction	  in	  the	  no	  context	   condition,	   which	   was	   driven	   by	   greater	   remembering	   of	  rewarded	   objects	   and	   an	   absence	   of	   any	   such	   valence	   effect	   on	   know	  rates	   (remember:	   t(15)=2.71,	  p=0.016;	   know:	  p	   >	   0.2).	   In	   the	   context	  condition,	  no	  such	  memory	  type	  x	  valence	  interaction	  was	  observed	  (p	  >	   0.4).	   Instead,	   remember	   rates	   were	   significantly	   higher	   than	   know	  rates,	   for	   both	   rewarded	   and	   neutral	   objects.	   Comparing	   remember	  rates	  alone	  across	  context	  and	  no	  context	  conditions	  failed	  to	  clarify	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  interaction,	   in	  that	  direct	  comparison	  of	  remember	  rates	  for	  neutral	  objects	  in	  the	  context	  vs	  no	  context	  condition	  failed	  to	  find	  a	  significant	   effect	   (p>0.1).	   	  Focusing	   on	   the	   difference	   in	   the	   rates	   of	  ‘remember‘	   and	   ‘know’	   responses	   to	   neutral	   objects	   (i.e.	   remember	   >	  know	  rates	  for	  neutral	  objects),	  however,	  we	  found	  that	  neutral	  objects	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  remembered	  rather	  than	  known	  to	  be	  old,	  in	  the	  context	  condition	  (t(13)=2.98,	  p=.011)	  but	  not	  the	  no	  context	  condition	  (p>0.5).	   No	   other	   simple	   effects	   were	   observed	   that	   were	   consistent	  with	   the	   significant	   three-­‐way	   interaction	   between	   memory	   type,	  valence	  and	  condition	   (all	  p>0.1),	  and	  comparing	   the	  difference	   in	   the	  rates	   of	   remember	   and	   know	   responses	   with	   a	   2x2	   (condition	   x	  valence)	  ANOVA	  found	  a	  significant	  interaction	  between	  condition	  and	  valence	   (F(1,28)=6.79,	   p=0.015).	   As	   such,	   this	   three	   way	   interaction	  appears	   to	   reflect	   that	   neutral	   objects	   were	   more	   likely	   to	   be	  remembered	  than	  known	  to	  be	  old	  (i.e.	  similar	  to	  rewarding	  objects),	  in	  the	   context	   condition	   alone.	   These	   results	   indicate	   that	   reward	  associations	  modulate	  the	  quality	  of	  memories	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  explicit	  context	  stimuli	  (i.e.	  rewarded	  objects	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  remembered	  than	   known,	   in	   the	   no	   context	   condition).	   However,	   inclusion	   of	   an	  explicit	   	   (but	   task-­‐irrelevant)	   context	   stimulus	   leads	   to	   better	  remembering	   of	   associative	   detail	   (resulting	   in	   a	   ‘remember’	   rather	  than	   a	   ‘know’	   response)	   that	   benefits	   rewarded	   as	   well	   as	   neutral	  objects	  that	  are	  encountered	  within	  the	  same	  repeating	  context.	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Table	   4-­‐2:	   Memory	   type	   and	   valence	   effects	   within	   the	   three	   way	  interaction	  
	  	  4.4.3:	  Increased	  likelihood	  of	  remembering	  of	  neutral	  objects	  in	  the	  context	  condition	  was	  not	  related	  to	  attentional	  disengagement	  during	  encoding	  	  We	   noted	   earlier	   that	   subjects	   were	   more	   likely	   to	   make	   incorrect	  responses	  during	   the	   encoding	   task	  when	   the	  objects	  were	  neutral	   as	  compared	  to	  rewarded	  (Figure	  4-­‐2A).	  An	  additional	  possibility	  that	  we	  wanted	   to	   explore	   was	   the	   possibility	   that	   the	   observed	   pattern	   of	  memory	  results	  (i.e.	  an	  increased	  likelihood	  that	  neutral	  objects	  would	  be	  remembered	  rather	  than	  recognized	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  familiarity	  in	  the	  context	  condition)	  may	  have	  come	  about	  as	  a	  result	  of	  such	  attentional	  disengagement	   from	   neutral	   object	   processing:	   it	   is	   conceivable,	   for	  example,	  that	  attentional	  disengagement	  in	  the	  context	  condition	  would	  have	  led	  subjects	  to	  pay	  greater	  attention	  to	  the	  context	  stimuli,	  leading	  to	  a	  greater	  propensity	  to	  report	  such	  objects	  as	  being	  remembered	  due	  to	   stronger	   incidental	   encoding	   of	   the	   context	   stimulus	   in	   the	  background.	   If	   this	   had	   been	   the	   case,	   we	   reasoned	   that	   greater	  attentional	   disengagement	   (indexed	   by	   a	   greater	   reward-­‐related	  difference	   in	   encoding-­‐stage	   accuracy	   scores)	  might	   be	   related	   to	   the	  observed	   improvement	   in	   remembering	   for	   neutral	   objects	   in	   the	  context	   condition.	   To	   test	   for	   this,	  we	   looked	   to	   see	   if	   reward-­‐related	  differences	   in	   encoding	   task	   accuracy	   were	   correlated,	   across	   all	  subjects,	  with	   reward-­‐related	   differences	   in	   remember	   rates.	   No	   such	  correlation	   was	   observed	   (Figure	   4-­‐2D;	   r=-­‐0.02,	   p>0.9).	   As	   such,	   we	  found	  no	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  observed	  effect	  on	  remembering	  of	  neutral	  objects	  was	  due	   to	   subjects	   in	   this	   condition	  having	   shifted	  
	   No	  context	  condition	   Context	  condition	  
Memory	  type	   F(1,15)=4.03,	  p	  =	  0.063	   F(1,13)=6.65,	  p	   =	   0.021	  *	  
Valence	   F(1,15)=0.24,	  p	  >0.6	   F(1,13)=0.55,	  p	  >	  0.4	  
Memory	  type	  x	  
Valence	  
F(1,15)=8.80,	  p	  =	  0.01	  *	   F(1,13)=0.58,	  p	  >	  0.4	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their	  attention	  from	  the	  object	  to	  the	  context	  stimuli	  (i.e.	  leading	  to	  both	  poorer	   encoding	   task	   accuracy	   and	   a	   greater	   propensity	   for	   such	  objects	  to	  be	  remembered	  due	  to	  good	  recall	  of	  the	  context	  pictures).	  	  	  4.4.4:	  Context	  similarity	  did	  not	  have	  any	  effect	  on	  memory	  measures	  	  	  Our	   experimental	   design	   also	   allowed	   us	   to	   examine	   if	   context	  similarity	  had	  any	  effect	  on	  subsequent	  memory.	  Focusing	  solely	  on	  the	  context	  condition,	  we	  analysed	  encoding-­‐stage	  task	  accuracy,	  RTs,	  and	  all	  memory	  measures	  with	   a	   2x2	  ANOVA	   (similarity	   x	   valence).	   Aside	  from	   the	   already-­‐noted	   effects	   of	   valence	   on	   (encoding-­‐stage)	   task	  accuracy	   and	   RT,	   no	   other	   main	   effects	   of	   similarity	   or	   interactions	  between	   similarity	   and	   valence	   were	   found	   in	   encoding-­‐stage	  behavioural	  measures	   (all	  p>0.1).	  Additionally,	   no	  main	  or	   interacting	  effects	   were	   observed	   on	   any	   of	   the	   memory	   measures	   tested	   (d’,	  position	   recall	   accuracy,	   remember	   and	   know	   rates;	   Figure	   4-­‐3,	   all	  




	   	  
Figure	   4-­‐3:	   Context	   similarity	   effects.	   No	   effects	   of	   context	   similarity	   (nor	  interaction	  of	  context	  similarity	  with	  object	  valence)	  were	  observed	  for	  any	  of	  the	  memory	  measures	  collected.	  All	  error	  bars	  are	  +/-­‐	  1	  SE.	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4.5:	  Experiment	  1B	  Methods	  and	  Results	  	  The	   results	   of	   Experiment	   1A	   indicated	   that	   sharing	   a	   context	  with	   a	  rewarded	   object	   qualitatively	   changed	   memory	   for	   neutral	   objects,	  without	   necessarily	   improving	   overall	   recognition.	   An	   alternative	  explanation	   that	   we	   were	   unable	   to	   control	   for	   within	   the	   same	  experiment	  is	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  an	  explicit	  context	  picture	  might	  per	  
se	   lead	   to	   better	   remembering	   of	   the	   neutral	   events.	   Such	   an	  explanation	   is	   highly	   plausible,	   given	   that	   awareness	   of	   associated	  contextual	  detail	   is	  a	  hallmark	  characteristic	  of	   ‘remember’	  memories,	  and	   is	   indeed	  the	  criteria	  with	  which	  subjects	  were	   instructed	  to	  base	  the	   remember/know	   distinctions	   on	   (Tulving,	   1985).	   As	   such,	   we	  decided	   to	   explicitly	   examine	   this	   issue	   by	   running	   a	   separate	  experiment	  that	  aimed	  to	  examine	  if	  the	  inclusion	  of	  an	  explicit	  context	  stimulus	   in	   itself	   led	   to	   a	   greater	   tendency	   for	   subjects	   to	   remember	  objects	  (as	  opposed	  to	  recognizing	  objects	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  familiarity),	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  reward	  associations.	  New	  subjects	  encountered	  trial-­‐unique	   object	   stimuli	   where	   some	   trials	   included	   a	   task-­‐irrelevant	  context	   picture	   in	   the	   background,	   and	   other	   trials	   lacked	   such	   an	  explicit	   context	   picture	   (i.e.	   context	   vs	   no	   context	   conditions,	  manipulated	   on	   a	   within	   subject	   level	   for	   statistical	   efficiency).	   To	  prevent	   the	   context	   pictures	   from	   inadvertently	   producing	   any	  additional	   novelty	   effects,	   we	   pre-­‐exposed	   subjects	   to	   the	   context	  pictures	   by	   having	   subjects	   perform	   a	   cover	   task	   (prior	   to	   encoding)	  that	   involved	  attending	   to	   focal	  object	   stimuli	   (not	   subject	   to	  memory	  test)	   with	   the	   task-­‐irrelevant	   context	   pictures	   remained	   in	   the	  background.	  This	  pre-­‐encoding-­‐stage	  context	  exposure	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  learning	  stage	  of	  Experiment	  1A	  in	  aiming	  to	  remove	  potential	  novelty	  effects	  on	  memory.	  	  	  	  4.5.1:	  Methods	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Subjects	   	   	   An	   additional	   twenty-­‐two	   subjects	   were	   recruited	   for	  Experiment	   1B	   (12	   female,	   age	   range	   18-­‐34	   years,	   mean	   age=	   26.41,	  SD=6.37).	   The	   procedures	   regarding	   recruitment,	   eligibility	   criteria,	  informed	   consent	   and	   ethical	   clearance	   were	   identical	   to	   Experiment	  1A.	   To	   remove	   the	   any	   association	   that	   the	   object	   stimuli	  might	   have	  with	  reward,	  subjects	  were	  not	  able	  to	  explicitly	  win	  money	  on	  the	  task	  via	   their	   choices.	   However,	   to	   more	   generally	   motivate	   good	  concentration	  and	  participation,	  subjects	  were	  given	  a	  £2	  bonus	  if	  their	  overall	   accuracy	   surpassed	   a	   certain	   threshold,	   in	   addition	   to	   the	  £6/hour	  that	  they	  were	  paid	  as	  compensation	  for	  time.	  	  
Procedure	   	   	  Experiment	   1B	   included	   three	   separate	   stages:	   a	   context	  exposure	   stage,	   encoding	   stage,	   and	   memory	   test.	   In	   the	   context	  exposure	  stage	  (Figure	  4-­‐4A),	  subjects	  performed	  a	  cover	  task	  in	  which	  they	   saw	   a	   series	   of	   objects,	   and	   made	   up-­‐	   or	   down-­‐arrow	   button	  presses	   in	   response	   to	   each	   object,	   with	   the	   context	   pictures	   in	   the	  background.	  For	  each	  object	  category,	  a	  certain	  response	  (up	  or	  down)	  was	   ‘correct’	  70%	  of	   the	  time,	  and	  subjects	  had	  to	   learn,	  via	   trial-­‐and-­‐error,	  which	   type	  of	   response	  went	  with	  which	  object	   category	   (Man-­‐made	  or	  Natural)	  most	  of	  the	  time.	  On	  every	  trial,	  a	  context	  picture	  was	  shown	   by	   itself	   for	   2000	  ms	   before	   the	   object	   picture	   came	   onscreen	  (Figure	  4-­‐4A),	  and	  subjects	  were	  instructed	  that	   it	  was	  not	  relevant	  to	  the	   task	   that	   they	  had	   to	  perform.	  As	   in	   the	  previous	   experiment,	   the	  objects	  were	   randomly	  presented	   in	   any	  one	  of	   the	   four	  quadrants	   of	  the	  screen	  on	  each	  trial.	  Subjects	  were	  told	  whether	  their	  response	  was	  correct	   or	  wrong	  on	  every	   trial,	   but	  did	  not	   receive	  monetary	   reward	  for	  making	  correct	  responses.	  Subjects	  saw	  a	  total	  of	  20	  object	  stimuli	  and	  4	  context	  pictures	  in	  this	  stage	  (drawn	  from	  the	  pool	  of	  16	  unique	  context	   pictures	   in	   a	   similar	  manner	   as	   described	   in	   Experiment	   1A).	  The	   object	   and	   context	   pictures	   were	   repeated	   so	   that	   subjects	  completed	  a	  total	  of	  64	  trials	  in	  this	  stage	  of	  the	  experiment.	  	  In	   the	   second	   stage	   of	   the	   experiment	   (encoding	   stage,	   performed	  immediately	   after	   the	   context	   exposure	   stage),	   subjects	   completed	   a	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series	   of	   trials	   in	   which	   they	   saw	   pictures	   of	   objects	   (randomly	  presented	   in	   one	   of	   the	   four	   quadrants	   of	   the	   screen),	   and	   had	   to	  indicate	   if	   the	   objects	   were	   man-­‐made	   or	   natural	   with	   left	   and	   right	  button	   presses	   (Figure	   4-­‐4B).	   On	   some	   trials,	   an	   obviously	   up-­‐side	  down	   picture	   was	   shown,	   and	   subjects	   had	   to	   press	   the	   space-­‐bar	   if	  such	   a	   picture	   came	   onscreen.	   Trials	   were	   divided	   into	   alternating	  ‘context’	  and	  ‘no	  context’	  blocks	  (3	  blocks	  in	  each	  condition,	  44	  trials	  in	  each	   block),	   and	   subjects	  were	   given	   the	   opportunity	   to	   take	   a	   break	  between	  each	  block.	  In	  ‘no	  context’	  block	  trials,	  the	  object	  picture	  came	  onscreen	   immediately	   after	   the	   fixation-­‐cross	   disappeared	   (Figure	   4-­‐4B).	   In	   the	   ‘context’	   block	   trials,	   the	   fixation	   cross	  was	   followed	   by	   a	  context	  picture	  that	  was	  first	  presented	  on	  its	  own,	  and	  stayed	  onscreen	  for	   the	   rest	  of	   the	   trial.	  After	   the	   context	  picture	  was	  presented	  alone	  for	  2000ms,	  the	  object	  stimulus	  appeared	  superimposed	  on	  the	  context	  picture,	   and	   subjects	   then	  had	   to	  make	   the	   appropriate	   response.	   For	  both	   context	   and	   no	   context	   block	   trials,	   subjects	   received	   feedback	  regarding	   the	   accuracy	   of	   their	   responses	   on	   every	   trial,	   but	   were	  otherwise	   not	   rewarded	   for	   correct	   performance.	   Unlike	   the	   previous	  stage	  of	  the	  experiment,	  objects	  presented	  (240	  in	  total,	  plus	  24	  up-­‐side	  down	   targets)	   were	   trial-­‐unique,	   while	   the	   context	   pictures	   were	  repeated,	   resulting	   in	   a	   total	   of	   264	   trials	   in	   this	   stage	   of	   the	  experiment.	  All	  stimuli	  used	  were	  identical	  to	  those	  used	  in	  Experiment	  1A.	  Five	  days	   later,	   subjects	   returned	   to	   the	   lab	   to	  perform	  a	   surprise	  memory	  test,	  which	  proceeded	  identically	  as	  in	  Experiment	  1A.	  	  4.5.2:	  Results	  	  Encoding-­‐stage	   measures	   (task	   accuracy	   and	   RTs)	   and	   all	   memory	  measures	  were	  analysed	  with	  a	  one-­‐sample	  t-­‐test	  comparing	  scores	  for	  the	  context	  versus	  the	  no	  context	  condition.	  The	  presence	  of	  an	  explicit	  context	   stimulus	   did	   not	   affect	   accuracy	   or	  RT	  during	  performance	   of	  the	  encoding-­‐stage	  semantic	  categorization	  task	  (Figure	  4-­‐4C;	  accuracy:	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t(21)=0.79,	   p>0.4;	   RT:	   t(21)=0.58,	   p>0.5).	   Memory	   scores	   were	  calculated	  identically	  as	  in	  Experiment	  1A,	  again	  including	  only	  objects	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that	  had	  received	  a	  correct	  response	  in	  the	  encoding-­‐stage	  task.	  	  The	  presence	  of	  an	  explicit	  context	  stimulus	  did	  not	  have	  any	  significant	  
Figure	   4-­‐4:	   Experiment	   1B	   design	   and	   encoding-­‐stage	   performance.	   (A)	   To	  pre-­‐expose	  subjects	  to	  the	  context	  pictures,	  subjects	  first	  completed	  a	  separate	  task	  in	  which	  they	  learned	  via	  trial-­‐and-­‐error,	  which	  key	  presses	  (up/down)	  went	  with	  which	   object	   category,	   with	   the	   context	   pictures	   in	   the	   background	   (B)	   Trial	  sequence	  for	  the	  encoding-­‐stage	  trials,	   for	  no	  context	  and	  context	  blocks	  (top	  and	  bottom,	   respectively;	   manipulated	   within	   subject).	   (C)	   Encoding-­‐stage	   task	  accuracy	  and	  RTs.	  All	  error	  bars	  are	  +/-­‐	  1	  SE.	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effects	   on	   d’,	   position	   recall	   accuracy,	   remember	   rates	   or	   know	   rates	  (Figure	   4-­‐5;	   all	   p>0.1,	   see	   Table	   4-­‐3	   for	   all	   statistics).	   No	   significant	  context	  effects	  were	  found	  on	  any	  of	  the	  other	  memory	  measures	  (sure	  hit	   rates,	   sure	   remember	   and	   sure	   know	   rates;	   all	   p>0.1).	   Explicit	  comparisons	   of	   the	   effect	   of	   context	   on	   remember	   and	   know	   rates,	  using	  a	  repeated	  2x2	  ANOVA	  (context:	  context	  vs	  no	  context;	  memory	  type:	   remember	   vs	   know)	   found	   no	   significant	   effect	   of	   context	  (F(1,21)=0.32,	   p>0.5)	   or	   any	   context	   x	   memory	   type	   interaction	  (F(1,21)=1.39,	  p>0.2),	  though	  a	  main	  effect	  of	  memory	  type	  was	  found	  (F(1,21)=4.33,	  p=0.05),	   reflective	  of	  higher	  rates	  of	   remembering	   than	  knowing.	   As	   such,	   this	   follow-­‐up	   experiment	   found	   no	   evidence	   to	  suggest	   that	   the	   presence	   of	   an	   explicit	   context	   stimulus	   at	   encoding	  had	   any	   effect	   on	   remember	   rates,	   compared	   to	   a	   relatively	   sparse	  context	  of	  a	  black	  background.	  	  
Table	  4-­‐3:	  Experiment	  1B	  memory	  statistics	  
	   t	  statistic	  (df=21)	   p	  value	  (2-­‐tailed)	  
Recognition	  (d')	   0.70	   0.49	  
Sure	  hit	  rate	   1.60	   0.13	  
Remember	  rate	   0.63	   	  0.54	  
Know	  rate	   1.60	   0.12	  
Sure	  remember	  rate	   1.15	   0.26	  
Sure	  know	  rate	   1.43	   0.17	  
Position	  recall	  
accuracy	  
0.71	   0.49	  
84	  
	  
	   	  
Figure	   4-­‐5:	   Memory	   test	   results	   for	   Experiment	   1B.	   No	   significant	  effects	   of	   context	   presence	   (vs	   absence)	   were	   observed	   for	   any	   of	   the	  memory	  measures	  collected.	  All	  error	  bars	  are	  +/-­‐	  1	  SE.	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4.6:	  Discussion	  	  	  In	   this	   study,	   we	   set	   out	   to	   examine	   if	   sharing	   a	   context	   with	   other	  rewarded	   events	   influenced	   memory	   for	   objects	   that	   were	   never	  associated	   with	   reward.	   We	   found	   that	   sharing	   a	   context	   with	  rewarding	  objects	  increased	  the	  probability	  that	  motivationally	  neutral	  objects	   would	   be	   recognized	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   recollection	   rather	   than	  familiarity,	   but	   only	  when	   the	   shared	   context	  was	   explicitly	   signalled	  with	   a	   background	   picture.	   Subjects	  who	   saw	   objects	   against	   a	   blank	  black	   background	   during	   encoding	   (no	   context	   condition)	   showed	  higher	  rates	  of	  remembering	  for	  rewarded	  compared	  to	  neutral	  objects,	  whereas	   subjects	   who	   saw	   a	   task-­‐irrelevant	   context	   picture	   in	   the	  background	   during	   encoding	   (in	   the	   context	   condition)	   showed	   high	  rates	  of	  remembering	  for	  both	  rewarding	  and	  neutral	  objects	  (Figure	  4-­‐2C).	  These	  qualitative	  changes	  in	  memory	  were	  observed	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  effects	  on	  overall	  recognition	  (as	  measured	  by	  d’;	  Figure	  4-­‐2B).	  	  At	  memory	   test,	   subjects	  classified	  recognized	  objects	  as	  being	  having	  been	   ‘remembered’	   or	   ‘known’	   to	   be	   old,	   after	   having	   first	   made	   the	  initial	   judgment	   of	   whether	   they	   had	   seen	   the	   object	   before	   or	   not.	  Sharing	   a	   context	   with	   other	   rewarding	   objects	   did	   not	   affect	   simple	  recognition	  of	  neutral	  objects,	  but	   rather	   increased	   the	   likelihood	   that	  
associated	   detail	   would	   be	   successfully	   recollected	   (resulting	   in	   a	  ‘remember’	   rather	   than	   a	   ‘know’	   memory	   categorization).	   One	  significant	   possibility	   is	   that	   the	   context	   pictures	   were	   themselves	  recollected	  by	  subjects	  in	  the	  context	  condition	  (i.e.	  during	  the	  memory	  test;	   Experiment	   1A),	   thus	   influencing	   the	   rates	   of	   remembering	   for	  neutral	  objects.	  To	  explore	  this	  possibility,	  we	  ran	  a	  second	  experiment	  (Experiment	   1B,	   outlined	   in	   Figure	   4-­‐4)	   to	   examine	   if	   the	   presence	  (versus	  absence)	  of	  a	  background	  picture	  during	  encoding	  would	  itself	  influence	   the	   extent	   to	  which	  objects	  were	   recognized	  on	   the	  basis	   of	  recollection	  or	  familiarity.	  This	  follow-­‐up	  experiment	  failed	  to	  find	  any	  evidence	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  background	  context	  picture	  could	  itself	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lead	   to	   better	   recollection	   of	   associative	   detail	   (in	   support	   of	   better	  remembering)	  at	  subsequent	  memory	  test.	  	  Another	   possibility	   is	   that	   neutral	   objects	   were	   indirectly	   reward	  conditioned	   via	   generalization	   of	   the	   reward	   association	   from	   the	  rewarded	   objects	   to	   the	   contexts,	   and	   then	   from	   the	   contexts	   to	   the	  neutral	  objects	  themselves.	  While	  we	  are	  unable	  to	  entirely	  rule	  out	  the	  possibility	  that	  reward	  associations	  may	  have	  spread	  in	  this	  manner,	  it	  seems	   unlikely	   given	   that	   our	   data	   shows	   no	   evidence	   of	   reward	  conditioning	   for	  either	   the	  contexts	  or	   the	  neutral	  objects	   themselves.	  The	   context	   pictures	   themselves	   were	   unlikely	   to	   have	   been	   reward-­‐conditioned:	   because	   there	   was	   no	   relationship	   between	   the	   context	  pictures	  and	  the	  object’s	  reward	  status	  on	  each	  trial	  (a	  detail	  that	  was	  emphasized	   to	   subjects	   before	   the	   learning	   stage	   of	   the	   experiment),	  each	  context	  picture	  would	  have	  been	  paired	  with	  a	  rewarding	  objects	  roughly	  50%	  of	   the	  time	  only.	  The	   lack	  of	  reward	  conditioning	   for	   the	  context	   pictures	   is	   further	   supported	   by	   the	   fact	   that,	   while	   reward	  significantly	  impacted	  both	  accuracy	  and	  RT	  in	  the	  encoding-­‐stage	  task,	  the	   presence	   of	   a	   context	   picture	   itself	   did	   not	   significantly	   influence	  either	   RT	   and	   accuracy	   either	   alone	   or	   in	   interaction	   with	   reward	  (Figure	   4-­‐2A).	   As	   such,	   it	   seems	   unlikely	   that	   the	   observed	   memory	  effects	   would	   have	   come	   about	   via	   direct	   reward-­‐conditioning	   of	   the	  context	  pictures	  themselves.	  What	   other	   neural	   mechanisms	   might	   allow	   sharing	   a	   context	   with	  separate	   rewarding	   objects	   to	   influence	   memory	   for	   motivationally	  neutral	  objects?	  One	  possibility	  is	  that	  during	  encoding,	  both	  rewarding	  and	   neutral	   objects	   were	   bound	   to	   the	   same	   repeating	   context	  background	   pictures,	   so	   that	   representations	   of	   the	   neutral	   and	  rewarding	   objects	   were	   linked	   (along	   with	   that	   of	   the	   background	  context)	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  hippocampal	  ensemble.	  Multiple	  elements	  of	  an	   experience	   are	   thought	   to	   be	   bound	   together	   when	   they	   are	  encountered	   (Boywitt	   and	  Meiser,	   2012;	   Hayes	   et	   al.,	   2010),	   and	   the	  hippocampus	   is	   thought	   to	   sub-­‐serve	   this	   process	   via	   which	  multiple	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individual	   elements	   are	   bound	   into	   a	   single,	   conjunctive,	   long-­‐term	  memory	  representation	  (Broadbent	  et	  al.,	  2002;	  Davachi,	  2004;	  O’Reilly	  and	   Rudy,	   2001;	   Rudy	   and	   O’Reilly,	   2001;	   Shimamura,	   2002).	   If	   the	  rewarding	  and	  neutral	  objects	  were	  indeed	  representationally	  linked	  in	  this	   context-­‐mediated	   manner,	   reward-­‐related	   mechanisms	   that	  support	  enhanced	  consolidation	  of	  rewarding	  events	  may	  then	  have	  led	  to	   stabilization	   of	   the	   entire	   hippocampal	   engram,	   resulting	   in	  improved	  memory	  for	  the	  neutral	  objects	  as	  well.	  Spreading	  of	  reward-­‐related	   memory	   enhancements	   to	   non-­‐rewarded	   but	   associatively	  linked	  exemplars	  have	  been	  noted	   in	   the	   literature	  (Imai	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  The	   findings	   reported	   here	   may	   be	   similar	   to	   such	   previous	   reports,	  pointing	   towards	   a	   similar	   phenomenon	   in	   which	   reward-­‐related	  memory	   effects	   may	   spread	   to	   other	   neutral	   encountered	   objects	   via	  indirect	  associative	  structures.	  	  Lastly,	  we	  also	  hypothesized	  that	  the	  similarity	  of	  the	  context	  pictures	  used	  might	  modulate	  context-­‐mediated	  memory	  effects.	  Specifically,	  we	  had	  hypothesized	  that	  context-­‐mediated	  memory	  effects	  might	  be	  more	  pronounced	   when	   the	   context	   pictures	   were	   similar	   compared	   to	  dissimilar,	  due	  to	  discrimination	  of	   the	  similar	  picture	  pair	  potentially	  placing	  a	  greater	  demand	  on	  hippocampal	  pattern	   separation	   (Bakker	  et	   al.,	   2008;	   Bonnici	   et	   al.,	   2012;	   Graham	   et	   al.,	   2006;	   Kesner,	   2007,	  2013;	  Marr,	  1971;	  McNaughton	  and	  Morris,	  1987;	  Mundy	  et	  al.,	  2013;	  Neunuebel	  and	  Knierim,	  2014;	  O’Keefe	  and	  Nadel,	  1979).	  However,	  we	  found	   no	   significant	   effects	   of	   context	   similarity	   on	   subsequent	  memory,	  either	  on	   its	  own	  or	   in	   interaction	  with	  reward	  (Figure	  4-­‐3).	  One	   limitation	   of	   these	   negative	   findings	   reported	   here	   are	   is	   that,	  because	  the	  context	  pictures	  were	  task	  irrelevant,	  some	  subjects	  in	  the	  context	  condition	  may	  not	  have	  successfully	  discriminated	  between	  the	  similar	  pictures	  at	  all.	  As	  such,	  we	  are	  unable	  to	  confidently	  assert,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  current	  data,	  that	  context	  similarity	  does	  not	  affect	  the	  observed	  memory	  effects.	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In	  this	  study,	  we	  set	  out	  to	  examine	  how	  extensively	  reward	  influences	  episodic	   memory.	   Specifically,	   we	   examined	   if	   sharing	   an	   explicit	  background	   context	   with	   separate	   rewarding	   objects	   influenced	  memory	   for	   objects	   that	   were	   themselves	   motivationally	   neutral.	   We	  found	   that	   sharing	   a	   context	   with	   rewarding	   objects	   increased	   the	  probability	   that	   neutral	   objects	   would	   be	   recognized	   on	   the	   basis	   of	  recollection	   rather	   than	   familiarity,	   but	   only	  when	   the	   shared	   context	  was	   explicitly	   demarcated	   with	   a	   background	   picture.	   These	   results	  indicate	   that	   reward-­‐related	   effects	   on	   episodic	   memory	   may	   impact	  non-­‐rewarded	  objects,	  possibly	  as	  a	  result	  of	  reward	  effects	  spreading	  through	  associative	  representational	  structures.	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Chapter	  5:	  Contextual	  
modulation	  of	  memory	  and	  









5.2:	  Introduction	  	  Learning	  which	  contexts	  are	  associated	  with	  reward	  value	  is	  thought	  to	  depend	   on	   functional	   interaction	   between	   the	   hippocampus	   and	   the	  SN/VTA	   (Lisman,	   Grace,	   &	   Düzel,	   2011;	   Luo,	   Tahsili-­‐Fahadan,	   Wise,	  Lupica,	   &	   Aston-­‐Jones,	   2011).	   An	   outstanding	   question	   concerns	  whether	   a	   rewarding	   context	   can	   influence	   memory	   for	   the	   events	  embedded	   within	   it.	   Reinforcement	   learning	   theory	   would	   posit	   that	  objects	  embedded	  into	  a	  context	  should	  not	  acquire	  any	  reward-­‐related	  benefits	  if	  the	  reward	  is	  already	  fully	  predicted	  by	  the	  context	  (Kamin,	  1969;	   Rescorla	   and	   Wagner,	   1972).	   In	   contrast,	   the	   neurobiology	   of	  hippocampal-­‐SN/VTA	   interactions	   would	   theoretically	   predict	   such	  contextual	   memory	   benefits.	   Specifically,	   contextual	   activation	   of	   the	  hippocampus	   can	   lead	   to	   a	   tonic	   up-­‐regulation	   of	   SN/VTA	   activity,	  thereby	  influencing	  dopamine	  release	  to	  co-­‐occurring	  events	  (Goto	  and	  Grace,	   2008).	   Dopamine,	   in	   turn,	   can	   up-­‐regulate	   protein-­‐synthesis	   in	  hippocampal	  neurons,	   thereby	  affecting	  plasticity	   for	  events	  occurring	  in	  temporal	  proximity	  to	  its	  release	  (so-­‐called	  synaptic	  tag-­‐and-­‐capture;	  see	  Redondo	  &	  Morris,	  2011,	  for	  review).	  	  Given	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  hippocampus	  in	  regulating	  SN/VTA	  activity	  (Lisman	   and	   Grace,	   2005;	   Luo	   et	   al.,	   2011),	   it	   is	   conceivable	   that	  contextual	   reward	   effects	   on	   memory	   might	   be	   particularly	   strong	  when	   learning	   and	   retrieving	   context-­‐reward	   associations	   poses	   high	  demands	  on	  hippocampal	  processing.	  This	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  the	  case	  when	  it	   is	   necessary	   to	   discriminate	   between	   perceptually	   similar	   contexts	  (Graham	   et	   al.,	   2006;	   Kesner,	   2007;	   Lee	   et	   al.,	   2005a).	   Indeed,	   the	  formation	  of	  distinct	  memory	  representations	  for	  similar	  environments	  depends	   on	   the	   ability	   of	   the	   dentate	   gyrus	   (DG)	   to	   perform	   pattern	  separation	   on	   inputs	   from	   the	   entorhinal	   cortex,	   resulting	   in	   distinct	  representations	   that	   are	   maintained	   at	   the	   level	   of	   the	   hippocampal	  subfield	   CA3	   (Bakker	   et	   al.,	   2008;	   Bonnici	   et	   al.,	   2012;	   Graham	   et	   al.,	  2006;	  Kesner,	  2007,	  2013;	  Marr,	  1971;	  McNaughton	  and	  Morris,	  1987;	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Mundy	  et	  al.,	  2013;	  Neunuebel	  and	  Knierim,	  2014;	  O’Keefe	  and	  Nadel,	  1979).	   Therefore,	   intact	   learning	   about	   rewarding	   contexts	   that	   are	  perceptually	  similar	  should	  depend	  on	  neural	  representations	  that	  are	  supported	  by	  the	  CA3	  and	  SN/VTA.	  Indeed,	  a	  pathway	  linking	  CA3	  with	  the	  SN/VTA	  has	  recently	  been	  reported	  (Luo	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  	  	  We	   hypothesized	   that	   the	   ability	   to	   discriminate	   a	   rewarding	   context	  from	   a	   similar	   but	   neutral	   context	   would	   invoke	   co-­‐activation	   of	  DG/CA3	  and	  SN/VTA.	  We	  set	  out	  to	  determine	  (i)	  whether	  a	  rewarding	  context	   benefitted	   memory	   for	   embedded	   objects,	   (ii)	   the	   extent	   to	  which	  such	  a	  benefit	  related	  to	  a	  co-­‐activation	  of	  DG/CA3	  and	  SN/VTA,	  and	  (iii)	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  such	  a	  benefit	  was	  modified	  by	  demands	  on	  contextual	  pattern	  separation.	  Subjects	  underwent	  context	  conditioning	  for	  a	  pair	  of	  similar	  and	  dissimilar	  pictures,	  where	  one	  context	  picture	  in	  each	  pair	  was	  associated	  with	  reward	  and	  the	  other	  was	  associated	  with	  a	  neutral	  outcome	  (Figure	  5-­‐1A).	  During	  fMRI	  scanning,	  pictures	  of	  objects	   were	   superimposed	   on	   these	   context	   pictures	   (Figure	   5-­‐1B),	  and	  incidental	  memory	  for	  the	  objects	  was	  tested	  after	  a	  five-­‐day	  delay.	  We	   employed	   high-­‐resolution	   fMRI	   alongside	   specialized	   spatial	  normalization	   protocols,	   in	   order	   to	   determine	   if	   any	   such	  mnemonic	  effects	  were	   specifically	   related	   to	   co-­‐engagement	   of	   the	  DG/CA3	   and	  SN/VTA.	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5.3:	  Methods	  	  5.3.1:	  Subjects	  	  	  	  Twenty-­‐seven	  adults	  participated	  in	  the	  experiment	  (9	  male;	  age	  range	  19-­‐31	   years;	   mean=	   22.85,	   std	   =3.08	   years).	   Two	   Subjects	   were	  excluded	  from	  both	  behavioural	  and	  MRI	  analyses	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  poor	  overall	  memory	   (d’	   <0.3),	   and	   one	   further	   Subject	  was	   excluded	   from	  MRI	   analysis	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   poor	  MRI	   coverage.	   Overall,	   25	   subjects	  were	  included	  in	  behavioural	  analysis,	  and	  24	  subjects	  were	  included	  in	  the	   general	   fMRI	   analysis.	   In	   the	   brief	   behavioural	   analysis	   of	   ‘know’	  rates	   only,	   a	   further	   2	   subjects	   were	   removed	   for	   having	   negative	  corrected	  know	  rates	  (indicating	  more	  false	  alarms	  than	  hits	  in	   ‘know’	  memory	   judgments),	   in	   additional	   to	   the	   two	   Subjects	   that	   had	   been	  excluded	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   poor	   overall	   memory.	   All	   Subjects	   were	  healthy,	   right-­‐handed,	   and	   had	   normal	   or	   corrected-­‐to-­‐normal	   visual	  acuity.	   None	   of	   the	   Subjects	   reported	   a	   history	   of	   neurological	   or	  psychiatric	  conditions,	  or	  significant	  medications.	  All	  experiments	  were	  run	  with	  each	  Subject’s	  written	  informed	  consent	  and	  according	  to	  the	  local	  ethics	  clearance	  (University	  College	  London,	  London,	  UK).	  	  	  5.3.2:	  Experimental	  design	  and	  task	  	  	  	  	  	   The	   task	  was	   divided	   into	   three	   stages:	   a	   context-­‐conditioning	  stage,	  a	  context-­‐dependent	  object	  encoding	  stage,	  and	  a	  memory	  test.	  In	  the	  first	  stage	  (context	  conditioning	  stage:	  not	  scanned),	  Subjects	  were	  trained	   to	  associate	  4	  unique	  context	  stimuli	   (i.e.	  background	  pictures	  depicting	  an	  indoor	  environment;	  Figure	  5-­‐1A)	  with	  either	  the	  presence	  or	   absence	   of	   monetary	   reward,	   by	   performing	   a	   box-­‐probe	   task	   in	  which	  the	  background	  context	  indicated	  whether	  money	  was	  available	  to	  win	   on	   that	   trial	   or	   not.	   Each	   Subject	   saw	  a	   pair	   of	   similar	   context	  pictures	   and	   a	   pair	   of	   dissimilar	   ones	   in	   the	   experiment,	   with	   one	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picture	   in	   each	  pair	   being	   rewarded	   and	   the	   other	   not.	   Subjects	  were	  instructed	   that	   they	  would	   see	  4	  unique	   context	   stimuli,	   grouped	   into	  pairs	  according	  to	  the	  type	  of	  room	  depicted	  (office	  or	  living	  room),	  and	  that	  one	  picture	  in	  each	  pair	  would	  be	  rewarded.	  The	  exact	  stimuli	  used	  and	   their	   assignment	   to	   the	   similarity	   and	   valence	   conditions	   was	  counterbalanced	   across	   all	   subjects	   (see	   later	   section	   on	   Stimuli	   for	  more	   details).	   The	   background	   context	   stimulus	  was	   shown	   onscreen	  for	  4000	  ms,	  after	  which	  a	  blue	  box	  appeared	  (with	  a	   jittered	  onset	  of	  1100-­‐1600	   ms)	   briefly	   in	   one	   of	   the	   four	   quadrants	   of	   the	   picture.	  Subjects	  were	  instructed	  to	  press	  a	  button	  when	  the	  blue	  box	  appeared,	  and,	  if	  money	  was	  available	  to	  win	  on	  that	  trial	  (i.e.	  as	  indicated	  by	  the	  background	   context	   picture),	   then	   they	   would	   win	   +100p	   if	   their	  response	  was	  sufficiently	  quick.	  The	  background	  context	  stimulus	  was	  displayed	   for	   the	  entire	   length	  of	   each	   trial	   (between	  6000-­‐7000	  ms),	  and	   Subjects	   viewed	   a	   blank	   screen	   with	   a	   fixation	   cross	   during	   the	  inter-­‐trial	  interval	  (ITI;	  1000	  ms).	  Each	  context	  stimulus	  was	  presented	  30	   times,	   and	   the	   context–reinforcement	   relationships	   were	   held	  constant	   for	   each	   Subject	   throughout	   the	   entire	   experiment.	   Subjects	  learned	  through	  trial-­‐and-­‐error	  which	  context	  stimuli	  predicted	  reward	  and	   which	   predicted	   the	   absence	   of	   reward.	   This	   session	   lasted	   for	  roughly	   20	  minutes	   in	   total,	   and	   verbal	   report	   following	   this	   training	  confirmed	   that	   all	   Subjects	   had	   learned	   these	   associations	   with	   full	  accuracy.	   Subjects	   were	   told	   to	   respond	   on	   every	   trial	   regardless	   of	  whether	  they	  thought	  money	  was	  available	  to	  win	  or	  not,	  and	  response	  thresholds	   were	   set	   according	   to	   each	   Subject’s	   performance	   in	   an	  earlier	   box-­‐probe	   thresholding	   task	   (in	   which	   they	   made	   speeded	  responses	  to	  the	  appearance	  of	  a	  box	  probe,	  without	  any	  context	  stimuli	  in	  the	  background;	  the	  mean	  +	  1	  SD	  response	  time	  in	  the	  thresholding	  task	   was	   used	   as	   the	   response	   threshold	   during	   the	   context	  conditioning	  stage).	  This	  stage	  was	  performed	  on	  a	  desktop	  computer	  just	  before	  Subjects	  entered	  the	  MRI	  scanner	  for	  the	  second	  stage	  of	  the	  experiment.	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In	  stage	  2	  (context-­‐dependent	  object	  encoding	  stage:	  scanned),	  Subjects	  saw	   the	   same	   4	   unique	   context	   stimuli,	   while	   making	   semantic	  judgments	   to	  object	  stimuli	   that	  were	  superimposed	  on	  top	  (Figure	  5-­‐1B).	   On	   each	   trial,	   the	   context	   was	   presented	   onscreen	   for	   4000	  ms,	  after	  which	  three	  object	  pictures	  were	  presented	  for	  2000ms	  each,	  one	  after	   the	   other,	   with	   the	   context	   image	   remaining	   in	   the	   background.	  Subjects	  made	  speeded	  semantic	  judgments	  to	  each	  object,	  indicating	  if	  they	  were	  man-­‐made	  or	  natural.	  As	  in	  stage	  1,	  the	  background	  context	  stimuli	   determined	  whether	  monetary	   reward	  was	   available	  or	  not.	   If	  monetary	  reward	  was	  available	  on	  a	  given	   trial,	  Subjects	  were	  able	   to	  win	  money	  by	  being	  quick	  and	  accurate	  in	  their	  semantic	  judgments	  of	  each	  object	  (+50p	  per	  object).	  The	  threshold	  for	  a	  quick	  response	  was	  again	  adjusted	   for	  each	  Subject,	   according	   to	   their	  performance	  on	  an	  earlier	  thresholding	  task	  in	  which	  they	  made	  quick	  semantic	  judgments	  to	   practice	   object	   pictures	   without	   any	   co-­‐presented	   background	  stimuli	  (mean	  +	  1	  SD	  response	  time	  in	  the	  thresholding	  task	  was	  again	  used	  as	  the	  response	  threshold	  for	  this	  stage).	  At	  the	  end	  of	  50%	  of	  all	  trials,	   Subjects	   were	   provided	   with	   feedback	   specifying	   how	   much	  money	   they	   had	   won	   on	   that	   trial,	   and	   on	   the	   other	   half	   of	   trials	   no	  feedback	   was	   provided	   (i.e.	   a	   question	   mark	   was	   displayed).	   This	  procedure	  was	  adopted	  to	  allow	  us	  to	  de-­‐correlate	  the	  presentation	  of	  reward-­‐predicting	  context	  stimuli	  from	  the	  receipt	  of	  monetary	  reward	  in	  the	  fMRI	  analysis,	  and	  Subjects	  were	  told	  that	  they	  would	  still	  receive	  the	  money	  won	  on	   trials	  where	   the	   feedback	  was	  not	   directly	   shown.	  Subjects	  were	   instructed	  to	  perform	  as	  well	  as	  they	  could	  on	  all	   trials,	  regardless	  of	  reinforcement.	  To	  further	  encourage	  them	  to	  do	  so,	  slow	  or	  incorrect	  responses	  on	  neutral	  trials	  had	  a	  25%	  chance	  of	  incurring	  a	  small	   loss	   of	   -­‐5p.	   As	   before,	   the	   background	   context	   stimuli	   stayed	  onscreen	   in	   the	   background	   throughout	   the	   entire	   trial,	   and	   Subjects	  viewed	  a	  blank	   screen	  with	  a	   fixation	   cross	  during	   the	   ITI	   (2000	  ms).	  Subjects	   saw	   288	   trial-­‐unique	   object	   stimuli	   (144	   man-­‐made,	   144	  natural)	  during	  this	  stage	  of	  the	  experiment,	  together	  with	  the	  4	  unique	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Figure	  5-­‐1:	  Experimental	  design	   (A)	  Examples	  of	   four	  unique	  context	   stimuli	   seen	  by	  a	  single	  Subject.	  Context	   stimuli	  are	  divided	   into	  a	  similar	  pair	   and	  a	  dissimilar	  pair,	  where	  one	   context	   picture	   in	   each	   pair	   is	   rewarded	   and	   the	   other	   is	   neutral	   (producing	   four	  experimental	   context	   conditions:	   similar-­‐reward,	   similar-­‐neutral,	   dissimiliar-­‐reward,	  dissimilar-­‐neutral)	   (B)	   Trial	   sequence	   for	   the	   Encoding-­‐phase,	   performed	   in	   scanner.	  Reinforcement-­‐neutral	   objects	   were	   presented	   with	   reinforcement-­‐predicting	   context	  pictures	   in	   the	   background.	   	   On	   each	   trial,	   Subjects	   made	   semantic	   judgements	   to	   each	  object	  as	  it	  came	  onscreen	  (indicating	  if	  it	  was	  a	  man-­‐made	  or	  natural	  object).	  	  The	  context	  picture	  on	  each	  trial	  determined	  whether	  there	  was	  money	  available	  to	  be	  won	  on	  the	  trial	  or	  not;	  if	  money	  was	  available,	  Subjects	  would	  win	  +50p	  for	  each	  object	  to	  which	  they	  had	  made	  a	  quick	  and	  accurate	  response.	  The	  object	  stimuli	  were	  subject	  to	  a	  surprise	  memory	  test	  after	  a	  5-­‐day	  delay.	  (C)	  In	  order	  to	  control	   for	  stimulus-­‐specific	  effects	  relating	  to	   the	  context	   stimuli,	   the	   exact	   four	   context	   stimuli	   seen	   by	   each	   subject	   was	   randomly	  counterbalanced	   across	   all	   subjects.	   Four	   different	   similar	   context	   stimuli	   pairs	   were	  created	  by	  altering	  the	  positions	  of	  furniture	  within	   four	  different	  rooms	  (two	  offices	  and	  two	  living	  rooms).	  For	  each	  subject,	  similar	  and	  dissimilar	  pairs	  of	  contexts	  were	  assembled	  by	  choosing	  one	   similar	   context	  pair	   (e.g.	   two	  similar	   living	   rooms,	  outlined	   in	  green),	   as	  well	  as	  one	  picture	   from	  each	  of	   the	  two	  context	  pairs	   from	  the	  other	  room	  category	  (e.g.	  two	  office	  context	  pictures,	  one	  from	  each	  of	  the	  office	  context	  pairs,	  outlined	  in	  blue).	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context	   images	   (each	   repeated	   24	   times),	   for	   a	   total	   of	   96	   trials.	   This	  session	  lasted	  approximately	  23	  minutes	  in	  total.	  Stage	   3	   of	   the	   experiment	   (object	   memory	   test:	   not	   scanned)	   was	  conducted	  5	  days	  later,	  with	  this	  delay	  period	  determined	  based	  on	  the	  results	  of	  pilot	  experiments.	  Subjects	  saw	  428	  objects	  onscreen	  (288	  of	  which	  they	  had	  seen	  before	  in	  Stage	  2	  of	  the	  experiment,	  140	  of	  which	  were	  new),	  and	  for	  each	  object	  had	  to	  decide	  whether	  it	  was	  old	  (if	  they	  had	  seen	  it	  before	  in	  the	  experiment)	  or	  new.	  If	  the	  object	  was	  deemed	  to	   be	   old,	   Subjects	  were	   then	   asked	   if	   they	   “Knew”	   or	   “Remembered”	  the	   object.	   Following	   this	   judgment,	   Subjects	   were	   asked	   to	   indicate	  whether	   their	   memory	   for	   the	   object	   was	   “strong”	   or	   “weak”.	   We	  followed	  standard	  procedures	   in	   instructing	  Subjects	  about	  remember	  and	   know	   judgments	   (Tulving,	   1985);	   specifically,	   Subjects	   were	  instructed	   to	   give	   a	   ‘Remember’	   response	   if	   they	   could	   recollect	   any	  other	   details	   from	   when	   they	   had	   initially	   seen	   the	   object,	   and	   were	  instructed	  to	  respond	  with	  ‘Know’	  if	  they	  could	  not	  recollect	  any	  other	  details	   about	   the	   object,	   and	  merely	   had	   a	   sense	   of	   it	   being	   familiar.	  Detailed	   instructions	   regarding	   this	   distinction	   were	   relayed	   to	  Subjects,	   along	   with	   examples	   of	   such	   memories	   as	   one	   would	  encounter	   them	   in	   daily	   life,	   to	   ensure	   that	   Subjects	   understood	   how	  they	  should	  respond	  in	  the	  task.	  All	  memory	  measures	  were	  corrected	  for	  false	  alarm	  rates,	  and	  d’	  [Z(hit	  rate)	  –	  Z(false	  alarm	  rate)]	  was	  used	  to	   index	   recognition	  memory.	  Overall,	   Subjects	  were	   compensated	   for	  participation	   in	   the	   experiment	   at	   a	   rate	   of	   £6/hour	   for	   behavioural	  tasks	  and	  £10/hour	  for	  MRI.	  Subjects	  also	  received	  a	  proportion	  of	  the	  total	  amount	  of	  money	  that	  they	  had	  won	  in	  the	  experiment	  (in	  stage	  1	  and	  2	  of	  the	  experiment).	  	  A	   2x2	   (Similarity	   x	   Valence)	   Factorial	   design	   was	   employed	   for	   the	  Context	   images,	   and	   behavioural	   measures	   (response	   speeds,	  recognition	  accuracy)	  were	  analysed	  with	  a	  2x2	  (Similarity	  x	  Valence)	  repeated-­‐measures	  factorial	  ANOVA.	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  5.3.3:	  Stimuli	  	  Context	   stimuli	   were	   specifically	   created	   for	   this	   experiment,	   and	  consisted	   of	   grayscale	   pictures	   of	   offices	   and	   living	   rooms	   with	   no	  human	  beings	  in	  them	  (Figure	  5-­‐1C).	  The	  similar	  pictures	  were	  created	  by	   changing	   the	   position	   of	   furniture	  within	   room,	  without	   adding	   or	  removing	   any	   elements	   in	   the	   scene.	   Dissimilar	   context	   stimuli	  consisted	   of	   two	   pictures	   from	   two	   different	   rooms	   (belonging	   to	   the	  same	   category,	   e.g.	   two	  different	   offices).	   Four	   similar	   context-­‐picture	  pairs	  were	  created	  for	  this	  experiment	  (2	   living	  room	  and	  2	  office).	   In	  order	   to	   eliminate	   stimulus-­‐specific	   effects	   relating	   to	   the	   context	  stimuli,	   the	   exact	   context	   stimuli	   used	   for	   each	   Subject	   (and	   their	  assignment	  within	  the	  factorial	  design)	  was	  counterbalanced	  across	  the	  entire	   group,	   by	   drawing	   different	   similar-­‐dissimilar	   permutations	   of	  the	  context	  stimuli	   from	  the	  original	   four	  similar	  context-­‐pairs	  (Figure	  5-­‐1C).	   Each	   Subject	   saw	   four	   unique	   context	   stimuli,	   repeated	  throughout	   the	   experiment.	   Object	   stimuli	   consisted	   of	   colour	   images	  assembled	  from	  the	  Brady,	  Konkle,	  Alvarez,	  &	  Oliva	  (2008)	  database	  of	  object	  stimuli	  as	  well	  as	  some	  additional	  images	  from	  the	  internet,	  and	  were	   balanced	   in	   terms	   of	   semantic	   category	   (man-­‐made	   versus	  natural).	  	  
	  5.3.4:	  fMRI	  data	  acquisition	  and	  preprocessing	  	  	  	  	  Data	   was	   acquired	   using	   a	   3T	   Quattro	   Siemens	   scanner	   (Siemens	  Healthcare,	  Erlangen,	  Germany)	  operated	  with	  a	  32-­‐channel	  head	  coil.	  Functional	  data	  was	  acquired	  using	  a	  three-­‐dimensional	  gradient-­‐echo	  T2*-­‐weighted	   echo-­‐planar	   imaging	   (EPI)	   sequence	   (TR=62.5ms,	  TE=30ms,	   flip	   angle=15°),	   covering	  a	  partial	   volume	   that	   included	   the	  hippocampus,	   striatum	   and	   midbrain	   (40	   oblique	   axial	   slices	   per	  
98	  
	  
volume	  acquired	  in	  ascending	  order;	  field	  of	  view=192	  mm;	  slab	  angled	  at	  -­‐45°	  in	  the	  anteroposterior	  axis;	  spatial	  resolution=	  2mm	  isotropic),	  using	   a	   functional	   sequence	   that	   was	   optimized	   for	   the	   hippocampus	  and	   midbrain	   (Lutti	   et	   al.,	   2013).	   Respiration	   and	   heart	   rate	   were	  recorded	  using	  a	  breathing	  belt	  and	  pulse	  oximeter,	  and	  used	  to	  correct	  for	   respiration-­‐	   and	   heartbeat-­‐related	   artefacts	   (Hutton	   et	   al.,	   2011).	  Individual	   field	   maps	   were	   also	   acquired	   using	   the	   standard	  manufacturer’s	   double	   echo	   gradient	   echo	   field	   map	   sequence	   (TE	   =	  10.0	   and	   12.46	  ms,	   TR	   1020ms;	  matrix	   size,	   64x64;	   64	   slices,	   spatial	  resolution=3	  x	  3	  x	  3	  mm),	   to	  allow	   for	  distortion	  correction	  using	   the	  SPM	  Fieldmap	  toolbox	  (Hutton	  et	  al.,	  2002).	  Multiparameter	  structural	  images	   (including	   T1-­‐weighted	   and	   magnetization-­‐transfer	   contrasts;	  spatial	   resolution=1.3mm	   isotropic)	   were	   acquired	   using	   established	  protocols	   (Weiskopf	  and	  Helms,	  2008).	  These	  high-­‐resolution	   imaging	  protocols	  allow	  us	  to	  localize	  any	  observed	  neural	  activations	  to	  specific	  hippocampal	   subfields,	   though	   it	   precludes	   reliable	   differentiation	   of	  the	   DG	   and	   CA3	   regions.	   As	   such,	   the	   DG	   and	   CA3	  were	   treated	   as	   a	  single	   combined	   region	   in	   our	   analysis.	   All	   data	   analysis	   (aside	   from	  spatial	  normalization)	  was	  conducted	  in	  SPM8	  (Wellcome	  Trust	  Centre	  For	   Neuroimaging,	   London,	   UK).	   Preprocessing	   included	   bias	  correction,	   realignment,	   unwarping	   (using	   individual	   fieldmaps),	   and	  smoothing	   with	   a	   4	   mm	   Gaussian	   kernel.	   Standard	   spatial	  normalization	   steps	  were	  omitted	  during	  preprocessing,	   in	   lieu	  of	   the	  specialized	  protocols.	  	  Spatial	   normalization	  was	   conducted	   using	   the	   programme	   Advanced	  Normalization	  Tools	  (ANTs;	  Avants,	  Tustison,	  Wu,	  Cook,	  &	  Gee,	  2011),	  which	   implements	   SyN	   (symmetric	   normalization),	   a	   powerful	  diffeomorphic	   registration	   algorithm	   (Klein	   et	   al.,	   2009)	   commonly	  used	   for	   hippocampal	   subfield	   localization.	   Using	   this	   procedure,	   a	  group	   template	   brain	   is	   first	   constructed	   using	   the	   structural	   T1-­‐weighted	  images	  of	  all	  Subjects,	  and	  transformations	  mapping	  between	  each	  Subjects	  native	  space	  and	  the	  group	  template	  are	  then	  calculated,	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guided	  by	  user-­‐specified	  anatomical	   landmarks	  that	  are	  marked	  in	  the	  group	   and	   individual	   Subject	   spaces	   (bilateral	   landmarks	   used:	  anterior-­‐most	   edge	   of	   the	   hippocampus;	   posterior	   hippocampus;	  superior,	  inferior,	  medial	  and	  lateral	  borders	  of	  the	  hippocampus	  on	  the	  first	   coronal	   slice	  where	   the	  uncus	   is	   clearly	  visible;	   superior,	   inferior	  and	   middle	   borders	   of	   the	   SN/VTA).	   Spatial	   normalization	   was	   then	  implemented	   by	   using	   these	   transformations	   to	   bring	   the	   first-­‐level	  statistical	  maps	  (first	   level	  contrasts;	   see	   later	  section	   for	  detail)	   from	  each	  Subject	  into	  the	  group	  template	  space.	  Importantly,	  this	  procedure	  allows	  for	  inverse	  mapping	  of	  group-­‐level	  results	  clusters	  back	  into	  the	  native	  space	  of	  individual	  Subjects,	  which	  allows	  us	  to	  verify	  that	  group-­‐level	  hippocampal	  voxels	  in	  DG/CA3	  did	  indeed	  map	  onto	  the	  DG/CA3	  hippocampal	  subregion	  in	  all	  individual	  Subjects’	  anatomical	  scans.	  	  5.3.5:	  fMRI	  analysis	  	  
Voxel-­‐based	   fMRI	  analysis	   	   	  A	   single	   first-­‐level	  General	   Linear	  Model	  was	  employed	  to	  examine	  all	  neural	  activations	  relating	  to	  the	  contexts,	  objects,	   and	   overall	   memory.	   The	   model	   included	   four	   separate	  regressors	   corresponding	   to	   the	   background	   contexts	   of	   our	   2x2	  factorial	   design	   (i.e.	   Similar-­‐Rewarded,	   Similar-­‐Neutral,	   Dissimilar-­‐Rewarded	   and	   Dissimilar-­‐Neutral).	   The	   presentation	   of	   background	  contexts	  was	  modelled	  with	  a	  boxcar	   function	  of	  12	   seconds	  duration	  (including	   the	   presentation	   of	   the	   three	   embedded	   objects),	   and	  convolved	   with	   a	   canonical	   hemodynamic	   response	   function	   (HRF)	  combined	  with	   time	   and	   dispersion	   derivatives	   (Friston	   et	   al.,	   1998).	  These	   ‘context	   event’	   regressors	   were	   parametrically	   modulated	   by	  their	   respective	   ‘context	   memory’	   scores	   (i.e.	   the	   number	   of	   objects,	  ranging	  from	  0	  to	  3,	  recognized	  as	  ‘old’	  during	  the	  memory	  test).	  These	  Subject-­‐specific	   parametric	   regressors	   were	   also	   convolved	   with	   the	  HRF	   (and	   time/dispersion	   derivatives),	   allowing	   us	   to	   identify	   brain	  regions	   whose	   activity	   correlated	   with	   successful	   memory	   for	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embedded	   objects	   as	   a	   function	   of	   context	   type.	   8	   Object	   regressors	  were	  also	   included	   in	   the	   same	  GLM	  (corresponding	   to	   the	  embedded	  objects)	   as	   stick	   functions.	   These	   corresponded	   to	   the	   2x2	   factorial	  design	   (similarity,	   valence),	   with	   the	   additional	   incorporation	   of	  whether	  an	  object	  was	  subsequently	  recognized	  5	  days	  later	  (i.e.	  hit)	  or	  not	   (i.e.	   miss).	   Trials	   on	   which	   subjects	   made	   wrong	   semantic	  judgments	  to	  the	  objects	  (error	  trials)	  were	  modelled	  as	  a	  regressor	  of	  no	  interest,	  and	  additional	  covariates	  were	  included	  to	  capture	  residual	  artifacts	  related	  to	  movement	  (three	  rigid-­‐body	  translations	  and	  three	  rotations	   from	   realignment),	   scanning	   session,	   heart	   rate	   and	  respiration.	   Model	   estimation	   proceeded	   in	   two	   stages:	   in	   the	   first	  stage,	   condition-­‐specific	   experimental	   effects	   (parameter	   estimates)	  were	  obtained	   in	  a	  voxel-­‐wise	  manner	   for	  each	  Subject.	   In	   the	   second	  (random-­‐effects)	   stage,	   Subject-­‐specific	   linear	   contrasts	   of	   these	  parameter	   estimates	   were	   entered	   into	   a	   series	   of	   ANOVAs	   (i.e.	   2x2	  factorial,	  Similarity	  x	  Valence	  for	  the	  context-­‐event	  and	  context	  memory	  conditions;	   2x2x2	   factorial,	   Similarity	   x	   Valence	   x	   Recognition	   for	   the	  object	  conditions).	  	  
Regions	  of	  interest	  	  	  We	  focused	  our	  analysis	  on	  the	  midbrain	  and	  the	  hippocampus,	   because	   these	   regions	   are	   thought	   to	   mediate	   the	  reward-­‐related	   and	   novelty-­‐related	   enhancement	   of	   episodic	  memory	  (Lisman	  and	  Grace,	  2005;	  Ranganath	  and	  Rainer,	  2003;	  Wittmann	  et	  al.,	  2005).	   Because	   all	   analyses	  were	   performed	   in	   group	   template	   space	  (see	   above	   section	   regarding	   ANTs	   normalization),	   all	   anatomical	  search	  volumes	  had	  to	  be	  manually	  defined	  using	  the	  software	  MRIcron.	  Hippocampal	  anatomical	  masks	  (4322	  voxels	  on	  the	  left,	  4601	  voxels	  on	  the	   right)	  were	   created	   by	  manually	   segmenting	   the	   hippocampus	   on	  the	   group	   T1-­‐weighted	   template	   scan,	   guided	   by	   an	   anatomical	   atlas	  (Duvernoy,	   2013).	   The	   substantia	   nigra/ventral	   tegmental	   area	   (971	  voxels	   on	   the	   left,	   979	   on	   the	   right)	   anatomical	   mask	   was	   manually	  defined	  using	  the	  group	  magnetization-­‐transfer-­‐weighted	  template	  scan	  created	  using	  the	  normalization	  protocol	  employed.	  On	  Magnetization-­‐
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Transfer-­‐weighted	   images,	   the	   SN/VTA	   can	   be	   distinguished	   from	  surrounding	  structures	  as	  a	  bright	  stripe	  (Bunzeck	  &	  Düzel,	  2006;	  Düzel	  et	   al.,	   2009).	   Where	   further	   analysis	   motivated	   the	   division	   of	   the	  hippocampus	  into	  anterior	  and	  posterior	  sections,	  ROIs	  were	  created	  by	  segmenting	   the	   above-­‐mentioned	   hippocampal	   image	   at	   the	   first	  coronal	  slice	  in	  which	  the	  uncus	  could	  be	  clearly	  observed,	  in	  line	  with	  existing	   recommendations	   in	   the	   literature	   (Baumann	   et	   al.,	   2010;	  Poppenk	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  Voxels	  anterior	   to	  and	   including	   this	   slice	  were	  regarded	   as	   belonging	   to	   the	   anterior	   hippocampus,	   while	   voxels	  posterior	   to	   this	   slice	   were	   regarded	   as	   being	   part	   of	   the	   posterior	  hippocampus.	  	  All	   ROIs	   were	   defined	   from	   contrasts	   that	   were	   orthogonal	   to	   the	  contrasts	   of	   interest	   to	   allow	   statistical	   tests	   to	   be	   performed	   in	   an	  unbiased	   fashion.	  We	  examined	   the	   identity	  matrix	  F-­‐contrast	   in	   each	  second-­‐level	   model	   (which	   identifies	   voxels	   that	   are,	   on	   average,	  sensitive	   to	   the	   context	   presentations,	   ignoring	   the	   similarity	   and	  valence	   conditions)	   at	   a	   threshold	  of	  p=0.05	  uncorrected,	   and	   applied	  the	  anatomical	  masks	  to	  define	  the	  search	  volume	  to	  be	  used	  in	  small-­‐volume	   correction.	   This	   procedure	   thus	   identifies	   voxels	   in	   our	  anatomical	   regions	   of	   interest	   that	   respond	   to	   the	   overall	   cohort	   of	  conditions	   on	   average	   (e.g.	   all	   the	   context-­‐event	   conditions,	   in	   the	  context-­‐event	  model).	   The	   identity	  matrix	   contrast	   used	   to	   create	   the	  search	   volume	   is,	   importantly,	   orthogonal	   to	   our	   comparisons	   of	  interest,	   which	   focus	   on	   between-­‐condition	   differences	   in	   activation,	  rather	   than	  condition-­‐specific	  activations	   relative	   to	  baseline.	  As	  such,	  this	   procedure	   avoids	   statistical	   double-­‐dipping	   in	   controlling	   for	  multiple	  comparisons	  (Kriegeskorte	  et	  al.,	  2009),	  and	  provides	  us	  a	  way	  of	   balancing	   the	   likelihood	   of	   Type	   I	   and	   Type	   II	   error	   without	  compromising	  statistical	  validity.	  All	  reported	  voxel-­‐based	  results	  were	  initially	   thresholded	   at	   p<0.001	   uncorrected,	   and	   all	   reported	   whole-­‐brain	  results	  were	  significant	  at	  a	  threshold	  of	  p<0.05	  family-­‐wise-­‐error	  corrected	   with	   small-­‐volume	   correction	   for	   the	   particular	   anatomical	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region-­‐of-­‐interest	   in	   question	   (bilateral	   hippocampus	   or	   bilateral	  SN/VTA).	  
Psycho-­‐physiological	  models	  Psycho-­‐physiological	   (PPI)	  models	  were	  employed	   to	   examine	   trial-­‐by-­‐trial	   functional	   coupling	   of	   regions	   of	  interest	  in	  each	  of	  the	  different	  context	  conditions.	  Such	  analyses	  allow	  one	  to	  show	  that	  activity	  in	  a	  distant	  region	  can	  be	  accounted	  for	  by	  an	  interaction	   between	   the	   influence	   of	   a	   source	   region	   and	   an	  experimental	  parameter	  (Friston	  et	  al.,	  1997).	  We	  used	  a	  PPI	  analysis	  to	  examine	   if	   the	   right	   SN/VTA	   (our	   source	   region,	   derived	   from	  observation	   of	   results	   peak	   coordinates	   in	   second-­‐level	   contrasts;	   see	  Results	  section	  for	  further	  detail)	  significantly	  influenced	  activity	  in	  the	  bilateral	   anterior	   hippocampus	   in	   relation	   to	   memory	   in	   each	   of	   the	  context	  conditions.	  SPM	  was	  used	  to	  extract	  the	  time	  series	  from	  a	  2mm	  sphere	   in	   the	   SN/VTA	   (location	   derived	   from	   the	   simple-­‐effects	  contrasts	   that	   were	   performed	   as	   a	   follow	   up	   from	   the	   interaction	  analysis	   in	   the	   whole-­‐brain	   voxel-­‐based	   analysis).	   Five	   separate	   PPIs	  were	  run	  (one	  for	  each	  context	  condition	  compared	  to	  baseline,	  and	  one	  directly	   comparing	   the	   similar-­‐reward	   with	   the	   similar-­‐neutral),	   and	  parameter	   estimates	   from	   the	   bilateral	   anterior	   hippocampus	   (see	  Results	   for	  motivation)	  were	   then	   extracted	   from	   all	   PPI	  models,	   and	  subjected	   to	   correlational	   analysis	  with	   the	  memory	   scores	  d’	   and	  RT	  measures	  from	  the	  encoding-­‐stage	  task.	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5.4:	  Results	  	  5.4.1:	  Contextual	  reward	  improves	  memory	  for	  embedded	  objects	  
selectively	  in	  the	  similar	  condition	  	  After	  context	  conditioning,	  all	  subjects	  verbally	  reported	  which	  contexts	  were	   rewarded	   and	  which	  were	   not	  with	   full	   accuracy.	   RTs	   from	   the	  conditioning	   stage	   indicated	   successful	   reward	   conditioning	   that	   was	  comparable	  in	  the	  similar	  and	  dissimilar	  condition	  (assessed	  with	  a	  2x2	  similarity	   x	   valence	   ANOVA,	   main	   effect	   of	   valence:	   F(1,24)=5.30,	  
p<0.03;	  p>0.4	  for	  the	  similarity	  x	  valence	  interaction	  and	  main	  effect	  of	  similarity;	  mean	  RT	   speeding	  of	  20.65	  and	  25.59	  ms,	   SD	  of	  51.05	  and	  53.80	  in	  the	  similar	  and	  dissimilar	  condition,	  respectively).	  Accuracy	  on	  the	   object	   semantic-­‐judgment	   task	   performed	   during	   the	   scanning	  session	  was	  very	  high	  (mean	  accuracy=96.20%,	  SD=0.03),	  and	  was	  not	  affected	  by	  context	  similarity	  or	  valence	  (assessed	  with	  a	  2x2	  similarity	  x	  valence	  ANOVA;	  all	  main	  effects	  and	  interaction	  p>0.2).	  Subjects	  made	  faster	  responses	  to	  objects	  when	  a	  rewarding	  background	  context	  was	  present	   (valence	   effect,	   F(1,24)=30.38,	   p<.001;	   Figure	   5-­‐2A),	   and	   this	  reward	   effect	   was	   not	   modulated	   by	   context	   similarity	   (similarity	   x	  valence	  interaction	  and	  main	  effect	  of	  similarity	  both	  p>.0.3),	  indicating	  successful	  and	  comparable	  reward-­‐conditioning	  in	  both	  the	  similar	  and	  dissimilar	  context	  pairs.	  	  Overall,	  Subjects	  showed	  above	  chance	  memory	  for	  the	  objects	  during	  a	  recognition	  memory	   test	   five	  days	  after	  encoding	  (mean	  d’	  =0.67,	  SD=	  0.19).	   Subjects	  were,	   however,	  more	   likely	   to	   recognize	   an	   object	   if	   it	  had	   been	   presented	   with	   a	   similar-­‐rewarded	   context,	   compared	   to	   a	  similar-­‐neutral	   or	   a	   dissimilar-­‐rewarded	   context	   (Figure	   5-­‐2B;	  similarity	   x	   valence	   interaction,	   F(1,24)=4.64,	   p=0.042;	   similar-­‐rewarded	  versus	  similar-­‐neutral,	  t(24)=2.68,	  p=0.01;	  similar-­‐rewarded	  versus	  dissimilar-­‐reward,	  t(24)=2.27,	  p=0.03).	  No	  main	  effect	  of	  context	  similarity	  or	  valence	  was	  found	  on	  object	  recognition	  (both	  p>0.2),	  and	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post-­‐hoc	   t-­‐tests	   found	   no	   valence	   effect	   in	   the	   dissimilar	   context	  condition	   (dissimilar-­‐rewarded	   versus	   dissimilar-­‐neutral,	   p>0.4).	   No	  main	   effects	   or	   interaction	   of	   context	   similarity	   and	   valence	   were	  observed	  in	  remember	  rates	  (all	  p>0.2)	  or	  know	  rates	  (all	  p>0.098).	  These	   results	   indicate	   that	   a	   rewarding	   context	   affords	   a	   mnemonic	  benefit	   selectively	   in	   the	   similar	   condition.	   Notably,	   the	   observed	  asymmetry	  in	  the	  recognition	  effects	  between	  the	  similar	  and	  dissimilar	  condition	   are	   unlikely	   to	   be	   due	   to	   differences	   in	   context	   reward	  conditioning,	   working	   memory	   load	   associated	   with	   context	  discrimination	   or	   other	   attentional	   differences,	   as	   subjects	   were	   well	  conditioned	  prior	  to	  the	  encoding	  stage,	  had	  4s	  on	  each	  encoding	  trial	  to	  examine	  the	  context	  picture	  alone	  before	  the	  objects	  were	  presented,	  and	  demonstrated	  no	  differences	  in	  context	  conditioning	  as	  indexed	  by	  encoding-­‐stage	  response	  times	  (RTs;	  no	  similarity	  x	  valence	  interaction	  in	   RTs,	   p<0.3;	   Figure	   5-­‐2A).	   These	   behavioural	   results	   indicate	   that	  contextual	   reward	   enhances	   memory	   for	   embedded	   neutral	   events	  particularly	   when	   context	   discrimination	   poses	   demands	   on	   neural	  processes	   that	   depend	   on	   the	   hippocampus	   (in	   our	   case,	   on	   pattern	  separation).	  We	   therefore	  examined	  whether	   the	  observed	  benefits	   in	  recognition	   memory	   in	   the	   similar-­‐reward	   condition	   would	   be	  underpinned	   by	   activation	   of	   the	   hippocampus	   (DG/CA3	   subfield	   in	  particular)	  together	  with	  a	  reward-­‐related	  recruitment	  of	  the	  SN/VTA.	  	  5.4.2:	  Context-­‐related	  activation	  of	  the	  anterior	  DG/CA3	  and	  SN/VTA	  tracks	  successful	  memory	  formation	  in	  the	  similar-­‐reward	  condition	  
	  We	   employed	   a	   single	   first-­‐level	   fMRI	  model	   that	   included	   regressors	  describing	   each	   12s	   context	   epoch	   (by	   similarity	   and	   valence),	   each	  object	  presentation	  (by	  context	  similarity,	  context	  valence,	  and	  object-­‐recognition	   success),	   and	   ‘context-­‐memory’	   parametric	   modulators	  (parametric	   modulators	   applied	   to	   the	   context	   epoch	   regressors,	  describing	  the	  number	  of	  co-­‐presented	  objects	  out	  of	  three	  that	  were	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   later	   successfully	   recognized;	   see	   Methods	   for	   more	   detail).	  Examination	   of	   these	   subject-­‐specific	   context-­‐memory	   regressors	  allowed	   us	   to	   identify	   neural	   responses	   that	   varied	   as	   a	   function	   of	  context-­‐related	   memory	   in	   each	   of	   the	   four	   context	   conditions,	   after	  controlling	   for	   object-­‐related	   (rather	   than	   context-­‐related)	   responses.	  The	   first-­‐level	   context-­‐memory	   contrasts	   were	   included	   in	   a	   second-­‐level	   2x2	   ANOVA	   (Similarity:	   similar,	   dissimilar;	   Valence:	   reward,	  neutral),	   and	  examination	  of	   the	   similarity	  by	  valence	   interaction	  at	   a	  significance	  threshold	  of	  p<0.05	  FWE	  (with	  small-­‐volume	  correction	  for	  the	   bilateral	   hippocampus	   and	   SN/VTA	   search	   volumes;	   see	  Methods	  for	  more	  detail)	  revealed	  clusters	  in	  the	  left	  anterior	  DG/CA3	  subfield	  of	  
Figure	  5-­‐2:	  Behavioural	  performance	  on	  encoding-­‐stage	  task	  and	  recognition	  
memory.	  Subjects	  were	  quicker	  to	  respond	  to	  objects	  when	  there	  was	  a	  rewarding	  context	   in	   the	   background	   (A),	   in	   both	   the	   similar	   and	   dissimilar	   context	  conditions.	  Despite	  successful	  and	  comparable	  context	  conditioning	   in	   the	  similar	  and	   dissimilar	   conditions,	   recognition	  memory	   (indexed	   by	   d’)	  measured	   after	   a	  five	  day	  delay	  was	  enhanced	  by	  reward	  in	  the	  similar	  context	  condition,	  but	  not	  the	  dissimilar	  (B).	  All	  error	  bars	  are	  +/-­‐	  1	  SE.	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the	   hippocampus,	   the	   right	   SN/VTA,	   and	   the	   bilateral	   posterior	  hippocampus	   (Figure	   5-­‐3A-­‐C).	   Further	   examination	   of	   the	   constituent	  positive	   and	   negative	   interaction	   contrasts	   revealed	   two	   distinct	  networks	   of	   activity	   across	   the	   different	   context	   conditions.	   The	  positive	   interaction	   contrast	   revealed	   activation	   clusters	   in	   the	   left	  anterior	  hippocampal	  DG/CA3	  subfield	  and	  right	  SN/VTA	  (Figure	  5-­‐3A	  &	   3b;	   Left	   DG/CA3:	   FWE	   p=0.030,	   t(23)=3.60,	   Z=3.47,	   peak	  coordinates=-­‐27.4,	   5.5,	   9.3,	   28	   voxels;	   Right	   SN/VTA:	   FWE	   p=0.018,	  t(23)=3.40,	  peak	  coordinates=2.6,	   -­‐4.5,	  4.2,	  45	  voxels).	   In	  contrast,	   the	  negative	   interaction	   revealed	   significant	   clusters	   in	   the	   posterior	  bilateral	  hippocampus	  (Figure	  5-­‐3C).	  	  The	  anterior	  hippocampal	  cluster	   identified	   in	   the	  positive	   interaction	  contrast	  did	  appear	  to	  be	  localized	  to	  the	  DG/CA3	  in	  anatomical	  group	  space.	   	   To	   verify	   that	   the	   specialized	   localization	   protocols	   employed	  were	  sufficiently	  accurate	  as	  to	  allow	  for	  such	  fine	  localization,	  we	  used	  the	  inverse	  mapping	  tools	  from	  the	  normalization	  protocols	  (Advanced	  Normalization	   Tools;	   see	   Methods	   for	   more	   detail)	   to	   verify	   that	   the	  group-­‐level	   hippocampal	   cluster	   reported	   here	   did	   indeed	   map	   onto	  voxels	   from	  the	  DG/CA3	  hippocampal	  subfield	   in	  each	  Subjects'	  native	  space.	  Results	  from	  this	  inverse	  mapping	  indicate	  that	  the	  group-­‐level-­‐significant	  cluster	   in	   the	  anterior	  hippocampus	  did	   indeed	  correspond	  to	  voxels	  from	  the	  DG/CA3	  sub-­‐region	  in	  every	  single	  Subject	  (Figure	  5-­‐3D).	  	  To	  determine	  which	  simple	  effects	  were	  driving	  the	  positive	  interaction	  in	   the	   DG/CA3	   and	   SN/VTA,	   we	   examined	   each	   simple-­‐effects	   voxel-­‐based	   contrast	   that	   made	   up	   the	   positive	   interaction,	   looking	  specifically	   for	   activation	   in	   these	   same	   functional	   ROIs	   (Figure	   5-­‐3).	  We	   decided	   to	   examine	   the	   simple	   effects	   using	   the	   voxel-­‐based	  contrasts	  (rather	  than	  by	  extracting	  parameter	  estimates	  from	  each	  ROI	  and	  conducting	  t-­‐tests	  for	  each	  simple	  effect	  at	  the	  beta	  level)	  so	  as	  to	  maintain	   a	   consistent	   whole-­‐brain	   significance	   threshold	   throughout	  this	  analysis.	  Examination	  of	  the	  simple-­‐effects	  contrasts	  indicated	  that	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Figure	  5-­‐3:	  The	  hippocampus	  and	  SN/VTA	  track	  memory.	  Activation	  of	  the	  left	  anterior	  hippocampal	  CA3	  (A)	  and	  right	  SN/VTA	  (B)	  in	  response	  to	  the	  contexts	  were	  found	  to	  track	  object	  memory	  more	   in	   the	   similar-­‐reward	   condition	   compared	   to	   the	   similar-­‐neutral	   or	  dissimilar-­‐reward.	  In	  contrast,	  activation	  of	  the	  bilateral	  posterior	  hippocampus	  was	  found	  to	   track	   memory	   for	   objects	   encountered	   in	   the	   similar-­‐neutral	   context	   (C;	   right	  hippocampal	  cluster	  pictured).	  Inverse	  transformations	  of	  the	  DG/CA3	  ROI	  from	  the	  group	  template	   space	   to	   the	   native	   space	   of	   each	   individual	   subject	   confirmed	   that	   this	  hippocampal	   cluster	  mapped	  onto	   the	  DG/CA3	  region	  of	   the	  hippocampus	   in	  every	   single	  subject	  (D).	  All	  error	  bars	  are	  +/-­‐	  1	  SE.	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greater	   activations	   in	   these	   regions	   in	   the	   similar-­‐reward	   context	  compared	   to	   the	   similar-­‐neutral.	   Of	   the	   four	   simple-­‐effects	   contrasts	  (comparing	   similar-­‐reward	   vs	   similar-­‐neutral,	   dissimilar-­‐neutral	   vs	  dissimilar-­‐reward,	  similar-­‐reward	  vs	  dissimilar-­‐	  reward	  and	  dissimilar-­‐neutral	   vs	   similar-­‐neutral),	   only	   the	   similar-­‐reward	   >	   similar-­‐neutral	  contrast	   found	   any	   significant	   voxels	   (even	   at	   the	   relatively	   lenient	  threshold	   of	   p=0.001	   uncorrected)	   in	   these	   functional	   ROIs.	   These	  results	  are	  in	  line	  with	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  recruitment	  of	  hippocampus	  and	   SN/VTA	  mediate	   the	   selective	  memory	   enhancement	   observed	   in	  the	  similar-­‐reward	  condition.	  	  Context	  and	  object-­‐related	  regressors	  describing	  memory	  were	  allowed	  to	   compete	   for	   variance	   in	   the	   same	   fMRI	   general	   linear	   model,	   to	  distinguish	   between	   context	   and	   object-­‐related	   activation	   of	   the	  SN/VTA	   (see	   Methods	   for	   more	   detail).	   This	   general	   linear	   model	  reveals	   significant	   activations	   relating	   to	   variance	   that	   is	   uniquely	  explained	   by	   each	   regressor,	   and	   thus	   allows	   us	   to	   examine	   context-­‐related	  activation	  that	  is	  not	  contaminated	  by	  object-­‐related	  responses.	  	  Our	   ability	   to	   control	   for	   such	   object-­‐related	   responses	   in	   our	   fMRI	  analysis	   allows	   us	   to	   infer	   that	   the	   observed	   context-­‐related	  memory	  effects	  were	  unlikely	  to	  have	  been	  a	  mere	  product	  of	  summated	  object-­‐related	   responses.	   Examining	   the	   object-­‐related	   regressors	   using	   the	  voxel-­‐based	   approach	   found	   no	   significant	   effects	   across	   the	   entire	  partial	  volume	  in	  support	  of	  successful	  memory,	  either	  as	  a	  function	  of	  context	  similarity,	  context	  valence,	  or	  an	  interaction	  between	  these	  two	  factors.	  Our	  experimental	  design	  does	  not	  enable	  us	   to	   rule	  out	  a	   role	  for	   object-­‐related	  neural	   activations	   in	   support	   of	  memory,	   since	   sub-­‐threshold	  activation	  or	  activations	  that	  are	  shared	  by	  context	  and	  object	  regressors	   (which	   do	   not	   appear	   as	   results	   from	   the	   GLM)	   may	  additionally	   contribute	   to	   the	   observed	   behavioural	   effects.	   However,	  the	  absence	  of	  significant	  object-­‐related	  effects,	  taken	  together	  with	  the	  positive	   context-­‐related	   findings,	   indicates	   that	   the	   observed	  memory	  benefit	  in	  the	  similar-­‐reward	  condition	  was	  likely	  more	  closely	  related	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to	  neural	  responses	  to	  the	  context	  epoch	  itself	  rather	  than	  to	  responses	  to	  discrete	  objects	  themselves.	  In	  addition	   to	   the	  results	  relating	   to	   improved	  memory	   in	   the	  similar-­‐reward	  condition,	  the	  negative	  similarity	  x	  valence	  interaction	  contrast	  also	  revealed	  significant	  clusters	  in	  the	  bilateral	  posterior	  hippocampus	  (right	   posterior	   hippocampus	   pictured	   in	   Figure	   5-­‐3C;	   Right:	   FWE	  
p=0.025,	   t(23)=3.70,	   Z=3.52,	   peak	   coordinates=27.6,	   -­‐22.0,	   16.1,	   21	  voxels;	   Left:	   FWE	   p=0.010,	   t(23)=3.90,	   peak	   coordinates=-­‐31.4,	   -­‐18.0,	  18.2,	   164	   voxels).	   Simple	   effects	   comparisons	   revealed	   that	   these	  activations	  were	  driven	  mainly	  by	  differences	   in	  the	  similar	  condition,	  but	   in	   the	   opposite	   direction	   to	   the	   results	   reported	   so	   far,	   tracking	  memory	   in	   the	   similar-­‐neutral	   condition	   more	   than	   in	   the	   similar-­‐reward	  condition	  (Figure	  5-­‐3C).	  Overall,	  these	  results	  are	  suggestive	  of	  a	   functional	   dissociation	   in	   the	   processing	   of	   rewarding	   and	   neutral	  contexts,	   with	   rewarding	   contexts	  modulating	  memory	   for	   embedded	  stimuli	  via	  the	  anterior	  hippocampus,	  and	  neutral	  contexts	  modulating	  memory	  (without	  necessarily	  producing	  better	  subsequent	  recognition)	  via	  the	  posterior	  hippocampus.	  	  	  5.4.3:	  SN/VTA	  activity	  tracks	  context	  conditioning	  and	  successful	  memory	  in	  the	  similar-­‐reward	  condition	  	  	  	  	  Using	   the	   same	   first-­‐level	   fMRI	   model,	   we	   were	   also	   able	   to	   identify	  activations	  relating	  to	  processing	  of	  the	  similar	  and	  dissimilar	  contexts	  themselves.	  We	  examined	   these	   context-­‐related	  activations	   to	   identify	  brain	   regions	   that	   are	   associated	  with	   specific	   reward	   learning	   in	   the	  similar	   condition	   (i.e.	   in	   the	   face	   of	   perceptual	   similarity),	   and	   that	  might	  additionally	  reveal	  asymmetries	   in	   the	  processing	  of	   the	  similar	  and	   dissimilar	   contexts	   that	   might	   explain	   the	   striking	   behavioural	  pattern	   of	   memory	   effects.	   First-­‐level	   contrasts	   relating	   to	   the	   12s	  context	   epochs	   were	   entered	   into	   a	   second-­‐level	   2x2	   (Similarity	   x	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Valence)	   ANOVA.	   Surprisingly,	   neither	   the	   main	   effect	   or	   interaction	  contrasts	   revealed	   any	   significant	   voxels	   across	   the	   entire	   partial	  volume.	   The	   lack	   of	   a	   main	   effect	   of	   valence	   in	   the	   SN/VTA	   was	  unexpected,	  and	  motivated	  us	   to	  conduct	   further	  exploratory	  analysis.	  We	   directly	   contrasted	   the	   similar-­‐reward	   with	   the	   similar-­‐neutral	  condition,	   and	   the	   dissimilar-­‐reward	   with	   the	   dissimilar-­‐neutral	  condition,	   in	  order	   to	   further	  examine	   the	   reward-­‐related	   response	   in	  each	   condition	   separately.	   While	   direct	   comparison	   of	   the	   similar-­‐reward	   compared	   to	   the	   similar-­‐neutral	   context	   condition	   revealed	   a	  cluster	  in	  left	  SN/VTA	  (Figure	  5-­‐4A;	  peak	  FWE	  p=0.041,	  t=3.31,	  6	  voxel	  cluster),	   comparing	   the	   dissimilar-­‐reward	   with	   the	   dissimilar-­‐neutral	  condition	   found	   no	   surviving	   voxels	   in	   the	   SN/VTA,	   even	   at	   the	   very	  lenient	   threshold	   of	   p<0.05	   uncorrected.	  While	   these	   negative	   results	  relating	   to	   processing	   of	   the	   rewarding	   context	   in	   the	   dissimilar	  condition	   do	   not	   allow	   us	   to	   infer	   that	   the	   SN/VTA	   response	   to	   the	  dissimilar-­‐rewarding	  context	  was	  entirely	  absent,	  the	  overall	  pattern	  of	  results	  were	   suggestive	   of	   a	   difference	   in	   the	   reward-­‐related	   SN/VTA	  response	   in	   the	   similar	   and	   dissimilar	   conditions.	   To	   further	   explore	  this	  possibility,	  we	  directly	  compared	   the	  similar-­‐reward	  >	  dissimilar-­‐reward	  contexts,	  and	  this	  comparison	  revealed	  a	  cluster	   in	   the	  middle	  of	   the	   SN/VTA	   (Figure	   5-­‐4B;	   peak	   FWE	   p=0.033,	   t=	   3.53,	   11	   voxels).	  Examination	   of	   the	   reverse	   contrast	   (dissimilar-­‐reward	   >	   similar-­‐reward)	  revealed	  no	  significant	  voxels	  in	  the	  SN/VTA,	  even	  at	  the	  very	  lenient	  threshold	  of	  p=0.05	  uncorrected.	  These	  results	  indicate	  that	  the	  reward-­‐related	   response	   of	   the	   SN/VTA	   was	   stronger	   in	   the	   similar	  compared	   to	   the	   dissimilar	   condition,	   despite	   comparable	   context-­‐reward	  learning	  in	  the	  similar	  and	  dissimilar	  conditions	  (as	  indexed	  by	  RT	  speeding;	  Figure	  5-­‐2A).	  	  The	  asymmetry	  between	  the	  activation	  of	  the	  SN/VTA	  in	  the	  similar	  and	  dissimilar	   conditions	   motivated	   us	   to	   conduct	   further	   exploratory	  analyses.	   Given	   that	   the	   previous	   analysis	   has	   indicated	   stronger	  SN/VTA	   activity	   in	   response	   to	   the	   similar	   versus	   the	   dissimilar	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contexts,	  we	   investigated	   if	   the	   strength	   of	   the	   SN/VTA	   response	  was	  preferentially	  related	   to	  conditioning	  and	  memory	  performance	   in	   the	  similar	   condition.	   We	   extracted	   parameter	   estimates	   from	  anatomically-­‐	   and	   functionally-­‐defined	   ROIs	   in	   the	   SN/VTA,	   from	   the	  four	   context-­‐epoch	   contrasts	   themselves	   (i.e.	   not	   from	   the	   context-­‐memory	   parametric	   modulators),	   and	   subjected	   these	   parameter	  estimates	   to	   correlational	   analyses.	   Reward-­‐related	   differences	   in	   the	  right	  SN/VTA	  (anatomically	  defined)	  were	   found	  to	  correlate	  with	   the	  amount	   of	   reward-­‐related	   RT	   speeding	   in	   the	   similar	   condition	   alone	  (r=	  0.426,	  p=0.038,	  Figure	  5-­‐4C;	  trend	  level	  correlation	  only	  for	  the	  left	  SN/VTA,	  r=0.276,	  p=0.096).	  No	  such	  correlations	  were	  observed	  in	  the	  dissimilar	  condition	  for	  either	  the	  left	  or	  right	  SN/VTA	  (both	  p>0.2),	  or	  for	   the	   left	  or	  mid	  SN/VTA	  ROIs.	  Direct	   comparison	  of	   the	   correlation	  coefficients	   confirmed	   that	   the	   correlation	   between	   reward-­‐related	  differences	   in	  RTs	  and	  reward-­‐related	  differences	   in	  the	  right	  SN/VTA	  response	   was	   stronger	   in	   the	   similar	   condition	   as	   compared	   to	   the	  dissimilar	  (right:	  z=2.23,	  p=0.026	  one-­‐tailed;	  left:	  z=1.62,	  p=0.053	  one-­‐tailed).	   Parameter	   estimates	   extracted	   from	   the	   mid	   SN/VTA	   ROI	  (identified	   in	   the	   similar-­‐reward	   >	   dissimilar-­‐reward	   contrast	  described	   above)	   were	   also	   found	   to	   correlate	   with	   memory	   in	   the	  similar-­‐reward	  condition	  alone	  (r=0.484,	  p=0.019;	  Figure	  5-­‐4B).	  Again,	  direct	   comparison	   of	   the	   correlation	   coefficients	   indicated	   that	   the	  correlation	   between	   the	   SN/VTA	   response	   and	   memory	   scores	   was	  stronger	  in	  the	  similar-­‐reward	  condition	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  dissimilar-­‐reward	   (z=2.66,	   p=0.004	   one-­‐tailed).	   No	   significant	   correlations	  were	  observed	   for	   the	   other	   SN/VTA	   ROIs	   (all	   p>0.1).	   While	   exploratory,	  these	   results	   suggest	   that	   the	   selective	   SN/VTA	   responding	   in	   the	  similar-­‐reward	   condition	   is	   related	   both	   to	   successful	   context	  conditioning	   in	   the	   similar	   condition,	   as	   well	   as	   to	   the	   improved	  memory	  performance	  in	  the	  similar-­‐reward	  condition.	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Figure	   5-­‐4:	   Activation	   of	   the	   SN/VTA	   is	   linked	   to	   memory	   and	   context	  
conditioning	   in	   the	   similar	   condition.	   The	   mid	   SN/VTA	   (A)	   showed	   a	   greater	  response	  to	  the	  similar-­‐reward	  context,	  compared	  to	  all	  the	  other	  contexts.	  Across	  all	  subjects,	   parameter	   estimates	   from	   this	   region	   were	   correlated	   with	   memory	   for	  objects	  presented	  in	  the	  similar-­‐reward	  context	  (B).	  Additionally,	  the	  left	  SN/VTA	  (C)	  responded	  more	  strongly	  to	   the	  similar-­‐reward	  context	   as	  compared	   to	  the	  similar-­‐neutral.	   Parameter	   estimates	   from	   the	   right	   SN/VTA	   (anatomically	   defined)	  correlated	  with	  reward	  learning	   in	  the	  similar	  condition:	  across	  all	  subjects,	  greater	  differences	  in	  the	  right	  SN/VTA	  response	  to	  the	  similar-­‐reward	  context	  (as	  compared	  to	  the	  similar	  neutral)	  was	  correlated	  with	  greater	  reward-­‐related	  RT	  speeding	  in	  the	  similar	  condition	  (D).	  Across	  all	  subjects,	  coupling	  between	  the	  right	  SN/VTA	  and	  the	  right	  anterior	  hippocampus	  (anatomically	  defined)	  in	  response	  to	  the	  similar-­‐reward	  context	  was	  also	   correlated	  with	  greater	   reward-­‐related	  RT	   speeding	   in	   the	   similar	  condition	  (E).	  
114	  
	  
	  Overall,	  these	  findings	  suggest	  a	  selectivity	  in	  the	  SN/VTA	  response	  to	  the	   similar-­‐reward	   context.	   This	   selectivity	   of	   the	   SN/VTA	   response	  may	   provide	   a	   potential	   mechanism	   which	   allows	   specific	   reward	  associations	  to	  be	  formed	  with	  individual	  contexts,	  without	  generalizing	  to	  perceptually	  similar	  but	  motivationally	  neutral	  contexts.	  Further,	  the	  asymmetry	   of	   the	   SN/VTA	   response	   in	   the	   similar	   and	   dissimilar	  conditions,	   found	   using	   exploratory	   analyses,	   suggests	   that	   the	  underlying	  discriminatory	  processing	  circuits	  may	  influence	  the	  extent	  to	   which	   context	   representations	   are	   able	   to	   drive	   robust	   reward-­‐related	   responding	   in	   the	   SN/VTA.	   This	   difference	   in	   the	   SN/VTA	  response	   in	   the	   similar	   and	   dissimilar	   conditions	   may	   additionally	  explain	   the	   lack	   of	   a	   memory	   benefit	   in	   the	   dissimilar-­‐reward	   as	  compared	   to	   the	   similar-­‐reward	   condition.	   Interestingly,	   we	   did	   not	  observe	   increased	   hippocampal	   activity	   in	   the	   similar-­‐reward	  condition.	   Indeed,	   no	   effects	   were	   observed	   in	   the	   hippocampus	   in	  relation	  to	  the	  context-­‐event	  regressors	  for	  all	  reported	  contrasts,	  even	  at	  the	  threshold	  of	  p<0.001	  uncorrected.	  	  	  5.4.4:	   Connectivity	   between	   the	   right	   SN/VTA	   and	   the	   anterior	  hippocampus	   is	   correlated	   with	   reward-­‐related	   RT	   speeding	   in	   the	  similar	   condition,	   and	   successful	   memory	   encoding	   in	   the	   similar-­‐reward	  condition	  
	  The	   findings	   presented	   so	   far	   implicate	   the	   anterior	   and	   posterior	  hippocampus	  respectively	  in	  the	  modulation	  of	  memory	  by	  the	  similar-­‐reward	   and	   similar-­‐neutral	   contexts.	   To	   further	   examine	   connectivity	  (rather	  than	  co-­‐activation)	  between	  the	  anterior	  hippocampus	  and	  the	  SN/VTA,	   we	   conducted	   a	   psycho-­‐physiological	   interaction	   (PPI)	  analysis	   to	   see	   if	   connectivity	   between	   these	   regions	   was	   linked	   to	  reward	   effects	   observed	   in	   our	   task.	  We	   seeded	   a	   PPI	   using	   the	   peak	  coordinate	   derived	   from	   the	   activation	   cluster	   in	   the	   right	   SN/VTA	  (identified	  using	  the	  similar-­‐reward	  >	  similar-­‐neutral	  contrast	  from	  the	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context-­‐memory	  analysis),	  and	  extracted	  parameter	  estimates	  from	  the	  positive	   PPI	   contrast	   for	   the	   bilateral	   anterior	   and	   posterior	  hippocampus	  separately	  (anatomically	  defined	  using	  existing	  protocols;	  see	   Methods	   for	   more	   detail),	   as	   well	   as	   the	   DG/CA3	   functional	   ROI	  identified	  using	  the	  context-­‐memory	  analysis	  (i.e.	  pictured	  	  in	  Figure	  5-­‐3A).	   In	   a	   between-­‐subjects	   analysis,	   parameter	   estimates	   from	   these	  regions	  were	   then	   subjected	   to	   correlational	   analysis	  with	  d’	  memory	  scores	  and	  with	  the	  RT	  measures	  of	  context	  conditioning.	  	  	  Functional	   coupling	   between	   the	   SN/VTA	   and	   the	   functional	   DG/CA3	  ROI	   did	   not	   show	   any	   between-­‐subject	   correlations	   with	   context	  conditioning	   or	   memory	   (all	   p>0.1).	   Focusing	   on	   the	   anterior	  hippocampus	  as	  a	  whole,	  however	   (anatomically	  defined),	   recognition	  memory	  in	  the	  similar-­‐reward	  condition	  was	  found	  to	  correlate	  (across	  all	   subjects)	   with	   the	   parameter	   estimates	   from	   the	   left	   and	   right	  anterior	   hippocampus	   (Figure	   5-­‐4D;	   left:	   r=0.35,	   p=0.046	   one-­‐tailed;	  right:	   r=0.36,	   p=0.040	   one-­‐tailed).	   Increased	   coupling	   between	   the	  SN/VTA	  and	  the	  anterior	  hippocampus	  during	  encoding	  (comparing	  the	  similar-­‐reward	  with	  the	  similar-­‐neutral)	  was	  therefore	  associated	  with	  better	  subsequent	  memory	  in	  the	  similar-­‐rewarded	  condition.	  No	  other	  correlations	   with	   memory	   were	   found	   for	   any	   of	   the	   other	   context	  conditions,	   and	  no	   correlations	  with	  memory	  were	  observed	  with	   the	  parameter	   estimates	   from	   the	   bilateral	   posterior	   hippocampus	   (all	  
p>0.1).	  These	  results	  point	  towards	  a	  role	  for	  the	  right	  and	  left	  anterior	  hippocampus	   in	   supporting	   memory	   enhancement	   in	   the	   similar-­‐reward	  condition,	  and	  further	  support	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  connectivity	  between	   the	   SN/VTA	   and	   the	   anterior	   hippocampus	   in	   particular	  underlies	  the	  memory	  benefit	  in	  the	  similar-­‐reward	  condition.	  	  	  We	   also	   asked	   whether	   increased	   coupling	   between	   the	   anterior	  hippocampus	   and	   the	   SN/VTA	   was	   related	   to	   successful	   reward	  conditioning	  (indexed	  by	  reward-­‐related	  RT	  speeding;	  Figure	  5-­‐2A)	   in	  the	   similar	   condition.	   Following	   an	   analogous	   procedure	   (i.e.	   in	   a	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between-­‐subjects	  analysis),	  we	  found	  that	  greater	  coupling	  between	  the	  right	  SN/VTA	  and	  the	  right	  anterior	  hippocampus	  in	  the	  similar-­‐reward	  condition	  was	   correlated	  with	   greater	   reward-­‐related	   RT	   speeding	   in	  the	   similar	   condition	   (Figure	  5-­‐3e;	   r	  =	  0.44,	  p=0.015	  one-­‐tailed;	   trend	  observed	  in	  left	  anterior	  hippocampus,	  r=0.296,	  p=0.080	  one-­‐tailed).	  No	  correlations	  with	  RT	  speeding	  were	  observed	  with	  parameter	  estimates	  extracted	   from	   the	   posterior	   bilateral	   hippocampus,	   and	   no	   such	  correlations	   between	   RT	   speeding	   and	   anterior	   hippocampal	  connectivity	   were	   seen	   in	   the	   dissimilar	   condition	   (all	   p>0.1).	   Direct	  comparison	   of	   correlation	   coefficients	   confirmed	   that	   the	   correlation	  between	   reward-­‐related	   differences	   in	   SN/VTA-­‐anterior-­‐hippocampal	  coupling	  and	  reward-­‐related	  RT	  speeding	  were	  stronger	   in	  the	  similar	  condition,	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  dissimilar	  (z=2.19,	  p=0.014	  one-­‐tailed).	  It	  is	   worth	   noting	   that	   reward-­‐related	   RT	   speeding	   and	  memory	   in	   the	  similar-­‐reward	  condition	  are	  not	  correlated	  across	  all	  subjects	  (p>0.3).	  In	   light	   of	   this,	   these	   results	   therefore	   indicate	   that	   functional	  connectivity	   between	   the	   anterior	   hippocampus	   and	   the	   SN/VTA	  may	  underlie	   successful	   context	   conditioning	   in	   the	   similar	   condition	   in	  addition	   to	   the	   observed	   memory	   effects	   in	   the	   similar-­‐reward	  condition.	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5.5:	  Discussion	  	  By	  varying	  the	  similarity	  of	  our	  context	  stimuli,	  we	  had	  set	  out	  to	  vary	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  context	  discrimination	  should	  theoretically	  depend	  on	  the	  hippocampus	  (and	  the	  DG/CA3	  region	  in	  particular).	  Lesion	  data	  from	   humans	   and	   animals	   have	   demonstrated	   that	   an	   intact	  hippocampus	   is	   necessary	   for	   reliable	   disambiguation	   of	   perceptually	  similar	   scenes,	   with	   hippocampal	   damage	   leading	   to	   deficits	   in	   the	  ability	  to	  reliably	  distinguish	  perceptual	  similar	  stimuli	  (Graham	  et	  al.,	  2006;	   Hannula	   et	   al.,	   2006;	   Lee	   et	   al.,	   2005a;	   McHugh	   et	   al.,	   2007;	  Neunuebel	   and	   Knierim,	   2014;	   Watson	   et	   al.,	   2013).	   Furthermore,	  functional	   imaging	   studies	   have	   related	   the	   CA3	   region	   of	   the	  hippocampus	  to	  distinct	  representations	  of	  perceptually	  similar	  stimuli	  (Bakker,	   Kirwan,	  Miller,	   &	   Stark,	   2008;	   Bonnici	   et	   al.,	   2012),	   even	   for	  stimuli	  that	  have	  been	  made	  familiar	  via	  repeated	  exposure	  (Berron	  et	  al.,	   2013).	   Therefore,	   it	   seems	   plausible	   that	   the	   specific	   SN/VTA	  response	   to	   the	   similar	   rewarding	   context	   in	  our	  experiment	   (i.e.	   that	  did	   not	   generalize	   to	   the	   similar	   neutral	   context)	   was	   related	   to	  hippocampal	   disambiguation	   of	   context	   representations.	   Indeed,	   the	  degree	  of	  behavioural	  context	  conditioning	  in	  the	  similar	  condition	  (as	  indexed	   by	   the	   speeding	   of	   responses	   on	   trials	   with	   rewarding	  contexts)	   was	   correlated	   with	   functional	   connectivity	   between	   the	  SN/VTA	   and	   the	   hippocampus	   (Figure	   5-­‐4E).	   Such	   a	   relationship	  was	  absent	   in	   the	   dissimilar	   context	   condition.	   This	   neural	   difference	  between	   the	   similar	   and	   dissimilar	   context	   occurred	   despite	  comparable	   reward	   conditioning	   of	   the	   context	   stimuli,	   as	   indexed	  by	  reward-­‐related	   RT	   speeding	   in	   both	   the	   conditioning	   and	   encoding	  stages	  of	  the	  experiment.	  	  The	   idea	   that	   disambiguation	   of	   similar	   scenes	   should	   rely	   on	  hippocampal	   representations	   is	   in	   line	  with	   recent	   assertions	   that	   the	  hippocampus	  is	  part	  of	  a	  representational	  system	  that	  spans	  perceptual	  and	  memory	  functions	  (Lee	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  Mundy	  et	  al.,	  2013;	  Nadel	  and	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Peterson,	   2013).	   While	   different	   researchers	   have	   emphasized	   the	  importance	   of	   the	   hippocampus	   for	   binding	   (see	   Yonelinas,	   2013	   for	  recent	   review),	   relational	   memory	   (Eichenbaum	   and	   Cohen,	   2001b;	  Konkel,	  2009),	  or	   the	  construction	  of	   coherent	   spatial	   representations	  specifically	   (Maguire	   and	   Mullally,	   2013),	   these	   theories	   (and	   their	  associated	   evidence)	   commonly	   point	   towards	   the	   hippocampus	   as	  being	   crucial	   for	   perceptual	   functions,	   in	   addition	   to	  memory.	  Within	  this	   context,	   the	  pattern	   separation	  abilities	  of	   the	  hippocampus	   refer	  not	   just	   to	   the	   need	   for	   incoming	   representations	   to	   be	   stored	  separately	   from	   existing	   memories	   (even	   in	   the	   face	   of	   perceptual	  overlap),	   but	   also	   the	   need	   for	   concurrently	   perceived	   overlapping	  stimuli	   to	  be	  represented	  separately	   in	  the	  brain	  (Nadel	  and	  Peterson,	  2013).	   In	   support	   of	   the	   idea	   that	   the	   hippocampus	   plays	   a	   role	   in	  disambiguation	   at	   a	   perceptual	   or	   representational	   level,	   several	  experiments	   indicate	   that	   the	   hippocampus	   remains	   involved	   in	  maintaining	  disambiguated	  representations	  of	  similar	  scenes	  not	  just	  at	  first	   encounter	   (i.e.	   in	   relation	   to	   encoding	   or	   the	   creation	   of	   novel	  mnemonic	   representations),	   but	   on	   an	   ongoing	   basis	   (i.e.	   even	   as	   the	  scenes	  get	   increasingly	  familiar).	  Scene	  stimuli	  have	  been	  shown	  to	  be	  represented	  distinctly	  in	  the	  CA3	  subfield	  specifically	  (but	  not	  in	  other	  regions,	   e.g.	   hippocampal	   CA1)	   even	   when	   subjects	   have	   been	  extensively	   familiarized	   with	   the	   stimuli	   (Berron	   et	   al.,	   2013),	   and	  hippocampal-­‐lesioned	  patients	   fail	   to	  show	  any	   improvements	   in	  their	  ability	  to	  disambiguate	  scenes	  with	  overlapping	  features	  (which	  would	  be	   indicative	   of	   a	   switch	   to	   hippocampal-­‐independent	   discrimination	  strategies),	   even	   with	   repeated	   exposures	   and	   direct	   trial-­‐wise	  feedback	   regarding	   their	   disambiguation	   accuracy	   (Lee	   et	   al.,	   2005a).	  Similarly,	   depleting	   hippocampal	   neurogenesis	   in	   mice	   produces	   a	  deficit	   in	   the	   ability	   to	   disambiguate	   similar	   contexts	   that	   cannot	   be	  compensated	   for	   with	   extensive	   training	   (Tronel	   et	   al.,	   2012).	   Given	  such	   findings,	   it	   seems	   likely	   that	   the	   ongoing	   disambiguation	   of	   the	  similar	   scenes	   in	   our	   experiment	   would	   have	   relied	   on	   orthogonal	  context	   representations	   in	   the	   hippocampus,	   and	   that	   learning	   about	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the	   similar-­‐reward	   context	   in	   particular	   would	   have	   relied	   on	   these	  representations	   driving	   the	   reward-­‐related	   response	   in	   the	   SN/VTA.	  Unexpectedly,	   we	   did	   not	   find	   evidence	   of	   greater	   hippocampal	  activation	  when	  subjects	  faced	  the	  similar	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  dissimilar	  contexts.	  We	  did	  note,	  however,	  that	  such	  distinct	  univariate	  effects	  (i.e.	  greater	   hippocampal	   activation	   when	   subjects	   face	   ambiguous	   as	  compared	   to	   unambiguous	   stimuli)	   are	   also	   not	   reported	   in	   several	  other	  fMRI	  studies	  that	  have	  targeted	  hippocampal	  pattern	  separation.	  Recent	  studies	  of	  pattern	  separation	  in	  humans	  have	  tended	  to	  employ	  repetition	   suppression	   paradigms	   (Azab	   et	   al.,	   2013;	   Bakker	   et	   al.,	  2008;	   Lacy	   et	   al.,	   2011)	   or	  MVPA	   (Berron	   et	   al.,	   2013;	   Bonnici	   et	   al.,	  2012;	   Huffman	   and	   Stark,	   2014),	   which	   examine	   hippocampal	  representations	   rather	   than	   focusing	   on	   overall	   levels	   of	   activation	   in	  the	  hippocampus	  per	  se.	  	  The	   reward-­‐related	   functional	   connectivity	   between	   the	   hippocampus	  and	   SN/VTA	   is	   particularly	   relevant	   in	   view	  of	   physiological	   evidence	  that	   the	   hippocampus	   can	   disinhibit	   dopaminergic	   neurons	   via	   two	  polysynaptic	   pathways.	   One	   pathway	   originates	   in	   the	   subiculum	   and	  relays	  by	  the	  nucleus	  accumbens	  and	  the	  ventral	  pallidum	  (Floresco	  et	  al.,	  2001,	  2003;	  Grace	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Legault	  and	  Wise,	  1999;	  Lodge	  and	  Grace,	  2006),	  while	  the	  other	  originates	  	  at	  CA3	  and	  relays	  at	  the	  caudo-­‐dorsal	  lateral	  septum	  (Luo	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  The	  ability	  of	  the	  hippocampus	  to	  disinhibit	  the	  SN/VTA	  via	  such	  pathways	  (see	  Lisman	  &	  Grace,	  2005,	  for	   review)	  may	   potentially	   account	   for	   our	   observation	   (found	   using	  exploratory	   analysis)	   that	   SN/VTA	   activity	   in	   the	   similar-­‐reward	  condition	   was	   stronger	   than	   any	   reward-­‐related	   response	   in	   the	  dissimilar	  condition.	  	  The	   difference	   in	   the	   reward-­‐related	   SN/VTA	   response	   between	   the	  similar	  and	  dissimilar	  conditions	  was	  accompanied	  by	  differences	  in	  the	  effects	  of	   contextual	   reward	  on	  memory.	  Contextual	   reward	   improved	  memory	   for	   embedded	   objects	   only	   in	   the	   similar	   condition,	   i.e.	  recognition	   memory	   for	   objects	   encountered	   in	   the	   similar-­‐reward	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context	   was	   higher	   compared	   to	   memory	   for	   objects	   in	   the	   similar-­‐neutral	   context	   (Figure	   5-­‐2B).	   Within-­‐subject	   fMRI	   analysis	   based	   on	  subsequent	  memory	   performance	   showed	   that	   this	   selective	  memory	  enhancement	  was	   related	   to	   recruitment	  of	   the	  anterior	  hippocampus	  and	   SN/VTA	   during	   the	   entire	   context	   epoch	   (Figure	   5-­‐3A-­‐b).	   Our	  specialized	   anatomical	   normalization	   protocol	   (optimized	   for	  hippocampal	   subfields	   and	   the	   SN/VTA)	   allowed	   us	   to	   localize	   this	  memory-­‐related	   hippocampal	   activation	   specifically	   to	   the	   subfield	  DG/CA3	  (Figure	  5-­‐3A;	  consistently	  localized	  to	  DG/CA3	  in	  each	  Subjects	  native	  space,	  Figure	  5-­‐3D).	  This	  selectivity	  and	  specificity	  of	  activation	  in	  the	  DG/CA3	  and	  SN/VTA	  is	  remarkable	  because	  it	  is	  fully	  consistent	  with	   the	   aforementioned,	   newly	   discovered	   pathway	   from	   CA3	   to	  SN/VTA	   (Luo	   et	   al.,	   2011).	   Consistent	   with	   our	   findings,	   a	   previous	  study	   from	  Wolosin,	   Zeithamova,	   &	   Preston	   (2012)	   found	   that,	   when	  subjects	   were	   rewarded	   for	   intentionally	   remembering	   object	   pairs,	  reward-­‐related	  changes	   in	   the	  DG/CA2-­‐3	  and	  SN/VTA	  were	  related	   to	  successful	   memory	   performance.	   The	   data	   reported	   here	   extend	   the	  importance	  of	  the	  DG/CA3	  and	  SN/VTA	  to	  contextual	  reward	  effects	  on	  object	   memory,	   and	   further	   demonstrate	   that	   the	   extent	   to	   which	  DG/CA3	   computations	   are	   necessary	   for	   reward	   discrimination	   can	  influence	  the	  reward-­‐related	  memory	  benefits	  that	  are	  observed.	  	  While	   coupling	   between	   the	   functional	   DG/CA3	   ROI	   and	   the	   SN/VTA	  did	  not	  show	  any	  between-­‐subject	  statistical	  relationship	  with	  learning	  and	  memory,	   the	   amount	   of	   functional	   coupling	   between	   the	   SN/VTA	  and	  the	  bilateral	  anterior	  hippocampus	  was	  correlated	  with	  memory	  in	  the	   similar	   rewarded	   context	   (across	   all	   subjects;	   Figure	  5-­‐4D).	  While	  these	   findings	  were	   found	  using	   exploratory	   analysis,	   they	  do	   suggest	  that	  interaction	  between	  the	  hippocampus	  and	  SN/VTA	  may	  have	  been	  involved	   in	   producing	   the	   observed	   memory	   effects.	   Hippocampal	  outputs	  triggered	  by	  processing	  a	  rewarding	  context	  could	  have	  caused	  tonic	   disinhibition	   of	   the	   SN/VTA	   (Blaha	   et	   al.,	   1997;	   Brudzynski	   and	  Gibson,	   1997;	   Floresco	   et	   al.,	   2001,	   2003;	   Legault	   and	   Wise,	   1999;	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Lodge	   and	   Grace,	   2006)	   thereby	   increasing	   the	   likelihood	   that	  embedded	   events	  will	   trigger	   phasic	   SN/VTA	   activation	   despite	   being	  non-­‐predictive	   of	   reinforcement.	   Alternatively,	   or	   additionally,	  dopamine	  release	  triggered	  by	  a	  reward-­‐predicting	  context	  might	  have	  increased	   the	   availability	   of	   plasticity-­‐related	   proteins	   in	   the	  hippocampus,	  which,	   in	   turn,	  would	   stabilize	  memory	   representations	  for	   embedded	   neutral	   objects	   (a	   phenomenon	   known	   as	   synaptic	  tagging	  and	  capture;	  Bethus,	  Tse,	  &	  Morris,	  2010;	  Chowdhury,	  Guitart-­‐Masip,	  Bunzeck,	  Dolan,	  &	  Düzel,	  2012;	  Frey	  &	  Morris,	  1997;	  McNamara,	  Tejero-­‐Cantero,	   Trouche,	   Campo-­‐Urriza,	   &	   Dupret,	   2014;	   O’Carroll,	  Martin,	  Sandin,	  Frenguelli,	  &	  Morris,	  2006;	  Sajikumar	  &	  Frey,	  2004;	  see	  Redondo	  &	  Morris,	  2011,	   for	   review).	   In	  our	  experiment,	   the	  memory	  benefit	   for	   embedded	   objects	   was	   not	   related	   to	   increased	   SN/VTA	  responding	   to	   the	   objects	   themselves,	   but	   instead	   to	   activation	   of	   the	  SN/VTA	   in	   response	   to	   the	   context	   epoch	   as	   a	   whole	   (i.e.	   SN/VTA	  responses	   were	   found	   using	   parametric	   modulators	   linked	   to	   the	  context	  epochs,	   rather	   than	   to	  discrete	  object	  presentations).	   In	  order	  to	   separate	   neural	   responses	   relating	   to	   the	   contexts	   and	   the	   object	  themselves,	   we	   had	   included	   regressors	   for	   both	   context	   and	   object	  presentations	   in	   the	   same	   first-­‐level	   general	   linear	   model.	   Such	   a	  procedure	   reveals	   only	   activations	   that	   relate	   uniquely	   to	   target	  regressors,	   omitting	   variance	   that	   is	   shared	   between	   multiple	  regressors,	   thus	   allowing	   us	   to	   conclude	   that	   the	   observed	   context-­‐related	   activations	   were	   not	   a	   mere	   summation	   of	   object-­‐related	  responses.	   While	   we	   are	   unable	   to	   rule	   out	   a	   role	   for	   sub-­‐threshold	  object-­‐related	  activations	  in	  support	  of	  the	  observed	  memory	  effect,	  our	  findings	   do	   not	   provide	   positive	   support	   for	   the	   possibility	   that	   the	  memory	  benefit	  was	  caused	  by	  stronger	  object-­‐related	  SN/VTA	  activity,	  as	  would	  be	  compatible	  with	  a	  tonic	  disinhibition	  of	  the	  SN/VTA	  by	  the	  hippocampus.	   Instead,	   our	   results	   are	   more	   compatible	   with	   the	  possibility	   that	   memory	   for	   embedded	   objects	   benefitted	   from	  enhanced	   plasticity	   in	   a	   rewarding	   context,	   in	   line	   with	   the	   synaptic	  tagging	  and	  capture	  framework.	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The	   synaptic	   tag-­‐and-­‐capture	   framework	   relates	   to	   the	   long-­‐term	  stabilization	   and	   consolidation	   of	   memory	   traces	   (rather	   than	   to	  changes	   in	   memory	   strength	   on	   short	   time	   scales),	   and	   predicts	   that	  stimuli	  that	  do	  not	  elicit	  dopamine	  release	  may	  benefit	  from	  dopamine	  released	   to	   neighbouring	   events	   that	   occur	  within	   a	   certain	   temporal	  window.	  Previous	  experimental	  tests	  of	  this	  prediction	  in	  humans	  that	  have	   used	   appropriate	   delays	   between	   encoding	   and	   memory	   test	  (roughly	   4-­‐6	   hours;	   i.e.	   to	   target	   consolidation	   rather	   than	   improved	  immediate	   recall	   due	   to	   attentional	   factors)	   have	   found	  mixed	   results	  for	  such	  cross-­‐enhancement	  of	  memory	  by	  unrelated	  reward-­‐predictive	  cues	   (Murayama	   and	   Kitagami,	   2014;	   Wittmann	   et	   al.,	   2011).	   In	   our	  data,	   cross-­‐enhancement	  of	  object	  memory	  by	   the	   rewarding	   contexts	  was	   only	   observed	   in	   the	   similar	   condition,	   a	   finding	   that	   cannot	   be	  explained	   by	   differences	   in	   conditioning	   between	   the	   similar	   and	  dissimilar	   conditions,	   since	   context	   conditioning	   in	   the	   similar	   and	  dissimilar	   conditions	   were	   comparable	   in	   both	   the	   conditioning	   and	  encoding	  stages	  of	  the	  experiment	  (i.e.	  reward-­‐related	  RT-­‐speeding	  did	  not	  significantly	  differ	  in	  the	  similar	  vs	  dissimilar	  condition).	  Given	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  similarity	  effect	  on	  the	  extent	  of	  reward-­‐related	  RT	  speeding,	  as	  well	   as	   the	   lack	   of	   a	   relationship	   (across	   all	   subjects)	   between	   RT	  speeding	   and	   the	   memory	   benefit	   in	   the	   similar-­‐reward	   condition	  (p>0.3),	   it	   also	   seems	   unlikely	   that	   the	   observed	   pattern	   of	   memory	  effects	   may	   have	   come	   about	   due	   to	   differences	   in	   attentional	  engagement	  in	  the	  similar	  vs	  dissimilar	  condition.	  Exploratory	  analysis	  of	   our	   fMRI	   data	   revealed	   that	   the	   SN/VTA	   response	   in	   the	   similar	  condition	   was	   stronger	   than	   the	   reward-­‐related	   response	   in	   the	  dissimilar	   condition.	  As	   such,	   one	  possibility	   suggested	  by	   our	   data	   is	  that	  the	  response	  of	  the	  SN/VTA	  during	  conditioning	  governs	  the	  extent	  to	   which	   such	   cross-­‐enhancement	   may	   be	   observed	   as	   a	   result	   of	  reward	  associations.	  	  While	  the	  anterior	  hippocampus	  tracked	  memory	  for	  objects	  that	  were	  presented	  in	  the	  similar-­‐rewarded	  context	  (the	  focus	  of	  the	  discussion	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thus	  far),	  posterior	  hippocampal	  regions	  were	  more	  involved	  in	  tracking	  memory	   in	   the	   similar-­‐neutral	   context.	   Such	   a	   segregation	   along	   the	  long	  hippocampal	  axis,	  with	  reward	  and	  affective	  functions	  linked	  to	  the	  anterior	   hippocampus	   and	   “cold”	   cognitive	   functions	   to	   the	   posterior	  hippocampus	   has	   been	   predicted	   previously	   (Fanselow	   and	   Dong,	  2010;	   Poppenk	   et	   al.,	   2013),	   but,	   to	   our	   knowledge,	   has	   not	   been	  previously	   demonstrated	   in	   the	   recognition	   memory	   literature	   in	  humans.	   The	   results	   presented	   here	   indicate	   that	   context	  representations	  may	  be	  organized	  in	  the	  hippocampus	  in	  an	  analogous	  way,	  i.e.	  according	  to	  the	  affective	  qualities	  associated	  with	  the	  context	  at	  hand.	  	  Our	   results	   show	   a	   surprisingly	   tight	   connection	   between	   the	   neural	  circuitry	   recruited	   in	   the	   processing	   of	   a	   rewarding	   context	   and	   the	  influence	  that	  such	  a	  context	  exerts	  on	  memory	  for	  the	  events	  that	  are	  embedded	  within	   it.	  A	  mnemonic	  enhancement	  of	  embedded	  events	   is	  only	   evident	   when	   pattern	   separation	   is	   required	   to	   maintain	   the	  integrity	  of	  the	  context’s	  value	  associations,	  and	  the	  findings	  presented	  here	  indicate	  that	  the	  reason	  for	  this	  link	  lies	  in	  the	  recruitment	  of	  the	  hippocampal-­‐SN/VTA	   loop	   when	   pattern	   separation	   demands	   for	  context	  discrimination	  are	  high.	  These	  findings	  are	  compatible	  with	  the	  existence	   of	   a	   pathway	   linking	   subfield	   CA3,	  where	   pattern	   separated	  representations	   of	   environments	   are	   likely	   to	   be	   maintained,	   to	   the	  SN/VTA	   (Luo	   et	   al.,	   2011).	   Thus,	   we	   have	   identified	   a	   role	   for	   the	  functional	   loop	   between	   the	   anterior	   hippocampus	   and	   SN/VTA	   in	  maintaining	  undistorted	  representations	  of	  environmental	  value	  and	  in	  modulating	  long-­‐term	  memory	  for	  embedded	  events.	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Chapter	  6:	  Parsing	  the	  role	  of	  
the	  hippocampus	  in	  avoidance	  
and	  exploration	  (Experiment	  
III)	  	  	  	  
6.1:	  Summary	  
	  
	  The	   hippocampus	   plays	   a	   central	   role	   in	   the	   expression	   of	   anxiety	   in	  animals	   and	   humans.	   However,	   identifying	   the	   exact	   functional	  contributions	  of	  the	  hippocampus	  in	  anxiety	  has	  been	  difficult.	  Using	  a	  new	  gambling-­‐based	  task	  that	  controls	  for	  spatial	  processing	  demands,	  we	   demonstrate	   that	   the	   hippocampus	   is	   involved	   in	   behavioural	  avoidance	   rather	   than	   exploratory	   risk	   assessment.	   The	   inferior	  anterior	   hippocampus,	   corresponding	   predominantly	   to	   the	   CA1	  subfield,	   was	   specifically	   recruited	   when	   subjects	   rejected	   aversive	  gambles,	   and	   the	   strength	   of	   this	   response	   was	   related	   to	   individual	  differences	   in	   anxiety.	   Additionally,	   while	   value-­‐related	   signals	   that	  indicated	   the	   relative	   attractiveness	   of	   different	   choice	   options	   were	  noted	  in	  various	  brain	  regions	  (e.g.	  the	  ventromedial	  prefrontal	  cortex	  and	  the	  ventral	  striatum),	  only	  hippocampal	  value	  signals	  distinguished	  between	   changes	   in	   value	   that	   occurred	   in	   an	   approach-­‐avoidance	  context	   compared	   to	   a	   neutral	   one.	   These	   results	   implicate	   the	  hippocampus	   in	   behavioural	   avoidance	   and	   highlight	   the	   interactions	  between	  hippocampal	  sub-­‐regions	  as	  a	  potential	  mechanism	  via	  which	  behavioural	  avoidance	  may	  emerge.	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6.2:	  Introduction	  	  	  To	  make	  adaptive	  choices,	  animals	  must	  represent	  and	  assess	  the	  likely	  harms	   and	   benefits	   associated	   with	   different	   courses	   of	   action.	   This	  assessment	  has	  been	   linked	   to	   the	  generation	  of	   anxiety,	   a	   tonic	   state	  associated	  with	  the	  possibility	  of	  aversive	  events	  in	  the	  future,	  which	  is	  distinct	   from	   fear	   (a	   phasic	   response	   to	  actually	   encountered	   threats;	  Hasler	   et	   al.,	   2007;	   McHugh,	   Deacon,	   Rawlins,	   &	   Bannerman,	   2004;	  Phillips	   &	   LeDoux,	   1992).	   Compelling	   evidence	   from	   the	   animal	  literature	   points	   towards	   a	   role	   for	   the	   hippocampus	   in	   anxiety	  (Bannerman	   et	   al.,	   2014;	   Gray	   and	   McNaughton,	   2000),	   and	   recent	  anatomical	   and	   functional	   data	   suggest	   that	   the	   hippocampus	  underpins	   aspects	   of	   anxiety	   in	   humans	   as	   well	   (Bach	   et	   al.,	   2014;	  Barrós-­‐Loscertales	  et	  al.,	  2006;	  Levita	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  Despite	  the	  wealth	  of	  evidence	  for	  hippocampal	  involvement	  in	  anxiety,	  its	   functions	  have	  been	  hard	   to	   identify.	  An	   influential	  model	   by	  Gray	  and	   colleagues	   endows	   it	   with	   three	   roles:	   monitoring	   for	   conflict	  between	   impulses	   to	   approach	   and	   avoid;	   and,	   if	   such	   conflict	   arises,	  inhibiting	   ongoing	   behaviour	   and	   initiating	   exploration	   to	   determine	  the	   best	   course	   of	   action	   (Gray	   and	   McNaughton,	   2000;	   McNaughton	  and	  Corr,	  2004).	  However,	  existing	  experimental	  evidence	  has	  failed	  to	  resolve	  whether	  the	  hippocampus	  is	  involved	  in	  behavioural	  inhibition,	  the	   initiation	  of	   exploration,	   or	  both.	  Additionally,	  many	   experimental	  paradigms	  involve	  spatial	  forms	  of	  conflict	  (e.g.	  Bach	  et	  al.,	  2014,	  Hasler	  et	   al.,	   2007),	   leaving	   open	   the	   possibility	   that	   hippocampal	  contributions	  relate	  mostly	  to	  representing	  the	  spatiotemporal	  context.	  The	  aversive	  affective	  quality	  could	  then	  be	  realized	  by	  other	  regions	  in	  the	   brain	   (e.g.	   the	   amygdala;	   see	   Duvarci	   &	   Pare,	   2014	   for	   recent	  review).	  To	  address	  these	  issues,	  we	  employed	  fMRI	  alongside	  a	  novel	  approach-­‐avoidance	   gambling	   task	   that	   enabled	   us	   to	   separate	   hippocampal	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contributions	  to	  behavioural	  avoidance	  and	  exploration.	  We	  controlled	  for	   non-­‐specific	   processes	   that	   were	   unrelated	   to	   aversion	   (e.g.	  planning,	  spatial	  processing)	  by	  including	  a	  control	  condition	  in	  which	  subjects	  performed	  the	  same	  gambling	  task	  without	  the	  threat	  of	  a	  loss.	  By	   allowing	   subjects	   to	   choose	   explicitly	   between	   rejecting	   aversive	  gambles	   and	   exploring	   them,	   we	   were	   able	   to	   demonstrate	   that	  hippocampal	  contributions	  to	  choice	  in	  an	  approach-­‐avoidance	  context	  relate	   to	   behavioural	   avoidance	   rather	   than	   to	   the	   initiation	   of	  information	   gathering	   (exploration).	   Furthermore,	   by	   using	  computational	  modelling	  to	  calculate	  characteristic	  signals	  that	  subjects	  might	   guide	   choice	   in	   such	   a	   task,	   we	   show	   that	   value	   signals	   in	   the	  anterior	   hippocampus	   alone	   are	   sensitive	   to	   the	   context	   that	   signals	  approach-­‐avoidance	  conflict.	  	  
	  





	  Thirty-­‐nine	  adults	  were	  trained	  in	  the	  task,	  of	  whom	  twenty-­‐one	  were	  considered	   to	   perform	   sufficiently	   well	   as	   to	   be	   suitable	   for	   imaging	  (see	   later	   section	   for	   details).	   Of	   these	   twenty-­‐one	   subjects,	   one	   was	  excluded	   for	   poor	   MRI	   coverage.	   Thus,	   a	   total	   of	   twenty	   subjects	  completed	   all	   sessions	   of	   the	   experiment	   and	   were	   included	   in	   the	  analyses	  (11	  female;	  mean	  age=22.60	  years,	  SD=2.39).	  All	  subjects	  were	  healthy,	   right-­‐handed,	   and	   had	   normal	   or	   corrected-­‐to-­‐normal	   visual	  acuity.	   None	   of	   the	   subjects	   reported	   a	   history	   of	   neurological	   or	  psychiatric	   conditions,	   or	   significant	   medications.	   Scores	   of	   state	   and	  trait	  anxiety	  were	  also	  collected,	  using	  the	  State-­‐Trait	  Anxiety	  Inventory	  (Costa	   and	   McCrae,	   1992).	   All	   experiments	   were	   run	   with	   written	  informed	  consent	  and	  according	  to	  the	  local	  ethics	  clearance	  committee	  (Ethics	  no.	  3793/001,	  University	  College	  London,	  London,	  UK).	  	  	  6.3.2:	  Experimental	  task	  	  	  In	  the	  experiment,	  subjects	  faced	  a	  series	  of	  gambles,	  and	  had	  to	  guess,	  for	  each	  one,	  whether	  or	  not	  there	  would	  be	  an	  activated	  bomb	  in	  it	  or	  not	  (Figure	  6-­‐1A,	  top).	  On	  each	  trial,	  subjects	  saw	  the	  gamble,	  consisting	  of	   a	   certain	   number	   of	   tokens	   (filled	   circles;	   i.e.	   Figure	   6-­‐1A	   shows	   a	  gamble	  with	  4	  out	  of	  12	  possible	   tokens)	   and	  a	   coloured	  background.	  Hidden	   amongst	   all	   the	   possible	   locations	   (i.e.	   out	   of	   12)	   might	   be	   a	  bomb;	  but	  it	  would	  only	  be	  ‘activated’	  if	  it	  was	  planted	  under	  one	  of	  the	  tokens	   in	   the	   array.	   The	   different	   coloured	   backgrounds	   indicated	  different	  probabilities	  that	  a	  bomb	  had	  been	  planted	  (ranging	  from	  1/6	  to	  1;	  termed	  ‘environmental	  threat’	  and	  abbreviated	  ‘EnvThreat’	  in	  the	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figures).	   If	   a	   bomb	  was	   planted,	   then	   it	  would	   be	   placed	   randomly	   at	  any	  of	  the	  12	  sites	  (indicated	  by	  circles	  in	  Figure	  6-­‐1A).	  Increasing	  the	  number	   of	   tokens	   on	   a	   trial	   thus	   increased	   the	   odds	   that	   a	   bomb,	   if	  planted,	   would	   be	   ‘activated’.	   The	   probability	   of	   an	   activated	   bomb	  [p(ActBomb)]	  is:	  𝑝 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝐵𝑜𝑚𝑏 = 𝑝 𝐵𝑜𝑚𝑏  𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑   ×𝑝 𝐵𝑜𝑚𝑏  𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑     𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑)	  
	  	  	   	   = 𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡  × !".!"#$%!#&'  !"#$%&!! 	  	  A	  maximum	  of	   one	  bomb	  was	  planted	   in	   a	   gamble	   on	   any	   given	   trial,	  while	  the	  number	  of	  tokens	  ranged	  from	  2	  to	  12.	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  experiment,	   subjects	   faced	   different	   combinations	   of	   6	   environmental	  threats	  and	  6	  levels	  of	  activated	  tokens.	  The	  task	  space	  thus	  comprised	  a	  6	  x	  6	  factorial	  design	  (environmental	  threat,	  number	  of	  tokens;	  Figure	  6-­‐1B).	  In	   the	  experimental	   condition	   (Figure	  6-­‐1A,	  bottom	   left),	   subjects	  had	  three	   choices:	   accept	   (i.e.,	   attempt	   to	   gather	   the	   rewards),	   reject	   (i.e.,	  avoid	  the	  gamble)	  or	  explore.	  Accepting	  a	  gamble	   that	  did	  not	  contain	  an	   activated	   bomb	   resulted	   in	   subjects	  winning	  money	   (10p/	   token).	  However,	  accepting	  a	  gamble	  that	  did	  contain	  an	  activated	  bomb	  led	  to	  a	   fixed	   loss	   of	   120p.	   Because	   the	   number	   of	   activated	   tokens	  additionally	  signalled	  how	  much	  money	  was	  available	  to	  win	  on	  a	  given	  trial,	   increasing	   the	   number	   of	   activated	   tokens	   simultaneously	  increased	   both	   potential	   winnings	   and	   p(ActBomb)	   (given	   the	   same	  environmental	   threat).	   Rejecting	   a	   gamble	   effectively	   discarded	   the	  gamble	  without	  incurring	  either	  gain	  or	  loss.	  	  Exploring	   required	  paying	  a	  20p	   fee	   to	  discover	  whether	  or	  not	   there	  was	   a	   bomb	   under	   50%	   of	   the	   tokens	   (Figure	   6-­‐1A,	   bottom	   left).	   If	  subjects	   chose	   to	   explore	   on	   a	   trial	   in	   which	   the	   bomb	   was	   under	   a	  token,	   then	   there	  was	   a	   50%	   chance	   that	   they	  would	   find	   this	   during	  exploration.	  Subjects	  could	  only	  explore	  once	  per	  trial.	  After	  exploring,	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Figure	  6-­‐1:	  Experimental	  design.	  Subjects	  evaluated	  gambles	  consisting	  of	  a	  background	  colour	  and	   a	   number	   of	   activated	   tokens	   (A,	   top)	   for	   the	   presence	   of	   an	   activated	   bomb.	   Gambles	  consisted	  of	  different	  combinations	  of	  6	  background	  colours	  (environmental	  threat)	  and	  6	  levels	  of	  activated	  tokens,	  which	  were	  combined	  to	  create	  a	  6x6	  task	  space	  that	  was	  well	  characterized	  in	  terms	  of	  several	  psychological	  variables	  (B).	  Choices	  in	  the	  experimental	  task	  involved	  a	  risk	  of	  win	   or	   loss	   (A,	   bottom	   left),	   while	   choice	   in	   the	   control	   task	   never	   resulted	   in	   any	   losses	   (A,	  bottom	   right).	   In	   the	   scanner,	   subjects	   made	   choices	   in	   response	   to	   each	   gamble,	   with	   the	  condition	   (experimental	  or	   control)	   clearly	   indicated	  onscreen	  at	  all	   times	   (C).	  All	   fMRI	  results	  reported	  relate	  to	  the	  evaluation	  and	  choice	  period	  of	  the	  trial	  sequence	  (indicated	  by	  blue	  bar	  in	  C,	  top).	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Experimental	  procedure	  	  	  	  	  Before	  completing	  the	  task	  in	  the	  scanner,	  subjects	   were	   first	   extensively	   pre-­‐trained	   so	   that	   they	   knew	   the	  associated	   p(ActBomb)	   associated	   with	   each	   gamble.	   Subjects	  completed	  three	  different	  versions	  of	  this	  task,	  over	  four	  experimental	  sessions.	   In	   the	   first	   session	   (Learning	   stage),	   subjects	   completed	   a	  reduced	   version	   of	   the	   task	   in	   which	   they	   passively	   observed	   the	  associated	   outcome	   (win	   or	   loss)	   associated	   with	   each	   trial,	   and	   so	  learned	  which	   background	   colours	  were	   associated	  with	   the	   different	  levels	   of	   environmental	   threat,	   as	   well	   as	   how	   the	   probability	   of	  encountering	   bomb	   changed	   with	   each	   different	   combination	   of	  environmental	   threat	   and	   number	   of	   tokens.	   During	   this	   stage,	   in-­‐activated	  bombs	  (i.e.	  bombs	  that	  were	  not	  under	  the	  tokens)	  were	  also	  shown	   after	   each	   trial	   outcome,	   to	   allow	   subjects	   to	   learn	   about	   the	  environmental	  threat	  in	  addition	  to	  learning	  about	  the	  overall	  outcomes	  associated	   with	   each	   gamble.	   Subjects	   were	   also	   instructed	   that	   they	  should	   monitor	   the	   fixation	   cross	   and	   press	   a	   button	   every	   time	   it	  changed	   from	   black	   to	   white.	   At	   the	   end	   of	   this	   stage,	   subjects	  completed	   a	   two-­‐alternative-­‐forced-­‐choice	   task	   in	   which	   they	   chose	  between	  two	  of	  the	  background	  colours	  at	  a	  time.	  Subjects	  who	  did	  not	  learn	  the	  pairing	  between	  background	  colour	  and	  environmental	  threat,	  or	   who	   could	   not	   explain	   (using	   worked	   examples,	   i.e.	   with	   known	  hypothetical	  environmental	  threats	  and	  a	  given	  number	  of	  tokens)	  how	  to	   correctly	   combine	   environmental	   threat	   and	   number	   of	   tokens	   to	  estimate	   p(ActBomb)	  were	   excluded	   from	   further	   participation	   in	   the	  experiment.	  For	  example,	  subjects	  who	  expressed	  the	  opinion	  that	  only	  environmental	   threat	   mattered	   to	   the	   outcome,	   or	   who	   could	   not	  consistently	   rank	   the	   background	   colours	   in	   terms	   of	   ascending	  environmental	  threat,	  were	  excluded.	  Subjects	  were	  informed	  that	  their	  winnings	  from	  this	  training	  session	  (typically	  large	  accumulated	  losses)	  did	   not	   count	   towards	   their	   monetary	   rewards,	   to	   prevent	   them	  adopting	  risk-­‐averse	  strategies	  for	  the	  remainder	  of	  the	  game.	  Subjects	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completed	   432	   trials	   in	   this	   session	   (12	   repetitions	   of	   the	   36	   trial	  types).	  	  In	  the	  second	  session,	  subjects	  completed	  432	  trials	  of	  the	  experimental	  task	   alone	   (Figure	   6-­‐1A,	   bottom	   left).	   In	   the	   third	   session,	   subjects	  completed	  432	  trials	  of	  the	  control	  task	  (Figure	  6-­‐1A,	  bottom	  right;	  note	  order	  of	  sessions	  was	  not	  counterbalanced	  across	  all	  subjects).	  Subjects	  were	  allowed	  to	  progress	  to	  the	  next	  and	  final	  stage	  of	  the	  study	  if	  their	  verbal	   report	   (after	   the	   third	   session)	   and	   performance	   in	   these	   two	  sessions	   indicated	   consistent	   learning	   regarding	   the	   different	  background	   colours	   and	   the	   associated	   environmental	   threat,	   active	  integration	  of	   information	  regarding	  the	  environmental	   threat	  and	  the	  number	   of	   tokens	   in	   their	   choices,	   and	   adequate	   use	   of	   accepting,	  rejecting	   and	  exploring	   in	   their	   overall	   performance.	   For	   example,	  we	  excluded	  subjects	  who,	  at	  this	  point,	  incorrectly	  ranked	  the	  background	  colours	  in	  terms	  of	  ascending	  environmental	  threat,	  as	  this	  indicated	  a	  change	   of	   mind	   regarding	   the	   background	   colours	   from	   the	   training	  session	  to	  this	  point.	  We	  also	  excluded	  subjects	  who	  failed	  to	  take	  into	  account	   both	   background	   colour	   and	   number	   of	   activated	   tokens	   in	  their	   choice,	   or	   who	   accepted/rejected	   gambles	   randomly	   across	   the	  6x6	   task	   space,	   or	   who	   failed	   to	   explore	   entirely,	   or	   who	   could	   not	  verbally	   explain	   how	   information	   from	   the	   environmental	   threat	   and	  number	   of	   activated	   tokens	   should	   be	   combined	   to	   estimate	  p(ActBomb).	  Subjects	  were	  extensively	  questioned,	  and	  their	  individual	  choice	   plots	   (i.e.	   similar	   to	   Figure	   6-­‐2A)	   visually	   inspected	   for	   such	  excluding	  behaviours.	  Such	  strict	  screening	  procedures	  were	  employed	  to	  ensure	   that	  subjects	  whose	  data	  were	   included	   in	   the	   final	  analysis	  had	   reasonably	   similar	   estimates	   of	   p(ActBomb)	   across	   the	   6x6	   task	  space,	   so	   as	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	   psychological	   variables	   that	   were	  controlled	   for	   in	   our	   fMRI	   model	   (Figure	   6-­‐1B;	   see	   later	   sections	   for	  more	   detail)	   were	   reasonably	   accurate.	   Data	   from	   these	   training	  sessions	  were	  not	  subject	  to	  any	  further	  analysis,	  though	  winnings	  from	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these	  stages	  were	  included	  in	  the	  money	  given	  to	  subjects	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  experiment.	  	  	  In	   the	   fourth	   session	   (fMRI	   stage,	   performed	   the	   next	   day),	   subjects	  completed	   12	   alternating	   blocks	   of	   the	   experimental	   and	   control	  condition	  (with	  the	  starting	  condition	  counterbalanced	  across	  subjects;	  Figure	  6-­‐1C),	  while	  concurrent	  fMRI	  data	  was	  being	  collected.	  Subjects	  were	   told	   that	   the	   p(ActBomb)	   associated	   with	   each	   gamble	   was	   the	  same	   as	   in	   previous	   sessions,	   and	   that	   this	   last	   session	   was	   an	  opportunity	  for	  them	  to	  use	  what	  they	  had	  learned	  so	  far	  to	  maximise	  their	   winnings	   in	   the	   game.	   All	   fMRI	   results	   presented	   relate	   to	   the	  stage	   of	   the	   trial	   sequence	   in	   which	   subjects	   were	   first	   evaluating	  gambles	  and	  indicating	  their	  choices	  (indicated	  by	  the	  blue	  bar	  on	  top	  of	   Figure	   6-­‐1C).	   Activation	   relating	   to	   this	   evaluation	   period	   was	   de-­‐correlated	   with	   processing	   of	   the	   outcome	   and	   any	   explored	  information,	  by	  omitting	   the	   latter	   two	  stages	  during	  50%	  of	   the	   fMRI	  trials	   and	   including	   nuisance	   regressors	   describing	   these	   latter	   two	  stages	  in	  our	  fMRI	  models.	  Subjects	  were	  told	  that	  incomplete	  ‘explore’	  trials	  would	  be	  completed	  after	  the	  scanning	  session,	  but	  no	  such	  post-­‐scanning	   session	  was	   actually	   conducted	   (in	   order	   to	   save	   time),	   and	  subjects’	   winnings	   for	   these	   trials	   were	   calculated	   by	   assuming	   that	  second-­‐stage	   choice	   would	   conform	   deterministically	   to	   the	  information	   revealed	  during	  exploration.	   Subjects	  were	  only	   informed	  about	  how	  winnings	  for	  these	  incomplete	  explore	  trials	  were	  calculated	  
after	  all	   scanning	  was	   completed,	   so	   that	   this	  explicit	   strategy	  did	  not	  influence	  their	  behaviour	  on	  the	  task.	  The	  fMRI	  stage	  of	  the	  experiment	  consisted	  of	  1296	  trials	  (18	  repetitions	  of	   the	  36	  experimental	  and	  36	  control	   trials),	   and	   subjects	   were	   offered	   a	   break	   after	   every	   other	  block.	  Only	  behavioural	  data	  from	  this	  stage	  was	  analysed.	  	  	  6.3.3:	  	  Design	  and	  task-­‐space	  variables	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We	   characterized	   the	   6x6	   task	   space	   in	   terms	   of	   several	   task-­‐related	  variables	  that	  might	  be	  tracked	  at	  a	  psychological	  or	  neural	  level	  across	  the	   6x6	   task	   space	   (Figure	   6-­‐1B).	   These	   variables	   were	   as	   follows:	  environmental	   threat,	   number	   of	   activated	   tokens,	   p(ActBomb),	   the	  uncertainty	  or	  entropy	  associated	  with	  this	  probability:	  𝐻 p ActBomb=  –   p ActBomb × log   p ActBomb      − 1− p ActBomb ×log  (1− p ActBomb )	  	  (Strange,	   Duggins,	   Penny,	   Dolan,	   &	   Friston,	   2005),	   value-­‐scaled	  uncertainty	  (uncertainty	  multiplied	  by	  magnitude	  of	  money	  available	  to	  win,	   i.e.	   number	   of	   activated	   tokens),	   and	   expected	   value	   of	   non-­‐exploration	  (EV),	  calculated	  in	  the	  experimental	  condition	  as:	  	   EV = −12  ×p ActBomb +     n  ×(1− p ActBomb )	  where	  n	  is	  the	  number	  of	  tokens.	  In	  the	  control	  condition,	  EV	  was:	  	  EV=	  	  	  	  V(Accept)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  if	  V(Accept)	  >	  V(Reject)	  V(Reject)	  	   	   otherwise	  	  V(Accept)	  =	  (1-­‐	  p(ActBomb)	  )	  ×	  n	  	  V(Reject)	  =	  p(ActBomb)	  	  ×	  n	  	  All	  non-­‐EV	  variables	  took	  the	  same	  values	  across	  the	  task	  space	  in	  the	  experiment	   and	   control	   tasks.	   However,	   the	   interpretation	   of	  p(ActBomb)	  differed	  between	  the	  two	  tasks,	   indicating	  the	  probability	  of	   losing	   money	   in	   the	   experimental	   but	   not	   the	   control	   task.	   These	  task-­‐related	   variables	   served	   as	   the	   starting	   point	   with	   which	   to	  construct	  the	  computational	  models.	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6.3.4:	  Behavioural	  modelling	  	  	  	  We	  fit	  a	  family	  of	  decision	  models	  to	  subjects'	  choices,	  parameterized	  by	  deviations	   from	  optimal	  behaviour.	  Models	   calculated	  a	  value	  on	  each	  trial	  for	  each	  of	  the	  three	  possible	  actions	  (accept,	  reject,	  explore).	  This	  approach	   aimed	   to	   enable	   us	   to	   calculate	   hidden	   informational	  quantities	  (i.e.	  value)	  that	  might	  be	  used	  to	  guide	  strategic	  choice	  in	  our	  task.	  Only	   choices	   from	   the	   fMRI	   session	   (i.e.	   after	   complete	   learning)	  were	   modelled,	   and	   choice	   on	   each	   trial	   was	   assumed	   to	   be	  independent.	  The	  model	  space	  was	  defined	  by	  first	  calculating	  the	  true	  expected	   values	   of	   accepting,	   reject	   and	   exploring,	   and	   then	  parameterizing	  seven	  separate	  possible	  sources	  of	  suboptimal	  influence	  over	   these	   values,	   all	   of	   whose	   combinations	   we	   considered.	   The	  potential	  sources	  of	  sub-­‐optimality	  were	  identified	  by	  considering	  both	  errors	   in	   optimal	   calculation	   (e.g.	   systematic	   miscalculation	   of	   the	  p(ActBomb)	   after	   one	   explores	   and	   fails	   to	   see	   a	   bomb),	   as	   well	   as	  descriptive	  psychological	   tendencies	   that	   could	   interfere	  with	   optimal	  performance	   (e.g.	   a	   perseverative	   tendency	   to	   act	   according	   to	   null	  information	   revealed	   during	   exploration,	   rather	   than	   integrating	   this	  information	  into	  a	  revised	  estimate	  of	  p(ActBomb)).	  	  Values	   for	   each	   choice	   were	   then	   used	   to	   predict	   the	   probability	   of	  Accepting,	  Rejecting	  or	  Exploring	  on	  each	  trial	  via	  a	  softmax	  function:	  p Choice =   ε  +        1−     3  ×  ε× 𝑒!  ×!(!"#$%&)𝑒!  ×!(!""#$%) +   𝑒!  ×!(!"#"$%) +   𝑒!  ×!(!"#$%&')	  Where	  β	  is	  the	  inverse	  temperature	  parameter	  of	  the	  softmax	  function	  (that	   governs	   the	   stochasticity	  of	   choice	   as	   a	   function	  of	   value),	   and	   ε	  describes	   the	   irreducible	   stochasticity	   in	   choice.	   The	   ε	   parameter	   is	  integrated	   into	   the	   typical	   softmax	   function	   as	   a	   fixed	   probability	   of	  making	  each	  choice,	  and	  the	  original	  p(Choice)	  (as	  would	  be	  calculated	  
137	  
without	  the	  ε	  parameter)	  is	  scaled	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  sum	  of	  p(Accept),	  p(Reject)	  and	  p(Explore)	  sums	  to	  1.	  	  	  The	  following	  free	  parameters	  were	  considered	  in	  constructing	  the	  full	  model	  space:	  β	   Inverse	   temperature	   parameter	   of	   the	   softmax	  function;	  Governs	  the	  stochasticity	  of	  choice	  as	  a	  function	  of	  value	  ε	   Describes	  the	  irreducible	  stochasticity	  in	  choice	  
j	   Distortion	  to	  environmental	  threat:	  EnvThreatj	  
m	   Distortion	  to	  k	  [posterior	  p(ActBomb	  |	  no	  bomb	  seen	  during	  exploration)],	  i.e.	  k	  =	  km	  ;	  Allows	  for	  inoptimal	  calculation	  of	  posterior	  probabilities	  
i	   Bonus	   to	   V(Stage	   2	   Accept);	   indexes	   general	  tendency	   to	   accept	   gambles	   after	   exploration	  reveals	  a	  lack	  of	  a	  bomb	  [rather	  than	  integrating	  the	   null	   information	   into	   the	   estimate	   of	  p(ActBomb)]	  
f	   Perceived	   magnitude	   of	   the	   fixed	   loss	  (objectively	   equals	   to	   -­‐12	   tokens)	   in	   the	  experimental	  condition	  
e	   Exploration	   bonus	   added	   to	   V(Explore)	   equally	  across	  the	  entire	  task	  space	  	  
w	   Bonus	  to	  V(Explore),	  quantifying	  the	  impact	  that	  task-­‐related	  variables	   (e.g.	  uncertainty)	  have	  on	  V(Explore).	   Thus,	   this	   describes	   an	   exploration	  bonus	   that	   varies	   across	   the	   6x6	   task	   space.	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Different	   versions	   of	   this	   w	   parameter	   were	  included	  in	  the	  model	  space,	  as	  separate	  models,	  to	   quantify	   variable	   exploration	   bonuses	   that	  related	  to	  different	  task	  related	  variables.	  	  	  Different	   versions	   of	   the	   w	   parameter	   were	   included	   (in	   different	  models)	   in	   the	  model	   space	   so	   as	   to	   allow	  us	   to	   examine	  which	   task-­‐related	   variables	   drove	   exploration	   across	   the	   6x6	   task	   space	   in	   our	  subjects.	  All	  variables	  considered	  for	  the	  variable	  exploration	  bonus	  w	  are	  shown	  in	  Figure	  7-­‐1b,	  and	  are	  as	  follows:	  	  
u	   Uncertainty	  regarding	  p(ActBomb)	  
v	   Value	  gained	  from	  exploration,	  calculated	  as:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  v	  =	  optimal	  V(Explore)	  	  -­‐	  EV	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  if	  	  EV	  >0	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  optimal	  V(Explore)	  	  -­‐	  	  0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  otherwise	  	  
o	   Value-­‐scaled	  uncertainty,	  calculated	  as:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  o	  =	  𝐻 p ActBomb     ×𝑛	  
y	   Binomial	  variance	  in	  p(ActBomb),	  calculated	  as:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  y	  =	  p(ActBomb)	  	  ×  	  [	  1-­‐	  p(ActBomb)	  ]	  
s	   Standard	  deviation	  of	  outcome	  (EV)	  
	  Comparison	  of	  models	  with	   the	  different	  versions	  of	   this	  w	  parameter	  thus	   allowed	   us	   to	   identify	   task-­‐related	   quantities	   that	   influenced	   the	  likelihood	   of	   exploration	   across	   the	   6x6	   task	   space	   (i.e.	   from	   trial	   to	  trial).	   Because	   the	   models	   were	   not	   nestable,	   separate	   models	   were	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included	  for	  all	  possible	  combinations	  of	  all	  8	  free	  parameters	  (without	  combining	   different	   versions	   of	   the	   w	   parameter),	   producing	   384	  individual	  models	  in	  the	  experimental	  condition	  and192	  in	  the	  control	  condition	   (which	   omits	   the	   f	  parameter).	   All	  models	  were	   allowed	   to	  compete	   on	   even	   footing	   with	   each	   other.	   Parameter	   fitting	   was	  implemented	   (separately	   for	   the	   experimental	   and	   control	   condition)	  using	   a	   hierarchical	   type	   II	   Bayesian	   (random	   effects)	   procedure	   that	  used	  maximum	  likelihood	  to	  fit	  simple	  parameterized	  distributions	  for	  higher-­‐level	   statistics	   of	   the	   parameters	   (Guitart-­‐Masip	   et	   al.,	   2012;	  Huys	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  Models	  were	  compared	  using	  the	  integrated	  Bayesian	  information	  criterion	  (iBIC),	  in	  which	  small	  iBIC	  values	  indicate	  a	  model	  that	   fits	   the	  data	  better	  after	  penalizing	   for	   the	  number	  of	  parameters	  (to	  prevent	  over-­‐fitting;	  Huys	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  	  	  6.3.5:	  fMRI	  data	  acquisition	  and	  preprocessing	  	  Data	  acquisition	  was	  performed	  on	  a	  3T	  Trio	  Siemens	  scanner	  (Siemens	  Healthcare,	  Erlangen,	  Germany)	  operated	  with	  a	  32-­‐channel	  head	  coil.	  Functional	  data	  was	  acquired	  using	  a	  three-­‐dimensional	  gradient-­‐echo	  T2*-­‐weighted	  echo-­‐planar	   imaging	   (EPI)	   sequence	   covering	   the	   entire	  brain	  (TR=70.0ms,	  TE=30ms;	  slab	  angled	  at	  -­‐30°	  in	  the	  anteroposterior	  axis,	   48	   slices	   per	   volume	   acquired	   in	   ascending	   order;	   spatial	  resolution=3x3x3	   mm).	   The	   functional	   imaging	   sequence	   chosen	   was	  optimized	  for	  orbitofrontal	  cortex	  and	  amygdala,	  with	  specialized	  shim	  in	   the	   Z	   plane	   to	   additionally	   optimize	   signal	   in	   the	   hippocampus	  (Weiskopf,	  Hutton,	  Josephs,	  &	  Deichmann,	  2006).	  Respiration	  and	  heart	  rate	  were	  recorded	  using	  a	  breathing	  belt	  and	  pulse	  oximeter,	  and	  used	  to	  correct	  for	  respiration-­‐	  and	  heartbeat-­‐related	  artefacts	  (Hutton	  et	  al.,	  2011).	   Each	   subject	   underwent	   6	   session	   of	   functional	   scanning	  (roughly	  260	  volumes	  per	  session,	  each	  session	  lasting	  ~14	  min),	  with	  breaks	  between	  each	  session	  for	  subjects	  to	  rest.	  Individual	  field	  maps	  were	   also	   acquired	   using	   the	   standard	   manufacturer’s	   double	   echo	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gradient	   echo	   field	   map	   sequence	   (TE	   =	   10.0	   and	   12.46	   ms,	  TR=1020ms;	  matrix	  size=	  64x64;	  64	  slices,	  spatial	  resolution=3	  x	  3	  x	  3	  mm),	  to	  allow	  for	  distortion	  correction	  using	  the	  SPM	  Fieldmap	  toolbox	  (Hutton	   et	   al.,	   2002).	   Multiparameter	   images,	   including	   T1-­‐weighted,	  proton	   density,	   and	   magnetization	   transfer	   contrasts	   (spatial	  resolution=1.3	   x	   1.3	   x	   1.3	   mm	   for	   all),	   were	   acquired	   for	   structural	  information	   using	   3D	   FLASH	   (fast	   low-­‐angle	   shot)	   sequences,	   using	  established	  multi-­‐parameter	  map	  protocols	  (Weiskopf	  &	  Helms,	  2008).	  	  Preprocessing	   of	   the	   fMRI	   data	   included	   bias	   correction,	   realignment,	  unwarping	   (using	   individual	   fieldmaps)	   and	   smoothing	   with	   a	   4	   mm	  Gaussian	   kernel.	   Standard	   spatial	   normalization	   steps	   were	   omitted	  during	   preprocessing,	   in	   lieu	   of	   the	   specialized	   protocols	   that	   were	  applied	  after	  to	  data	  from	  the	  first-­‐level	  contrasts.	  Spatial	  normalization	  was	   conducted	   using	   the	   programme	   Advanced	   Normalization	   Tools	  (ANTs;	  Avants,	  Tustison,	  Wu,	  Cook,	  &	  Gee,	  2011).	  Using	  this	  procedure,	  a	   group	   template	   brain	   is	   first	   constructed	   using	   the	   structural	   T1-­‐weighted	   images	   of	   all	   subjects	   (ANTS:	   buildtemplate.sh),	   and	  transformations	  mapping	   between	   each	   participants	   native	   space	   and	  the	  group	  template	  are	  then	  calculated.	  Spatial	  normalization	  was	  then	  implemented	   by	   using	   these	   transformations	   to	   bring	   the	   first-­‐level	  statistical	  maps	  from	  each	  subject	  into	  the	  group	  template	  space.	  	  
	  6.3.6:	  fMRI	  analysis	  	  
fMRI	   models	   	   	   Three	   different	   general	   linear	   models	   (GLMs)	   were	  constructed,	   to	   analyse	   data	   from	   several	   different	   perspectives:	   (1)	  
psychological,	  (2)	  restricted	  psychological,	  (3)	  chosen	  and	  counterfactual	  
value.	  All	  models	  included	  choice	  regressors	  that	  sorted	  trials	  according	  to	  choice	  and	  condition,	  and	  several	  parametric	  modulators	  describing	  different	   psychological	   or	   informational	   quantities	   (depending	   on	   the	  model)	  that	  varied	  across	  the	  6x6	  task	  space.	  The	  first	  and	  third	  models	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included	   6	   choice	   regressors	   (corresponding	   to	   accept,	   reject	   and	  explore	  in	  the	  experimental	  versus	  control	  condition),	  while	  the	  second	  model	  included	  4	  choice	  regressors	  of	  interest	  (reject	  and	  explore	  in	  the	  experimental	   and	   control	   condition,	   in	   the	   target	   zone	   only;	   see	   later	  section	   for	  more	   detail).	   Orthogonalization	  was	   omitted	   in	   the	   design	  matrix,	   so	   as	   to	   ensure	   that	   parameter	   estimates	   relating	   to	   the	  regressors	   and	   parametric	   modulators	   were	   not	   confounded	   by	  spurious	  correlations	  with	  each	  other	  (Andrade	  et	  al.,	  1999).	  All	  results	  were	  significant	  at	  a	  threshold	  of	  at	  p	  <0.05	  FWE,	  though	  this	  included	  an	   initial	   thresholding	   of	   p<0.001	   uncorrected	   and	   the	   application	   of	  small-­‐volume	  adjustment	  for	  the	  bilateral	  hippocampus.	  The	  first	  2	  models	  (psychological	  and	  restricted	  psychological)	  aimed	  to	  identify	   brain	   regions	   mediating	   choice,	   after	   controlling	   for	   task-­‐related	  variables	  that	  might	  be	  tracked	  at	  a	  psychological	  or	  neural	  level	  (environmental	   threat,	   number	   of	   tokens,	   p(ActBomb),	   uncertainty,	  EV).	  	  These	  models	  enabled	  us	  to	  identify	  neural	  activations	  relating	  to	  choice	   after	   removing	   variance	   associated	  with	   task-­‐related	   variables	  that	   putatively	   influence	   it	   (e.g.	   reject	   and	   explore	   decisions,	   after	  controlling	   for	  p(ActBomb)	  and	  uncertainty/value-­‐scaled	  uncertainty).	  While	   the	   psychological	   model	   looked	   at	   choice	   across	   the	   entire	   6x6	  task	  space,	  the	  restricted	  psychological	  model	  looked	  at	  a	  specific	  6-­‐cell	  zone	   in	   the	   task	   space	   in	   which	   subjects	   only	   occasionally	   rejected	  (Figure	   6-­‐4C),	   so	   as	   to	   verify	   that	   the	   identified	   choice-­‐related	   effects	  were	   not	   confined	   to	   conditions	   that	   were	   overwhelmingly	   aversive	  (see	  Results	  for	  more	  detail).	  In	   the	   third	  model	   (chosen	   and	   counterfactual	   value),	   we	   employed	   a	  reinforcement	   learning	   approach,	   and	   looked	   for	   values	   signals	   in	   the	  brain	  that	  subjects	  might	  be	  using	  to	  make	  strategic	  choices	  in	  our	  task.	  This	  approach	  focuses	  not	  on	  variables	  that	  are	  directly	  present	  in	  the	  task	  environment,	  but	  instead	  focuses	  on	  informational	  quantities	  that	  might	   be	   implicitly	   computed	   by	   subjects	   as	   they	   evaluate	   different	  choice	   options	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   different	   gambles	   faced.	   The	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winning	   behavioural	  models	  were	   used	   to	   calculate	   the	   values	   of	   the	  best	   chosen	   and	   best	   unchosen	   options	   on	   each	   trial,	   which	   were	  included	   as	   parametric	   modulators	   (separately	   for	   the	   experimental	  versus	   control	   condition)	   in	   the	   first	   level	   GLM	   for	   the	   chosen	   and	  
counterfactual	  value	  model.	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6.4:	  Results	  
	  6.4.1:	  Choice	  
	  Figure	  6-­‐2A	  shows	  the	  percentage	  of	  accepting,	  rejecting	  and	  exploring	  in	   the	   experimental	   and	   control	   conditions,	   across	   the	   entire	   6x6	  (environmental	   threat	   x	   no.	   tokens)	   task	   space.	   Overall,	   subjects’	  choices	   appeared	   to	   reflect	   an	   integration	   of	   information	   from	   the	  environmental	  threat	  and	  the	  number	  of	  tokens.	  The	  trade-­‐off	  between	  accepting	   and	   rejecting	   appeared	  particularly	   to	   track	  p(ActBomb).	   In	  order	  to	  quantify	  whether	  subjects	  adjusted	  their	  behaviour	  according	  to	   whether	   they	   were	   performing	   in	   the	   experimental	   or	   the	   control	  conditions,	  we	  used	  paired	  t-­‐tests	  to	  compare	  the	  overall	  percentages	  of	  accepting,	  rejecting	  and	  exploring.	  Subjects	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  accept,	  and	  less	  likely	  to	  reject,	  in	  the	  control,	  compared	  with	  the	  experimental,	  condition	  (Figure	  6-­‐2B;	  Accept:	  t(19)=4.55,	  p<0.001;	  Reject:	  t(19)=3.50,	  




Figure	  6-­‐2:	  Behavioural	   choice.	  Subjects	  made	  strategic	   choices	  across	   the	  6x6	  task	  space	   (A).	   The	   proportion	   of	   the	   task	   space	   in	   which	   subjects	   generally	   accepted	  gambles	  was	  larger	  in	  the	  control	  compared	  to	  the	  experiment	  condition	  (B).	  Bayesian	  model	  comparison	  was	  used	  to	  select	  the	  winning	  model	  from	  a	  large	  model	  space,	  and	  the	   winning	   models	   were	   able	   to	   closely	   reproduce	   the	   overall	   pattern	   of	   choice	  observed	  in	  both	  the	  experimental	  and	  control	  conditions	  (C).	  iBICs	  for	  selected	  models	  are	  shown	  in	  (D).	  All	  error	  bars	  are	  +/-­‐	  1	  SE.	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In	  the	  winning	  behavioural	  models,	  the	  values	  in	  the	  experimental	  task	  (quantified	  in	  terms	  of	  tokens)	  were	  calculated	  as	  follows:	  𝑉(𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡) = 𝑎  ×𝑓 + 1− 𝑎 ×𝑛	  𝑉(𝑅𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡) = 0	  𝑉 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 𝑝 𝑆𝑒𝑒 ×𝑉 𝑆𝑒𝑒       +       𝑝 𝑁𝑜  𝑆𝑒𝑒 ×𝑉 𝑁𝑜  𝑆𝑒𝑒 	  	  	   	   +  𝑒 + 𝑢×𝑤	  	  
𝑎 = 𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡!   × 𝑛12	  
𝑝 𝑆𝑒𝑒 =   12𝑎	  𝑉 𝑆𝑒𝑒 = 0	  
𝑝 𝑁𝑜  𝑆𝑒𝑒 = 1−     12𝑎	  𝑉 𝑁𝑜  𝑆𝑒𝑒 = 𝑘!  ×𝑓    +     1− 𝑘! ×𝑛	  	    +  𝑖	  	  	  	  if	  	  >	  0	                                        = 0	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	   	  	  	  else	   (gamble	  rejected)	  	  Where	  a	  is	  the	  objective	  probability	  of	  an	  activated	  bomb,	  j	  is	  a	  power-­‐law	  distortion	  on	  the	  perceived	  environmental	  threat,	  f	  is	  the	  perceived	  magnitude	  of	   the	   fixed	   loss	   (which	  objectively	  equals	   -­‐12	   tokens),	  n	   is	  the	  number	  of	  activated	  tokens	  on	  that	  trial,	  ‘See’	  describes	  the	  state	  of	  having	  seen	  an	  activated	  bomb	  during	  exploration	  (and	  whose	  value	  is	  0	   in	   the	   experimental	   condition	   because	   it	   is	   assumed	   that	   a	   subject	  would	   reject	   the	   gamble	   at	   the	   second	   stage),	   ‘No	   see’	   describes	   not	  having	   seen	   an	   activated	   bomb	   during	   exploration,	   e	   is	   the	   perceived	  net	   cost	   of	   exploring,	   o	   is	   value-­‐scaled	   uncertainty	   regarding	   the	  probability	  of	  an	  activated	  bomb	  (uncertainty	  ×	  n),	  w	  is	  an	  exploration	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bonus	   that	   quantifies	   the	   impact	   that	   value-­‐scaled	   uncertainty	   has	   on	  V(Explore),	   k	   is	   the	   posterior	   probability	   of	   an	   activated	   bomb	   given	  that	   exploration	   does	   not	   reveal	   an	   activated	   bomb	   (calculated	   using	  Bayes	  rule),	  m	  is	  a	  power	  law	  distortion	  of	  k	  (i.e.	  describing	  suboptimal	  calculation	  of	  the	  posterior	  probability),	  and	  i	  describes	  a	  bonus	  to	  VStage	  2	   Accept,	   reflecting	   a	   general	   tendency	   to	   accept	   gambles	   in	   which	  exploration	   does	   not	   reveal	   a	   bomb	   [as	   opposed	   to	   optimally	  integrating	  the	  null	  information	  into	  an	  estimate	  of	  p(ActBomb)].	  Values	  in	  the	  control	  task	  were	  as	  follows:	  𝑉(𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡) = 1− 𝑎 ×𝑛	  𝑉(𝑅𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡) =   𝑎×𝑛	  𝑉 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 𝑝 𝑆𝑒𝑒 ×𝑉 𝑆𝑒𝑒       +       𝑝 𝑁𝑜  𝑆𝑒𝑒 ×𝑉 𝑁𝑜  𝑆𝑒𝑒 	  +𝑒 + 𝑢×𝑤	  
𝑎 = 𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡!   × 𝑛12	  
𝑝 𝑆𝑒𝑒 =   12𝑎	  𝑉 𝑆𝑒𝑒 = 𝑛	  
𝑝 𝑁𝑜  𝑆𝑒𝑒 = 1−     12𝑎	  𝑉 𝑁𝑜  𝑆𝑒𝑒 = 𝑉!"#$%  !  !""#$%	   	   	   if	  	  VStage	  2	  Accept	  	  >	  VStage	  2	  Reject	   = 𝑉!"#$%  !  !"#"$%	  	   	   otherwise	  	  𝑉!"#$%  !  !""#$% = 1− 𝑘!   ×𝑛      + 𝑖	   	   	  𝑉!"#$%  !  !"#"$% = 𝑘!  ×𝑛	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where	  V(See)	  =	  n	  	  (assuming	  subjects	  correctly	  indicate	  ‘Reject’	  on	  such	  trials),	  	  the	  variable	  exploration	  bonus	  w	  here	  again	  quantifies	  the	  effect	  of	  uncertainty	  (u)	  on	  V(Explore).	  The	   winning	   models	   showed	   that	   subjects	   generally	   slightly	  underestimated	   the	  magnitude	  of	   the	   fixed	   loss	   in	  our	   task	  (described	  by	   the	   f	   parameter;	   mean	   subjective	   value	   =	   -­‐10.03	   tokens).	   Subjects	  also	   slightly	  over-­‐valued	  accepting	   gambles	   after	   exploration	   revealed	  no	  bomb	  than	  would	  be	  optimally	   likely,	   in	  both	  the	  experimental	  and	  control	  conditions	  (described	  by	  the	  i	  parameter).	  Subjects’	  underlying	  estimate	  of	  the	  environmental	  threat	  associated	  with	  each	  background	  colour	  was	  also	  slightly	  distorted	  relative	  to	  the	  true	  probabilities,	  but	  environmental	  threat	  was	  not	  systematically	  under-­‐,	  or	  over-­‐estimated	  by	  the	  group	  as	  a	  whole.	  Subjects	  were	  also	  more	  likely	  to	  explore	  than	  was	  optimal,	  and	  an	  exploration	  bonus	  linked	  to	  uncertainty	  was	  found	  in	   both	   the	   experimental	   and	   control	   conditions	   (described	   by	   the	  w	  parameter,	   linked	   to	   uncertainty	   in	   the	   winning	   model).	   This	   means	  that	  subjects	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  explore	  on	  trials	  in	  which	  uncertainty	  was	  high.	  	  6.4.3:	  Frontal,	  striatal,	  and	  parietal	  regions	  are	  associated	  with	  exploratory	  information	  gathering	  	  
	  We	  first	  employed	  an	  fMRI	  model	  that	  would	  allow	  us	  to	  identify	  neural	  regions	  that	  were	  involved	  in	  accepting,	  rejecting	  and	  exploring	  in	  our	  task.	   In	   this	   analysis,	   we	   constructed	   an	   fMRI	   model	   (referred	   as	  ’psychological	   model’	   in	   the	   Methods)	   that	   included	   the	   6	   choice	  regressors	   of	   interest	   (2x3,	   Condition	   x	   Choice)	   and	   6	   nuisance	  regressors	   that	   modelled,	   on	   every	   trial,	   environmental	   threat,	   the	  number	  of	  tokens,	  p(ActBomb),	  uncertainty,	  and	  expected	  value	  (EV)	  of	  the	   gamble	   (Figure	   6-­‐1B,	   each	   variable	   modelled	   separately	   for	   the	  experimental	  and	  control	  conditions;	  see	  Methods	  for	  detail).	  This	  fMRI	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model	  effectively	  allows	  us	  to	  identify	  BOLD	  responses	  associated	  with	  the	   decision	   to	   accept,	   reject	   or	   explore,	   independently	   from	   BOLD	  responses	  that	  relate	  to	  these	  task-­‐related	  variables	  that	  are	  correlated	  with	   choice	   (see	   Figure	   6-­‐1B	   and	   2a).	   This	   and	   all	   following	   fMRI	  analysis	  focused	  on	  the	  2000ms	  period	  in	  which	  subjects	  evaluated	  the	  gambles	  and	  made	  their	  choice	  (indicated	  by	  the	  blue	  bar	  at	  the	  top	  of	  Figure	   6-­‐1C).	   In	   order	   to	   minimize	   the	   correlation	   between	   BOLD	  responses	  associated	  with	  this	  evaluation	  period	  and	  the	  processing	  of	  outcome	  or	  the	  actual	  exploration	  phase,	  we	  omitted	  the	  outcome	  and	  exploration	  stages	  in	  50%	  of	  the	  fMRI	  trials,	  and	  included	  (for	  all	  fMRI	  models	   reported)	   a	   regressor	   that	   accounted	   for	   the	   variance	   in	   the	  BOLD	   signal	   that	   was	   associated	   with	   the	   presented	   outcomes	   (see	  Methods	  for	  more	  detail).	  We	  first	  looked	  for	  signals	  that	  differentiated	  between	  choices	  without	  distinguishing	  between	  the	  experimental	  and	  control	  conditions	  (main	  effect	  of	  choice).	  We	  looked	  for	  activation	  in	  the	  hippocampus,	  because	  one	   of	   our	   initial	   hypotheses	   was	   that	   the	   hippocampus	   might	   be	  recruited	  for	  choice	  in	  our	  task.	  	  We	  found	  significant	  activations	  in	  the	  bilateral	  anterior	  hippocampus,	  extending	  into	  the	  amygdala	  (Figure	  6-­‐3A;	  p	  <0.05	  FWE	  SVC	  for	  the	  bilateral	  hippocampus;	  see	  Table	  6-­‐1	  for	  all	  cluster	   statistics).	   Rather	   than	   clarifying	   the	   interaction	   by	   looking	   at	  simple	  effects	  in	  the	  extracted	  parameter	  estimates	  (i.e.	  at	  a	  significance	  threshold	  of	  p<0.05),	  we	  opted	  to	  examine	  the	  simple	  effects	  using	  the	  voxel-­‐based	   approach	   (which	   maintains	   a	   consistent	   threshold	   of	  
p<0.05	  FWE).	   Follow-­‐up	   comparisons	   revealed	   that	   the	  main	   effect	   in	  the	   hippocampus	   was	   driven	   by	   a	   pattern	   of	   high	   activation	   when	  subjects	   rejected	   gambles	   (regardless	   of	   condition),	   and	   relative	  
deactivation	   when	   they	   chose	   to	   explore.	   No	   other	   region	   in	   the	  hippocampus	  showed	  greater	  activation	  when	  subjects	  chose	  to	  explore	  (rather	  than	  accept	  or	  reject).	  	  Instead,	   exploration	   was	   associated	   with	   co-­‐activation	   of	   frontal,	  parietal	  and	  striatal	  regions.	  The	  main	  effect	  of	  choice	  contrast	  revealed	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activation	   in	   a	   network	   of	   regions	   that	   included	   the	   right	   striatum,	  lateral	   frontopolar	   cortex	   (BA10),	   middle	   frontal	   gyrus	   (including	  BA46),	   superior	   frontal	   gyrus	   (dorsolateral	   prefrontal	   cortex;	   DLPFC)	  and	   precuneus	   (Figure	   6-­‐3B;	   see	   Table	   6-­‐1	   for	   all	   cluster	   statistics).	  Follow-­‐up	   contrasts	   revealed	   a	   very	   consistent	   pattern	   of	   greater	  activation	   when	   subjects	   chose	   to	   explore,	   compared	   to	   when	   they	  chose	  to	  accept	  or	  reject	  (see	  Figure	  6-­‐3B	  for	  parameter	  estimates	  from	  these	   ROIs).	   No	   region	   showed	   a	   significantly	   greater	   BOLD	   response	  when	  subjects	  accepted	  gambles	  (compared	  to	  rejecting	  or	  exploring).	  However,	  this	  may	  have	  been	  because	  we	  were	  explicitly	  controlling	  for	  correlates	   of	   psychological	   variables	   that	   would	   have	   been	   highly	  correlated	  with	  choice	  (e.g.	  EV,	  number	  of	  tokens).	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  6-­‐3:	  Network	   involved	   in	   Exploration.	  While	   the	   superior	   anterior	   hippocampus	  showed	  relative	  deactivation	  when	  subjects	  explored	   (A),	   a	  network	  of	   frontal,	  striatal	  and	  parietal	  regions	  were	  implicated	  in	  exploration	  (B).	  Functional	  ROIs	  in	  all	  figures	  are	  shown	  at	  p<0.001,	  and	  all	  error	  bars	  are	  +/-­‐	  1	  SE.	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Although	   we	   did	   not	   find	   evidence	   for	   a	   hippocampal	   role	   in	  exploration,	   the	   regions	   identified	   are	   in	   line	   with	   existing	   findings	  regarding	  the	  neural	  circuits	  that	  are	  recruited	  when	  subjects	  choose	  to	  explore.	   One	   alternative	   possibility	   that	   arises	   from	   Gray	   and	  McNaughton’s	   hypothesis	   (2000)	   is	   that	   the	   hippocampus	   may	   be	  specifically	  recruited	  in	  exploration	  that	  is	  undertaken	  as	  a	  response	  to	  approach-­‐avoidance	   conflict	   (as	   opposed	   to	   being	   important	   for	  exploration	   more	   generally).	   To	   examine	   this	   possibility,	   we	   directly	  contrasted	   exploration	   in	   the	   experimental	   versus	   control	   condition,	  again	  using	  the	  voxel-­‐based	  approach.	  This	  contrast	  failed	  to	  reveal	  any	  significant	   activation	   in	   the	   hippocampus,	   or	   elsewhere	   in	   the	   brain.	  These	   results	   fail	   to	   support	   the	   hypothesis	   that	   the	   hippocampus	   is	  involved	   in	   initiating	   exploratory	   risk-­‐assessment	   behaviour,	   as	   had	  been	   hypothesized	   by	   Gray	   and	   McNaughton	   (2000).	   Instead,	  exploration	   was	   associated	   with	   activation	   in	   a	   network	   of	   regions	  commonly	  implicated	  in	  decision	  making	  and	  executive	  function	  (Badre	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  Boorman	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Daw	  et	  al.,	  2005),	  which	  suggests	  that	  exploration	   in	   an	   approach-­‐avoidance	   context	   is	   not	   qualitatively	  different	  from	  exploration	  in	  a	  broader	  decision-­‐making	  context.	  	  	  6.4.4:	  Inferior	  sub-­‐regions	  of	  the	  anterior	  hippocampus	  are	  specifically	  and	  selectively	  recruited	  during	  avoidance	  in	  an	  aversive	  context	  	  	  Next,	   we	   examined	   the	   condition	   x	   choice	   interaction	   contrast,	   to	  identify	   brain	   regions	   that	   responded	   differentially	   to	   choice	   in	   the	  experimental	  and	  control	  conditions.	  This	  is	  the	  key	  contrast	  of	  interest,	  as	   we	   were	   interested	   in	   understanding	   the	   contribution	   of	   the	  hippocampus	   to	   choice	   in	   the	   context	   of	   approach-­‐avoidance	   conflict,	  which	  is	  a	  feature	  of	  the	  experimental	  but	  not	  the	  control	  condition.	  We	  found	  significant	  clusters	  in	  the	  bilateral	  inferior	  anterior	  hippocampus	  (Figure	  6-­‐4A,	  blue;	  p	  <0.05	  FWE	  SVC	  for	  the	  bilateral	  hippocampus),	  an	  effect	   that,	   upon	   further	   examination	   (again	   using	   follow-­‐up	   voxel-­‐
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based	  contrasts),	  was	  driven	  by	  differences	  in	  activation	  when	  rejecting	  gambles	   in	   the	  experimental	  versus	   the	  control	  condition.	  While	   these	  regions	  showed	  high	  activation	  when	  subjects	  rejected	  gambles	   in	   the	  experimental	  condition,	  they	  were	  relatively	  deactivated	  when	  subjects	  faced	   the	   same	   decision	   in	   the	   control	   condition	   (Figure	   6-­‐4A).	   This	  result	   indicates	  that	  the	   inferior	  anterior	  hippocampus	  was	  selectively	  recruited	  while	  subjects	  acted	  to	  avoid	  a	  possible	  loss,	  as	  distinguished	  from	  acknowledging	  the	  presence	  of	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Table	  6-­‐1:	  Cluster	  statistics	  for	  Psychological	  model	  
	   	   	   	   	   Peak	  coordinates	  (mm	  in	  
group	  space)	  




F	   Z	   x	   y	   z	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Main	  effect	  of	  Choice	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Superior	  frontal	  gyrus	   4214	   0.000	   39.03	   7.15	   25.2	   25.9	   71.8	  	   	   0.000	   29.37	   6.34	   24.0	   46.9	   59.8	  	   	   0.000	   28.60	   6.26	   24.1	   35.9	   76.8	  Precuneus	   2360	   0.000	   36.29	   6.94	   3.8	   -­‐44.2	   58.6	  	   	   0.000	   28.60	   6.26	   4.8	   -­‐35.2	   57.7	  	   	   0.000	   24.84	   5.88	   2.9	   -­‐52.3	   58.6	  Cerebellum	   585	   0.000	   27.48	   6.15	   -­‐33.5	   -­‐30.4	   -­‐10.2	  	   	   0.006	   20.52	   5.37	   -­‐43.5	   -­‐22.5	   -­‐10.2	  Superior	  frontal	  gyrus	   270	   0.000	   24.90	   5.88	   17.3	   22.8	   88.8	  	   	   0.002	   22.16	   5.57	   23.4	   14.9	   86.8	  Middle	  frontal	  gyrus	   170	   0.002	   22.21	   5.58	   32.5	   -­‐23.8	   -­‐10.4	  	   	   0.018	   18.72	   5.14	   37.5	   -­‐32.7	   -­‐16.4	  Middle	  frontal	  gyrus	  (BA46)	   66	   0.008	   20.08	   5.31	   -­‐23.0	   52.5	   62.0	  Right	  caudate	   48	   0.011	   19.60	   5.25	   18.2	   24.9	   49.8	  BA10	   27	   0.011	   19.51	   5.24	   -­‐27.4	   78.5	   38.1	  Medial	  superior	  frontal	  gyrus	   26	   0.012	   19.35	   5.22	   -­‐0.7	   19.7	   75.8	  Left	  anterior	  hippocampus	  (superior)	   151	   0.000	   17.49	   4.97	   -­‐21.7	   5.6	   14.9	  Right	  anterior	  hippocampus	  (superior)	   51	   0.007	   13.11	   4.28	   23.2	   7.1	   14.7	  	   	   0.195	   8.35	   3.32	   19.2	   10.0	   13.8	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Task	  x	  Choice	  interaction	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Left	  anterior	  hippocampus	  (inferior)	   338	   0.007	   13.27	   4.31	   21.2	   8.1	   9.7	  	   0.029	   11.15	   3.92	   19.2	   11.0	   11.8	  	   0.065	   9.99	   3.68	   29.3	   3.1	   9.7	  	   	   0.194	   8.36	   3.32	   32.2	   6.2	   8.7	  Right	  anterior	  hippocampus	  (inferior)	   274	   0.025	   11.36	   3.96	   -­‐22.7	   3.7	   10.8	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a	   hypothetical	   threat	   that	   could	   not	   do	   them	   harm.	   Additionally,	   the	  strength	   of	   this	   response	   in	   left	   hippocampal	  ROI	   (reject	   >	   explore	   in	  the	   experimental	   condition)	  was	   positively	   correlated	   across	   subjects	  with	  individual	  differences	  in	  trait	  and	  state	  anxiety	  (Figure	  6-­‐4B;	  trait	  anxiety:	   τ=0.39,	   p=0.021;	   state	   anxiety:	   τ=0.33,	   p=0.047;	   non-­‐parametric	   correlation	   tests	   used	   due	   to	   avoid	   outlier-­‐driven	  correlations).	  	  Interestingly,	  we	  noted	  that	  the	  clusters	  showing	  a	  main	  effect	  of	  choice	  and	   those	   showing	   a	   condition	   x	   choice	   interaction	  were	   consistently	  segregated	   within	   the	   anterior	   hippocampus:	   voxels	   that	   showed	   a	  main	  effect	  of	   choice	  were	  relatively	  superior	   to	  voxels	   that	   showed	  a	  condition	  x	  choice	  interaction,	  on	  both	  the	  left	  and	  right	  (Figure	  6-­‐4A).	  Comparing	  our	   functional	  clusters	   to	  anatomical	  atlases	  and	  reference	  images	   in	  which	  hippocampal	  subfields	  had	  been	  manually	  segmented	  according	  to	  anatomical	   features	  (Duvernoy,	  2013;	  Wisse	  et	  al.,	  2012),	  we	   noted	   that	   the	   voxels	   that	   demonstrated	   a	   main	   effect	   of	   choice	  (Figure	   6-­‐4A,	   red)	   were	   mostly	   localized	   to	   the	   CA3	   subfield	   of	   the	  hippocampus,	  with	  extensions	  into	  the	  amygdala,	  while	  the	  voxels	  that	  demonstrated	   a	   condition	   x	   choice	   interaction	   were	   located	  predominantly	  in	  the	  CA1	  subfield	  on	  the	  right	  and	  CA1/DG	  on	  the	  left,	  with	  extensions	  into	  the	  subiculum,	  bilaterally.	  This	  striking	  pattern	  of	  segregated	  signals	  in	  the	  hippocampus	  indicate	  that	  a	  robust	  distinction	  between	  rejecting	  in	  the	  experimental	  versus	  the	  control	  condition	  may	  emerge	  predominantly	  in	  the	  CA1	  region	  of	  the	  hippocampus.	  	  	  6.4.5:	  The	  anterior	  hippocampus	  is	  associated	  with	  behavioural	  avoidance	  in	  the	  trade-­‐off	  with	  exploration	  	  Although	   our	   fMRI	   model	   controlled	   for	   task-­‐related	   psychological	  variables	   that	   were	   potentially	   correlated	   with	   the	   decision	   to	   reject	  [including	  p(ActBomb)],	  we	  wanted	  to	  confirm	  the	  involvement	  of	  the	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  anterior	   hippocampus	   in	   threat	   avoidance	   under	   conditions	   wherein	  subjects	   rejected	  gambles	  only	  occasionally.	  To	   this	  end,	  we	  defined	  a	  set	   of	   gambles	   for	   which	   reject	   and	   explore	   traded	   off	   (the	   zone	  outlined	   in	   Figure	   6-­‐4C)	   and	   built	   an	   fMRI	   model	   (referred	   to	   as	  
restricted	   psychological	   in	   the	  Methods)	   to	   identify	   regions	   that	   were	  associated	  with	  rejecting	  in	  this	  zone	  of	  the	  task	  space.	  This	  fMRI	  model	  included	   4	   regressors	   of	   interest	   (reject	   and	   explore	   for	   the	  experimental	   and	   control	   conditions	   separately)	   while	   controlling	   for	  all	   the	   same	   variables	   as	   in	   the	   full	   model	   (see	   Methods	   for	   detail).	  Despite	  the	  substantial	  reduction	  in	  statistical	  power,	  a	  second-­‐level	  2	  x	  2	  (Condition	  x	  Choice)	  ANOVA	  revealed	  significant	  activation	  in	  the	  left	  anterior	  hippocampal	  CA1	  subfield	  (peak	  at	  -­‐26.8,	  10,	  10,	  p=0.005	  FWE	  SVC	  for	  the	  bilateral	  hippocampus,	  F=26.71,	  Z=4.41)	  and	  a	  trend	  in	  the	  
Figure	   6-­‐4:	   The	   anterior	   hippocampus	   is	   associated	   with	   behavioural	   avoidance.	  Voxels	   in	   the	   inferior	   anterior	   hippocampus	   (A,	   blue)	   discriminated	   between	   rejecting	  gambles	   in	   an	   instrumentally	   aversive	   versus	   a	   neutral	   context.	   In	   contrast,	   the	   superior	  anterior	   hippocampus	   (A,	   red)	   failed	   to	   discriminate	   between	   rejecting	   gambles	   in	   the	  experimental	  and	  control	  condition	  (see	  Figure	  6-­‐3A).	  The	  strength	  of	  this	  response	  in	  the	  left	   inferior	  anterior	  hippocampus	  correlated	  across	  all	  subjects	  with	  measures	  of	  anxiety	  (B).	  Examining	  choice-­‐related	  responses	  in	  a	  restricted	  portion	  of	  the	  task	  space	   in	  which	  subjects	  only	  occasionally	  rejected	  gambles	  found	  a	  similar	  pattern	  of	  results	  in	  the	  anterior	  CA1	  (C).	  All	  error	  bars	  are	  +/-­‐	  1	  SE.	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right	  anterior	  hippocampal	  CA1	  (peak	  at	  20.2,	  10,	  7,	  p=0.066	  FWE	  SVC	  for	   the	   bilateral	   hippocampus,	   F=17.88,	   Z=3.69).	   Examination	   of	   the	  same	   contrast	   for	   choices	   outside	   this	   restricted	   portion	   of	   the	   task	  space	   (i.e.	   condition	   x	   choice	   interaction	   contrast	   in	   a	   2x2	   ANOVA	  comparing	   accepting	   and	   rejecting	   in	   the	   experimental	   versus	   control	  condition)	   did	   also	   find	   recruitment	   of	   the	   anterior	   hippocampus	   for	  rejecting	   in	   the	   experimental	   condition	   alone	   (right:	   peak	   at	   22.2,8,1,	  p=0.017	  FWE,	  F=22.56,	  Z=4.10;	  left:	  peak	  at	  -­‐21.7,	  3,	  13,	  p=0.082	  FWE,	  F=17.38,	   Z=3.64,	   both	  with	   SVC	   for	   the	  bilateral	   hippocampus).	  These	  results	  indicate	  that	  the	  hippocampal	  CA1	  activation	  is	  associated	  with	  the	   avoidance	   of	   aversive	   outcomes	   even	   under	   conditions	   in	   which	  subjects	  do	  not	  overwhelmingly	  choose	  to	  avoid.	  	  6.4.6:	  An	  approach-­‐avoidance	  context	  modulates	  subjective	  value	  signals	  in	  the	  superior	  anterior	  hippocampus	  	  The	   analysis	   thus	   far	   allowed	   us	   to	   identify	   regions	   that	   were	   more	  greatly	   activated	   under	   conditions	   in	  which	   subjects	   chose	   to	   explore	  and	   reject.	   Next,	  we	   looked	   for	   value-­‐related	   signals	   in	   the	   brain	   that	  subjects	   might	   use	   to	   generate	   the	   observed	   patterns	   of	   behavioural	  choice.	   Recent	   studies	   suggest	   that	   signals	   relating	   to	   the	   value	   of	  chosen	  and	  counterfactual	  (i.e.	  unchosen,	  competing)	  alternatives	  may	  usefully	   guide	   choice	   (Boorman	   et	   al.,	   2009;	   Hayden	   et	   al.,	   2009).	  Accordingly,	   we	   built	   a	   model	   (referred	   to	   as	   the	   Chosen	   and	  
Counterfactual	  Value	  model	  in	  the	  Methods)	  that	  employed	  the	  values	  of	  the	   chosen	   and	   best	   unchosen	   options	   as	   parametric	   modulators	   on	  each	  trial	  (Figure	  6-­‐5A).	  	  Value-­‐related	   signals	  were	   found	   in	  many	   regions	   that	   typically	   track	  values	   in	   decision-­‐making	   tasks,	   such	   as	   the	   ventromedial	   prefrontal	  cortex	   (vmPFC)	   and	   striatum.	   Consistent	  with	   previous	   studies,	  many	  regions	   that	   positively	   tracked	   the	   value	   of	   the	   chosen	   option	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[V(Chosen)]	   also	   negatively	   tracked	   the	   value	   of	   the	   best	   unchosen	  option	   [V(Best	   unchosen)],	   and	   vice	   versa	   (Boorman	   et	   al.,	   2011).	  Hippocampal	   activation	   was	   also	   observed	   to	   positively	   track	  V(Chosen)	  and	  negatively	   track	  V(Best	  Unchosen)	  across	   the	  6x6	   task	  space.	   To	   clarify	   these	   value-­‐related	   signals,	   we	   included	   first-­‐level	  contrasts	  related	  to	  V(Chosen)	  and	  V(Best	  unchosen)	  in	  a	  second-­‐level	  2x2	  ANOVA,	  separately	  for	  the	  experimental	  and	  control	  condition	  (i.e.	  2x2,	   Task	   x	   Value-­‐type).	   Looking	   at	   the	   main	   effect	   of	   value-­‐type	  contrast	   in	   this	   analysis,	   we	   noted	   again	   significant	   activation	   in	   the	  vmPFC,	   ventral	   striatum,	   hippocampus	   (extending	   into	   the	   amygdala)	  and	  temporal	  cortex,	  that	  tracked	  V(Chosen)	  >	  V(Best	  Unchosen)	  across	  the	  6x6	  task	  space	  (Figure	  6-­‐5B,	  red).	  Additionally,	  the	  parietal	  cortex,	  insula,	   thalamus,	   supplementary	   motor	   area	   (SMA)	   and	   dorsolateral	  PFC	   (extending	   into	   the	   rostrolateral	   PFC;	   RLPFC)	   positively	   tracked	  V(Best	  Unchosen)	  >	  V(Chosen)	  (Figure	  6-­‐5B,	  yellow).	  These	  results	  are	  in	   line	  with	   the	   existing	   literature	   regarding	  neural	   value	   signals,	   and	  the	   separation	  of	   chosen	  and	  counterfactual	  value	   signals	   in	   the	  brain	  (Boorman	  et	  al.,	  2009,	  2011).	  Examining	  the	  Task	  x	  Choice	   interaction	  within	   this	   same	   second-­‐level	   model,	   we	   noted	   additionally	   an	  interaction	   in	   the	  superior	  anterior	  hippocampus	  alone	  (left:	  peak	  at	   -­‐21.8,	  7,	  13,	  peak	  FWE	  p=0.037,	  T=3.78;	  right:	  peak	  at	  19.2,	  11,	  12,	  peak	  FWE	   p=0.018,	   T=4.32;	   all	   with	   SVC	   for	   the	   bilateral	   hippocampus),	  which	   tracked	  V(Chosen)	   positively	   and	  V(Best	  Unchosen)	   negatively,	  but	  did	  so	  more	  strongly	  in	  the	  experimental	  condition	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  control	  (Figure	  6-­‐5C).	  These	  results	  indicate	  that	  value	  signals	  in	  the	  hippocampus	  were	  potentiated	  by	   the	  approach-­‐avoidance	  context,	   so	  that	  a	  similar	  change	  in	  subjective	  values	  in	  the	  two	  conditions	  results	  in	  a	  larger	  difference	  in	  activation	  in	  the	  superior	  anterior	  hippocampus	  alone.	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Figure	  6-­‐5:	  Value	  signals	  and	  their	  neural	  correlates.	  Values	  of	  the	  chosen	  and	  best	  unchosen	  alternatives	  were	   calculated	   for	   each	   gamble	   type	   (A),	   using	   the	  winning	   behavioural	   models.	  Consistent	  with	  existing	  findings,	  we	  found	  significant	  tracking	  of	  V(Chosen)	  >	  V(Best	  unchosen)	  in	   the	   vmPFC,	   ventral	   striatum,	   and	   other	   regions,	   including	   the	   anterior	   hippocampus	   and	  amygdala	   (B).	   Value	   signals	   in	   the	   superior	   anterior	   hippocampus	   alone	   significantly	   differed	  between	  the	  experimental	  and	  control	  conditions,	  however	  (C),	  indicating	  a	  steeper	  hippocampal	  response	   to	   changes	   in	   subjective	   value	   in	   the	   experimental	   versus	   condition.	   Red	   clusters	  indicate	   significant	   activation	   for	  V(Chosen)>V(Best	  Unchosen),	   yellow	   clusters	   indicate	  V(Best	  Unchosen)>V(Chosen),	   and	   blue	   clusters	   indicate	   regions	   that	   tracked	   V(Chosen)	   >	   V(Best	  Unchosen)	  more	  strongly	  in	  the	  experimental	  condition.	  All	  error	  bars	  are	  +/-­‐	  1	  SE.	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6.5:	  Discussion	  	  
	  To	  clarify	  the	  functional	  contribution	  of	  the	  hippocampus	  in	  approach-­‐avoidance	   conflict,	   we	   developed	   a	   novel	   decision-­‐making	   task	   that	  separated	   behavioural	   avoidance	   from	   the	   decision	   to	   gather	   more	  information	   (explore).	   We	   found	   that,	   whereas	   exploration	   was	  associated	  with	   activation	   in	   a	   network	   of	   fronto-­‐striatal	   regions,	   the	  inferior	  anterior	  hippocampus	  was	  selectively	  recruited	  when	  subjects	  acted	  to	  avoid	  a	  potential	  loss,	  with	  the	  strength	  of	  this	  response	  linked	  to	   individual	   differences	   in	   anxiety.	   In	   contrast,	   activation	   in	   the	  
superior	   anterior	   hippocampus	   did	   not	   distinguish	   between	   acting	   to	  avoid	   a	   potential	   loss	   (i.e.	   in	   the	   experimental	   condition)	   and	  cognitively	  acknowledging	  the	  presence	  of	  an	  abstract	  threat	  that	  posed	  no	   instrumental	   harm	   (i.e.	   in	   the	   control	   condition).	   Examination	   of	  value-­‐related	  signals	  in	  our	  task	  further	  indicated	  that	  values	  of	  chosen	  and	  competing	  alternatives	  were	  tracked	  across	  the	  6x6	  task	  space	  by	  a	  network	  of	  regions	  that	  included	  the	  frontal	  cortex	  and	  striatum,	  value	  signals	   in	   the	   superior	   anterior	   hippocampus	   alone	   distinguished	  between	   the	   experimental	   and	   control	   conditions,	   in	   showing	   greater	  value-­‐tracking	  in	  the	  experimental	  condition	  compared	  to	  the	  control.	  	  In	   our	   analysis,	   we	   found	   hippocampal	   signals	   that	   related	   both	   to	  categorical	  choice,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  monotonic	  quantities	  that	  varied	  across	  the	   task	   space.	   These	   results	   suggest	   that	   the	   hippocampus	   may	   be	  involved	   in	  both	  monitoring	  and	  behavioural	  control.	  Dual	  monitoring	  and	   control	   modes	   have	   been	   previously	   suggested	   in	   the	   literature	  (Gray	  and	  McNaughton,	  2000),	  but	  have	  been	  difficult	  to	  demonstrate	  in	  rodents,	   because	   experimental	   indices	   of	   threat	   awareness	   (e.g.	  freezing)	   are	   tightly	   linked	   to	   adaptive	   behavioural	   control.	   By	  employing	   computational	  methods	   that	   quantify	   the	   subjective	   values	  underlying	   strategic	   choices,	   we	   were	   able	   to	   examine	   hippocampal	  contributions	   to	   threat	   monitoring	   outside	   the	   discrete	   set	   of	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circumstances	   that	   merit	   a	   behavioural	   response.	   The	   anterior	  hippocampus	   (extending	   into	   the	   amygdala),	   along	   with	   the	   ventral	  striatum,	   vmPFC	   and	   RLPFC	   showed	   signals	   that	   positively	   tracked	  V(Chosen)	  and	  negatively	  tracked	  V(Best	  Unchosen)	  across	  the	  6x6	  task	  space,	   which	  may	   reflect	   the	   brain’s	   sensitivity	   to	   quantities	   that	   are	  ultimately	  used	  to	  guide	  strategic	  choice	  in	  our	  task.	  Interestingly,	  only	  the	   signals	   in	   the	   superior	   anterior	   hippocampus	   distinguished	  between	   changes	   in	   value	   that	   occurred	   in	   an	   approach-­‐avoidance	  context	   compared	   to	   a	   neutral	   one	   (i.e.	   corresponding	   to	   the	  experimental	  and	  control	  conditions,	  respectively).	  Voxels	  in	  this	  region	  alone	   showed	   an	   interaction	   in	   the	   value	   signals	   as	   a	   function	   of	  experimental	  condition,	   indicative	  of	  a	  steeper	  change	   in	  hippocampal	  activation	   levels	   in	   the	   experimental	   versus	   control	   condition,	   as	   a	  function	  of	  a	  similar	  change	  in	  expected	  value.	  Previous	  work	  indicates	  that	  values	  of	  competing	  options	  are	  represented	  in	  the	  brain,	  and	  that	  competitive	   interactions	   between	   such	   neural	   representations	   are	  important	  in	  determining	  behavioural	  choice	  (Hayden	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Hunt	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  While	  broader	  networks	  of	  brain	  regions	  may	  be	  recruited	  to	  represent	  values	  in	  our	  task,	  the	  hippocampus	  may	  serve	  particularly	  to	   potentiate	   value	   signals	   that	   invoke	   approach-­‐avoidance	   conflict,	  thereby	  enhancing	  the	  differences	  between	  competing	  alternatives	  at	  a	  neural	   level.	   Such	   a	   potentiated	   value	   signal	   in	   the	   hippocampus	  may	  then	  provide	  the	  brain	  with	  value	  signals	  that	  more	  sharply	  define	  the	  best	  and	  unchosen	  alternatives,	  so	  as	  to	  more	  accurately	  guide	  choice	  in	  situations	  where	  incorrect	  decisions	  entail	  instrumental	  loss.	  	  In	   addition	   to	  observing	  monotonic	  value	   signals	   in	   the	  hippocampus,	  
categorical	  choice	  signals	  were	  also	  observed	  in	  the	  anterior	  regions	  of	  the	   hippocampus.	   The	   categorical	   signals	   reported	   indicate	   that	   the	  hippocampus’	   role	   in	   anxiety	   and	   choice	   under	   approach-­‐avoidance	  conflict	  may	  relate	  specifically	  to	  avoidance	  and	  behavioural	  inhibition,	  instead	  of	   to	   exploratory	   risk	   assessment	   (as	  previously	   suggested	  by	  Gray	   &	   McNaughton,	   2000).	   Consistent	   with	   this	   idea,	   lesions	   to	   the	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ventral	   hippocampus	   in	   rats	   produce	   impulsivity	   and	   deficits	   in	  inhibitory	  control,	  even	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  aversive	  context	  (Abela	  et	  al.,	   2013;	   Devenport	   et	   al.,	   1981;	   Jarrard	   et	   al.,	   1964;	   Swanson	   and	  Isaacson,	  1967).	  Similarly,	  human	  patients	  with	   lesions	  of	   the	  anterior	  hippocampus	   showed	   decreased	   passive	   avoidance	   and	   behavioural	  inhibition	  when	  performing	  a	  human	  analogue	  of	  anxiety	  tests	  typically	  used	  to	  study	  anxiety	  in	  rodents	  (Bach	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  The	  functioning	  of	  the	   hippocampus	   in	   exerting	   inhibitory	   control	   on	   motor	   plans	   may	  indeed	   explain	   why	   approach-­‐avoidance	   conflict,	   which	   invokes	  incompatible	  motor	   plans,	   is	   such	   a	   key	   feature	   of	   the	   rodent	   anxiety	  tests	   that	  have	  so	  convincingly	   implicated	  the	  hippocampus	  (Gray	  and	  McNaughton,	   2000).	   Straightforward	   avoidant	   responses	   (e.g.	  withdrawing	   from	   pain)	   and	   paradigms	   which	   involve	   explicit	  expectations	   of	   imminent	   aversive	   experiences	   may	   instead	   tap	   into	  other	   aspects	   of	   fear	   responding	   that	   recruit	   other	   structures	   in	   the	  brain.	  	  Although	   the	   spatial	   resolution	   of	   our	   MRI	   data	   (3mm	   isotropic)	  precludes	   clear	   quantification	   of	   the	   signals	   in	   each	   of	   the	   different	  hippocampal	   subfields,	   we	   also	   noted	   a	   remarkably	   consistent	  segregation	   of	   the	   functional	   categorical	   choice	   signals	   within	   the	  anterior	   hippocampus,	   in	   both	   the	   left	   and	   the	   right.	   Comparing	   the	  spatial	  distribution	  of	  the	  hippocampal	  signals	  with	  anatomical	  atlases	  and	  segmental	  subfield	  maps	  (Duvernoy,	  2013;	  Wisse	  et	  al.,	  2012),	  we	  noted	   that	   the	   superior/inferior	   segregation	   of	   our	   functional	   signals	  mirrored	   the	   superior/inferior	  anatomical	   segregation	  of	   the	  CA3	  and	  CA1	   subfields	   in	   the	   anterior	   hippocampus.	   The	   functional	   clusters	  observed	   in	   the	   superior	   anterior	   hippocampus,	   corresponding	  predominantly	   to	   the	   CA3	   subfield,	   did	   not	   robustly	   distinguish	  between	   rejecting	   an	   aversive	   gamble	   and	   positively	   indicating	   the	  presence	   of	   a	   bomb	   (i.e.	   in	   the	   experimental	   and	   control	   conditions,	  respectively),	   despite	   these	   two	   actions	   having	   very	   different	  psychological	  implications	  (i.e.	  regarding	  the	  possibility	  of	  instrumental	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loss).	   This	   stands	   in	   sharp	   contrast	   with	   the	   BOLD	   response	   in	   the	  inferior	   hippocampus	   (whose	   voxels	   were	   predominantly,	   but	   not,	  entirely	   in	   the	   CA1	   subfield),	   which	   distinguished	   between	   acting	   to	  avoid	   a	   potential	   loss	   (i.e.	   in	   the	   experimental	   condition)	   and	  cognitively	  acknowledging	  the	  presence	  of	  an	  abstract	  threat	  that	  posed	  no	   instrumental	   harm	   (i.e.	   in	   the	   control	   condition).	   An	   important	  caveat	   to	   note	   once	  more	   is	   that	   our	   relatively	   low	   spatial	   resolution	  (3mm	   isotropic)	   is	   likely	   to	   have	   resulted	   in	   signals	   that	   are	   spatially	  smeared	   relatively	   to	   their	   exact	   hippocampal	   location.	   Although	   our	  data	  do	  not	  allow	  us	  to	  make	  firm	  conclusions	  regarding	  the	  anatomical	  localization,	  these	  results	  do	  nevertheless	  highlight	  the	  possibility	  that	  this	   avoidance-­‐related	   hippocampal	   signal	  may	   emerge	  most	   robustly	  in	   the	   CA1	   sub-­‐region	   of	   the	   hippocampus.	   The	   CA1	   subfield	   is	   well	  placed	   to	   convey	   such	   a	   processed	   behavioural	   signal	   to	   other	   brain	  regions	   that	   are	   important	   for	  motivation,	   affect	   and	   neuroendocrine	  function,	   such	   as	   the	   nucleus	   accumbens,	   the	   central	   nucleus	   of	   the	  amygdala	   and	   the	   bed	   nucleus	   of	   the	   stria	   terminalis	   (Fanselow	   and	  Dong,	  2010).	  Interestingly,	  individual	  differences	  in	  the	  strength	  of	  this	  rejecting-­‐related	  neural	  response	  predicted	  the	  levels	  of	  anxiety	  in	  our	  sample.	   This	   again	   is	   consistent	   with	   previous	   work	   that	   has	   noted	  enhanced	  excitability	  of	  CA1	  neurons	  in	  the	  context	  of	  animal	  models	  of	  anxiety	  (Freeman-­‐Daniels	  et	  al.,	  2011;	  Gordon	  et	  al.,	  2005).	  	  	  One	   significant	  possibility	   suggested	  by	   the	  data	   reported	  here	   is	   that	  signals	   that	   relate	   to	   choice	   monitoring	   may	   be	   translated	   into	  categorical	   decision	   variables	   by	   processing	   of	   the	   hippocampal	   tri-­‐synaptic	  loop	  itself.	  Detailed	  computational	  models	  of	  signal	  processing	  within	   this	   hippocampal	   loop	   have	   proposed	   that	   processing	   in	   this	  circuit	  allows	  for	  representations	  of	  states	  to	  be	  maintained	  in	  attractor	  networks	   in	   CA3,	   and	   that	   CA1	   neurons	   additionally	   act	   to	   compare	  these	   CA3	   representations	   with	   inputs	   from	   the	   entorhinal	   cortex	  (Hasselmo	  et	  al.,	  1996;	  Kajiwara	  et	  al.,	  2008).	   In	  anxiety,	  CA1	  neurons	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may	   perform	   a	   similar	   computational	   function	   (i.e.	   of	   detecting	  convergent	   inputs),	   but	   acting	   on	   different	   inputs	   (Bannerman	   et	   al.,	  2014),	   e.g.	   comparing	   CA3	   signals	   with	   inputs	   from	   the	   amygdala	   or	  prefrontal	   cortex,	   which,	   in	   rodents,	   project	   bi-­‐directionally	   to	   the	  ventral	   hippocampus	   (the	   rodent	   homolog	   of	   the	   human	   anterior	  hippocampus;	   Fanselow	   &	   Dong,	   2010).	   Alternatively,	   monitoring-­‐related	   signals	   (which	   were	   noted	   in	   the	   superior	   anterior	  hippocampus,	  corresponding	  most	  closely	  to	  voxels	  in	  the	  CA3	  subfield)	  may	  result	  in	  activation	  of	  CA1	  neurons	  only	  when	  the	  strength	  of	  these	  upstream	   signals	   exceeds	   a	   certain	   threshold.	   Such	   dynamics	   would	  allow	   the	   hippocampus	   to	   play	   a	   role	   in	   both	   threat	   monitoring	   and	  active	   control,	   as	   has	   been	   the	   suggestion	   put	   forward	   by	   Gray	   and	  colleagues.	  	  One	   of	   the	   possibilities	   that	   we	   had	   seriously	   considered	   at	   the	  beginning	   of	   this	   experiment	   was	   that	   the	   hippocampus	   would	   have	  been	   important	   in	   generating	   risk	   assessment	  behaviours	   in	   response	  to	   situations	   of	   approach-­‐avoidance	   conflict.	   Instead	   of	   the	  hippocampus,	  we	   found	   that	   uncertainty-­‐based	   exploration	   engaged	   a	  network	  of	  regions	  that	  included	  the	  DLPFC,	  frontal	  pole	  and	  striatum.	  In	  reinforcement	  learning	  paradigms	  that	  study	  exploration,	  as	  well	  as	  the	   current	   task,	   subjects	   generally	   act	   to	   maximize	   rewards,	   while	  employing	  exploration	  as	  a	  means	  of	  decreasing	  uncertainty	  regarding	  the	  best	  course	  of	  action.	  While	  such	  studies	   typically	   link	  exploration	  to	   activation	   of	   the	   frontal	   pole	   and	   intraparietal	   sulcus	   (Badre	   et	   al.,	  2012;	   Boorman	   et	   al.,	   2009;	   Daw	   et	   al.,	   2005),	   studies	   that	   employ	  paradigms	   that	   place	   emphasis	   on	  mnemonic	   functions	   or	   the	   use	   of	  acquired	   information	   have	   tended	   to	   additionally	   implicate	   the	  hippocampus	  in	  exploration	  (Voss	  et	  al.,	  2011a,	  2011b;	  Wang	  and	  Voss,	  2014).	   The	   results	   reported	   here	   are	   remarkably	   consistent	   with	   the	  existing	   literature,	   and	   do	   not	   provide	   any	   evidence	   for	   the	   idea	   that	  exploration	   in	  an	  approach-­‐avoidance	  context	   is	  qualitatively	  different	  from	  uncertainty-­‐based	  information	  seeking	  in	  general.	  One	  additional	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speculative	   possibility	   from	   our	   data	   is	   that	   the	  marked	   hippocampal	  
deactivation	   we	   observed	  may	   be	   important	   in	   initiating	   uncertainty-­‐based	  exploration,	   for	   example	   if	   information	  gathering	   is	  potentiated	  by	  a	  lack	  of	  clear	  outcome	  information	  in	  the	  hippocampal	  ensemble.	  	  By	   combining	   careful	   experimental	   design,	   behavioural	  modelling	   and	  fMRI,	   we	   have	   been	   able	   to	   parse	   hippocampal	   contributions	   to	  avoidance	  and	  exploratory	  risk	  assessment	  when	  human	  subjects	   face	  an	   approach/avoidance	   conflict.	   Our	   results	   demonstrate	   that	   the	  hippocampus	   is	   associated	  with	   behavioural	   avoidance	   as	   opposed	   to	  exploration,	   and	   tracks	   the	   unattractiveness	   of	   unrealized	   options.	  Additionally,	  our	  results	   link	  anxiety	  to	  aversive	  signals	   in	  the	   inferior	  anterior	   hippocampus	   specifically,	   and	   identify	   this	   sub-­‐region	   of	   the	  hippocampus	  as	  a	  potentially	  productive	  focus	  for	  future	  experimental	  work.	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Chapter	  7:	  Modulation	  of	  





	  Experiments	   that	   examine	   how	   exploration	   impacts	  memory	   typically	  employ	  paradigms	  in	  which	  subjects	  are	  forced	  to	  encounter	  novelty	  or	  new	   information,	   which	   neglects	   the	   fact	   that	   exploration	   in	   the	   real	  world	   is	   typically	   spontaneous,	   actively	   chosen	   by	   the	   individual,	   and	  likely	  undertaken	  with	  some	  strategic	  aim	  in	  mind.	  In	  this	  experiment,	  we	   investigated	   the	   effects	   of	   spontaneous	   exploration	  on	   subsequent	  memory.	   Additionally,	   we	   examined	   if	   memory	   was	   modulated	   by	  informational	   quantities	   that	   influenced	   trial-­‐to-­‐trial	   decisions	   to	  explore.	  Subjects	  saw	  pictures	  of	  objects	  while	  performing	  a	  gambling	  task	  in	  which	  they	  were	  faced	  with	  mixed	  gambles,	  and	  were	  given	  the	  option	   to	   accept,	   reject	  or	   explore	  each	  one.	  Accepting	  gambles	   led	   to	  probabilistic	  gains	  or	   losses,	  while	  rejecting	  discarded	  the	  gamble	  and	  incurred	   neither	   gain	   nor	   loss.	   If	   subjects	   opted	   to	   explore,	   the	  computer	   then	  revealed	  an	   informative	  hint	   that	  subjects	  could	  use	   to	  make	   an	   accept	   or	   reject	   decision	   at	   the	   second	   stage	   of	   choice.	  Examining	  memory	  for	  objects	  that	  were	  encountered	  in	  the	  context	  of	  explore	  versus	  non-­‐explore	  decisions,	  we	   failed	   to	   find	  any	   significant	  effects	  of	  exploration	  on	  memory,	  whether	  tested	  immediately	  or	  after	  a	   five-­‐day	   delay.	   Using	   behavioural	   modelling,	   we	   identified	   value-­‐scaled	  uncertainty	  (a	  product	  of	  uncertainty	  and	  the	  amount	  of	  money	  that	  may	  be	  won	  on	  each	  trial)	  as	  an	  important	  variable	  that	  influenced	  exploratory	   behaviour	   from	   trial	   to	   trial.	   By	   modelling	   trial-­‐to-­‐trial	  memory	   performance	   with	   logistic	   general	   linear	   models,	   we	   then	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found	  that	  value-­‐scaled	  uncertainty	  significantly	   improved	  recollective	  aspects	   of	   memory	   at	   immediate	   (but	   not	   delayed)	   test,	   without	  influence	   influencing	   familiarity-­‐based	   recognition.	   These	   results	  suggest	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  strategic	  exploration	  on	  memory	  is	  mediated	  not	  by	  the	  act	  of	  exploring,	  but	  rather	  by	  the	  psychological	  responses	  to	  informational	  quantities	  that	  are	  important	  to	  the	  strategic	  decision	  to	  explore.	  	  	  	  	  	  




Exploration	   is	   thought	   to	   improve	   memory	   (Düzel	   et	   al.,	   2010;	  Izquierdo	  et	  al.,	  2003;	  Moncada	  and	  Viola,	  2007;	  Wittmann	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  This	  effect	  is	  thought	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  ability	  of	  novelty	  to	  elicit	  a	  response	  from	  dopaminergic	  regions	  like	  the	  substantia-­‐nigra/ventral	  tegmental	  area	  (SN/VTA;	  Bunzeck	  and	  Düzel,	  2006;	  Schott	  et	  al.,	  2004;	  Schultz	  et	  al.,	   1997;	   Wittmann	   et	   al.,	   2007),	   as	   well	   as	   functional	   interaction	  between	  the	  hippocampus	  and	  the	  SN/VTA.	  In	  humans,	  co-­‐activation	  of	  these	   neural	   structures	   has	   been	   associated	   with	   novelty-­‐,	   curiosity-­‐	  and	   reward-­‐related	   memory	   enhancements,	   using	   a	   range	   of	  experimental	   paradigms	   (Adcock	   et	   al.,	   2006;	   Bunzeck	   et	   al.,	   2012;	  Chowdhury	   et	   al.,	   2012;	   Gruber	   et	   al.,	   2014;	   Wittmann	   et	   al.,	   2005,	  2007;	  Wolosin	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  As	  such,	   it	  has	  been	  hypothesized	  that	  the	  hippocampus	   and	   dopaminergic	  midbrain	   form	   a	   functional	   loop	   that	  effectively	   gates	   entry	   to	   long	   term	   memory,	   with	   dopaminergic	  stabilization	   of	   hippocampal	   synaptic	   modifications	   crucially	  determining	  the	  persistence	  of	  memory	  at	  a	  systems	  level	  (Lisman	  and	  Grace,	  2005;	  Lisman	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  Behavioural	   studies	   investigating	   the	   effects	   of	   exploration	   on	   human	  memory	   have	   reported	   an	   enhancing	   effect	   on	   subsequent	   recall,	  despite	   different	   experiments	   having	   focused	   on	   different	   aspects	   of	  exploratory	  behaviour.	  Exploring	  a	  novel	  environment	  (compared	  to	  a	  familiar	   one)	   has	   been	   shown	   to	   improve	   recall	   (Schomaker	   et	   al.,	  2014),	   indicating	   that	   exposure	   to	   novelty	   itself	   improves	   memory,	  after	   controlling	   for	   active	   behaviour.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   other	  experimenters	   emphasize	   the	   volitional	   aspects	   of	   exploration,	   and	  have	   demonstrated	   that	   active	   sampling	   leads	   to	   improved	   memory,	  compared	   to	   passive	   exposure	   to	   novel	   stimuli	   (Plancher	   et	   al.,	   2012,	  2013;	   Voss	   et	   al.,	   2011b).	   These	   studies	   appear,	   on	   the	   face	   of	   it,	   to	  agree	  in	  their	  assertion	  that	  exploration	  generally	  potentiates	  memory,	  but	  lead	  to	  different	  conclusions	  regarding	  the	  underlying	  mechanisms	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(with	  the	  first	  study	  implicating	  novelty	  exposure	  rather	  than	  volitional	  engagement,	   and	   the	   second	   group	   of	   studies	   implicating	   volitional	  engagement	   over	  mere	   exposure).	   An	   additional	   perspective	   that	   has	  yet	  to	  be	  considered	  is	   that	  the	   informational	  or	  psychological	  context	  under	   which	   exploration	   occurs	   may	   significantly	   impact	   subsequent	  memory.	   According	   to	   this	   possibility,	   exploration	   may	   improve	  memory	   because	   the	   psychological	   context	   (e.g.	   the	   amount	   of	  strategically	   useful	   information	   that	   can	   be	   gained	   from	   exploration)	  causes	   anticipatory	   neural	   and	   psychological	   changes	   that	   make	   for	  enhanced	   encoding	   of	   encountered	   stimuli.	   Because	   previous	   studies	  have	  paid	  little	  attention	  to	  fluctuating	  informational	  and	  psychological	  variables	  that	  might	  drive	  spontaneous	  decisions	  to	  gather	  information,	  it	   remains	   difficult	   to	   discern	   how	   the	   different	   components	   of	  exploration	  may	  influence	  subsequent	  recall.	  	  In	   this	   study,	   we	   set	   out	   to	   examine	   the	   effects	   on	   exploration	   on	  memory.	   In	  addition	   to	   investigating	   the	  effects	  of	  exploratory	  choices	  on	   subsequent	   memory,	   however,	   we	   were	   also	   interested	   in	   the	  question	  of	  how	  memory	  would	  be	   influenced	  by	  trial-­‐to-­‐trial	  changes	  in	   the	   informational	   quantities	   that	   are	   used	   to	   guide	   behaviour.	   	   To	  examine	   these	   two	  questions,	  we	   employed	   a	  modified	   version	   of	   the	  bomb	  task	  used	  in	  Chapter	  6,	  in	  which	  subjects	  saw	  pictures	  of	  objects	  embedded	   in	   gambles	   and	   had	   to	   maximize	   winnings	   by	   accepting,	  rejecting	  or	  exploring	  each	  gamble	  (Figure	  7-­‐1C).	  We	  capitalized	  on	  two	  features	  of	  this	  task,	  to	  examine	  exploration-­‐related	  effects	  on	  memory.	  Firstly,	  our	  ability	  to	  explicitly	  characterize	  the	  gamble	  space	  in	  terms	  of	  static	  probabilistic	  outcomes	  that	  are	  well	  known	  to	  subjects	  enabled	  us	  to	  quantify	  the	  different	  informational	  and	  psychological	  variables	  that	  varied	  systematically	  across	  the	  task	  space.	  This	  allowed	  us	  to	  examine	  if	   any	   of	   these	   informational	   variables	   significantly	   influenced	  subsequent	   recall.	   Secondly,	   the	   pattern	   of	   behaviour	   in	   Chapter	   6	  suggested	   that,	  while	   exploratory	   behaviour	   could	   be	   reliably	   elicited	  from	  subjects,	  subjects	  still	   refrained	   from	  exploring	  deterministically,	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even	  when	   facing	   gambles	   in	  which	   they	  were	  most	   likely	   to	   explore.	  This	   feature	   of	   spontaneous	   behaviour,	   if	   replicated	   in	   the	   current	  experiment,	  would	  hopefully	  allow	  us	  to	  directly	  compare	  memory	  for	  objects	   seen	   on	   ‘explored’	   and	   ‘non-­‐explored’	   gambles,	  while	   focusing	  on	   the	   same	   types	   of	   gambles	   and	   thus	   controlling	   for	   the	   other	  psychological	   variables	   that	   varied	   across	   the	   task	   space.	   Because	  we	  were	   interested	   in	   the	   contribution	   of	   potential	   dopaminergic	  mechanisms	   to	   memory	   stabilization,	   we	   included	   delayed	   and	  immediate	  memory-­‐test	   conditions	   in	   our	   experiment,	  with	   the	   initial	  expectation	  that	  exploration-­‐related	  memory	  effects	  would	  only	  emerge	  at	  delayed	  recall.	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7.3:	  Methods	  	  	  	  7.3.1:	  Subjects	  	  	  Forty-­‐three	   subjects	   were	   trained	   in	   the	   task,	   of	   whom	   twenty-­‐five	  performed	   sufficiently	   well	   on	   the	   task	   as	   to	   be	   invited	   back	   for	   the	  memory	   test	   session	   (7	   female,	   years,	  mean	   age=	   22.6	   years,	   SD=3.5;	  see	   later	   section	   for	   detail	   on	   inclusion	   criteria).	   All	   subjects	   were	  recruited	   from	   the	   local	   population	   via	   departmental	   subject	  recruitment	   pools,	   had	   normal	   or	   corrected-­‐to-­‐normal	   visual	   acuity,	  and	   reported	   no	   history	   of	   neurological	   or	   psychiatric	   conditions,	   or	  significant	  medications.	   All	   experiments	  were	   run	  with	   each	   subject’s	  written	   informed	   consent	   and	   according	   to	   the	   local	   ethics	   clearance	  (University	   College	   London,	   London,	   UK).	   Subjects	  were	   compensated	  for	  their	  time	  at	  a	  rate	  of	  £6/hour,	  plus	  additional	  money	  to	  won	  on	  the	  task	  itself.	  	  	  7.3.2:	  Experimental	  task	  
	  We	  adapted	  a	  simplified	  version	  of	  the	  approach-­‐avoidance	  task	  used	  in	  Chapter	   6	   to	   manipulate	   exploration	   and	   other	   learning-­‐related	  experimental	   variables	   during	   object	   encoding.	   Subjects	   evaluated	  mixed	   gambles	   for	   the	   presence	   of	   an	   activated	   bomb,	   and	   had	   to	  choose	   between	   accepting,	   rejecting	   and	   exploring	   each	   gamble.	   Each	  gamble	  was	  associated	  with	  a	  certain	  probability	  of	  winning	  or	   losing,	  and	  was	  presented	  to	  the	  subjects	  as	  a	  number	  of	  activated	  tokens	  (out	  of	   8)	   against	   a	   coloured	   background	   (Figure	   7-­‐1A).	   On	   each	   trial,	   the	  background	   colour	   indicated	   the	   likelihood	   of	   a	   bomb	   having	   been	  planted	   in	   the	   gamble	   (ranging	   from	   ¼	   to	   1,	   termed	   ‘environmental	  threat’,	   abbreviated	   ‘Env	  Threat’),	   and	   the	  number	  of	  activated	   tokens	  (coloured	  in	  white)	  ranging	  from	  1	  to	  4	  pairs.	  If	  a	  bomb	  was	  planted	  in	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the	  gamble,	  it	  was	  randomly	  placed	  under	  any	  one	  of	  the	  8	  tokens,	  and	  was	   only	   ‘activated’	   if	   it	   had	   been	   placed	   under	   one	   of	   the	   activated	  tokens.	   Thus,	   the	   probability	   of	   an	   activated	   bomb	   [p(ActBomb)]	  increased	   as	   a	   function	   of	   environmental	   threat	   (indicated	   by	   the	  background	  colour)	  and	   the	  number	  of	  activated	   tokens,	  and	  could	  be	  calculated	  as:	  	   𝑝 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝐵𝑜𝑚𝑏 = 𝑝 𝐵𝑜𝑚𝑏  𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑   ×𝑝 𝐵𝑜𝑚𝑏  𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑     𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑑)	  
	  	  	   	   	   = 𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙  𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡  × !".!"#$%!#&'  !"#$%&! 	  	  A	  maximum	  of	   one	  bomb	  was	  planted	   in	   a	   gamble	   on	   any	   given	   trial.	  Over	   the	   course	   of	   the	   experiment,	   subjects	   faced	   different	  combinations	   of	   4	   environmental	   threats	   and	   4	   levels	   of	   activated	  tokens.	   The	   task	   space	   thus	   comprised	   a	   4	   x	   4	   factorial	   design	  (environmental	  threat,	  number	  of	  tokens),	  and	  subjects	  had	  to	  combine	  information	   from	   the	   background	   colour	   and	   number	   of	   activated	  tokens	  to	  estimate	  p(ActBomb)	  [Figure	  7-­‐1b].	  	  After	   seeing	   each	   gamble	   for	   2000	  ms,	   subjects	   were	   then	   presented	  with	   a	  picture	  of	   an	  object	   superimposed	  on	   the	   gamble,	   randomly	   in	  one	  of	  the	  quadrants	  of	  the	  screen	  (Figure	  7-­‐1C).	  The	  semantic	  category	  of	   the	   presented	   object	   (man-­‐made	   versus	   natural)	   told	   subjects	  whether	  they	  were	  meant	  to	  respond	  with	  their	  left	  or	  right	  hand	  (using	  different	  buttons)	  on	  that	  particular	  trial.	  Using	  the	  correct	  hand,	   they	  then	  had	  to	  decide	  whether	   to	  accept,	   reject	  or	  explore	   the	  gamble,	   to	  maximise	   winnings	   and	   avoid	   losses.	   Subjects	   won	   money	  (10p/activated	  token)	  if	  they	  accepted	  a	  gamble	  that	  did	  not	  contain	  an	  activated	   bomb,	  whereas	   accepting	   a	   gamble	  with	   an	   activated	   bomb	  resulted	  in	  a	  fixed	  loss	  of	  -­‐80p.	  Because	  the	  number	  of	  activated	  tokens	  additionally	  signalled	  how	  much	  money	  was	  available	  to	  win	  on	  a	  given	  trial,	   increasing	   the	   number	   of	   activated	   tokens	   simultaneously	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increased	   potential	   winnings	   as	   well	   as	   p(ActBomb)	   (given	   the	   same	  environmental	   threat).	   Rejecting	   a	   gamble	   effectively	   discarded	   the	  gamble	  without	  incurring	  either	  gain	  or	  loss.	  Subjects	  were	  also	  able	  to	  explore	   the	   gamble	   before	   making	   a	   final	   decision,	   which	   involved	  paying	  a	  20p	   fee	   to	  discover	  whether	  or	  not	   there	  was	  a	  bomb	  under	  50%	  of	  the	  activated	  tokens	  (Figure	  7-­‐1C).	  If	  subjects	  chose	  to	  explore	  on	   a	   trial	   in	   which	   there	   was	   an	   activated	   bomb	   (which	   was	  predetermined),	   there	   was	   a	   50%	   chance	   that	   this	   activated	   bomb	  would	  be	  shown	  during	  exploration.	  Subjects	  were	  only	  able	  to	  explore	  once,	   before	   they	   then	   had	   to	   decide	  whether	   to	   accept	   or	   reject	   the	  gamble.	  	  
Procedure	   	   	   	   The	   experiment	   progressed	   in	   three	   stages:	   a	   learning	  stage,	   followed	   immediately	   by	   a	   choice	   and	   encoding	   stage,	   and	   a	  surprise	  memory	  test	  five	  days	  later.	  During	  the	  learning	  stage,	  subjects	  completed	   a	   reduced	   version	   of	   the	   task	   in	   which	   they	   passively	  observed	   the	   outcome	   associated	   with	   each	   trial,	   and	   in	   so	   learned	  which	  background	  colours	  were	  associated	  with	  the	  different	   levels	  of	  environmental	  threat,	  as	  well	  as	  how	  the	  probability	  of	  encountering	  an	  activated	   bomb	   changed	   with	   each	   different	   combination	   of	  environmental	   threat	   and	   number	   of	   activated	   tokens	   (Figure	   7-­‐1D).	  The	   presentation	   of	   the	   objects	   was	   omitted	   for	   this	   stage	   of	   the	  experiment,	  and	  subjects	  were	  instructed	  that	  they	  should	  learn	  about	  the	   likely	   outcome	   associated	   with	   each	   gamble,	   while	   additionally	  monitoring	  the	  black	  fixation	  cross	  and	  pressing	  the	  down	  arrow	  every	  time	  it	  turned	  from	  black	  to	  white.	  The	  gamble	  was	  presented	  for	  2000	  ms	  on	  each	  trial,	  followed	  by	  the	  outcome	  for	  1000	  ms	  (with	  a	  jittered	  ITI	   of	   500-­‐1000	   ms).	   On	   trials	   in	   which	   a	   bomb	   was	   present	   but	  
inactivated,	   this	   inactivated	  bomb	  was	  additionally	   indicated	  onscreen	  for	  another	  1000	  ms	  (Figure	  7-­‐1D,	  middle	  option),	  to	  allow	  subjects	  to	  learn	   the	   environmental	   threat	   [i.e.	   p(Bomb	  planted)]	   associated	  with	  each	   background	   colour	   (i.e.	   in	   addition	   to	   the	   likely	   outcome	  associated	  with	   each	   gamble).	   On	   10%	   of	   all	   trials,	   the	   black	   fixation	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cross	  would	  turn	  white	  during	  the	  outcome	  presentation	  stage,	  with	  a	  jittered	  onset	  of	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Figure	   7-­‐1:	   Experimental	   paradigm.	   Subjects	   faced	   a	   series	   of	   gambles	   that	   comprised	  different	  combinations	  of	  four	  background	  colours	  and	  numbers	  of	  activated	  tokens	  (A).	  Subjects	  had	  to	  combine	  information	  from	  the	  environmental	  threat	  (background	  colour)	  and	  number	  of	  tokens	   to	   estimate	   the	   probability	   of	   an	   activated	   bomb	   [p(ActBomb)]	   on	   each	   trial	   (B).	   We	  characterized	  the	  4x4	  task	  space	   in	   terms	  of	  several	  quantities	   that	  subjects	  may	  have	  used	   in	  making	  choices	  (B).	  Subjects	  accepted,	  rejected	  or	  explore	  each	  gamble,	  with	  an	  object	  picture	  shown	   onscreen	   (choice/encoding	   stage;	   C).	   Before	   this	   choice/encoding	   stage,	   subjects	   first	  learned	   the	   probabilistic	   outcomes	   associated	   with	   each	   gamble,	   by	   passively	   observing	   its	  outcomes	  (D).	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700-­‐1000ms,	   staying	   onscreen	   for	   a	   full	   1000	  ms	   each	   time.	   Subjects	  completed	   160	   trials	   in	   this	   session	   (10	   repetitions	   of	   the	   16	   trial	  types).	   At	   the	   end	  of	   this	   stage,	   subjects	   completed	   a	   two-­‐alternative-­‐forced-­‐choice	  task	  in	  which	  they	  chose	  between	  two	  of	  the	  background	  colours	   at	   a	   time.	   Subjects	   who	   did	   not	   learn	   the	   pairing	   between	  background	  colour	  and	  environmental	  threat,	  or	  who	  could	  not	  explain	  (using	  worked	  examples,	  i.e.	  with	  a	  known	  environmental	  threats	  and	  a	  given	   number	   of	   tokens)	   how	   to	   correctly	   combine	   environmental	  threat	  and	  number	  of	  tokens	  to	  estimate	  p(ActBomb)	  after	  this	  stage	  of	  the	  experiment	  were	  excluded	  from	  further	  participation.	  For	  example,	  subjects	   who	   expressed	   the	   opinion	   that	   only	   environmental	   threat	  mattered	  to	  the	  outcome	  were	  excluded.	  Subjects	  were	  instructed	  that	  accumulative	  winnings	  from	  this	  session	  would	  not	  be	  counted	  towards	  their	   overall	   winnings,	   so	   as	   to	   avoid	   subjects	   adopting	   risk-­‐averse	  strategies	  in	  response	  to	  the	  large	  and	  unavoidable	  accumulative	  losses.	  In	   the	   choice/encoding	   stage,	   subjects	   saw	   the	   gamble	   on	   its	   own	   for	  2000	   ms,	   then	   the	   gamble	   with	   the	   superimposed	   object	   for	   an	  additional	   2000	   ms,	   followed	   by	   the	   trial	   outcome	   for	   1000	   ms	   (ITI:	  500-­‐1000	   ms;	   Figure	   7-­‐1C).	   If	   subjects	   chose	   to	   explore,	   the	   novel	  information	   from	   exploration	   was	   presented,	   without	   the	   object,	   for	  2000	  ms,	   after	   the	   first	   gamble	   presentation.	   Inactivated	   bombs	  were	  no	   longer	   shown,	   and	   subjects	   were	   instructed	   that	   they	   no	   longer	  mattered	   towards	   the	   outcome	   that	   they	   received.	   The	   outcome	   was	  shown	  on	  every	  single	  trial,	  and	  subjects	  were	  also	  told	  if	  they	  had	  used	  the	  wrong	  hand	  to	  respond	  (based	  on	   the	  object’s	  semantic	  category).	  Subjects	   saw	   a	   total	   of	   256	   trial-­‐unique	   objects	   in	   this	   stage	   of	   the	  experiment,	  with	  16	  repetitions	  of	  each	  of	  the	  16	  gamble	  types.	  Object	  stimuli	  consisted	  of	  colour	  images	  assembled	  from	  a	  database	  of	  object	  stimuli	  (Brady	  et	  al.,	  2008),	  as	  well	  as	  some	  additional	  images	  from	  the	  internet,	  and	  were	  balanced	  in	  terms	  of	  semantic	  category	  (man-­‐made	  versus	   natural).	   After	   this	   stage	   of	   the	   experiment,	   subjects	   again	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completed	   a	   two-­‐alternative-­‐forced-­‐choice	   task	   in	   which	   they	   chose	  between	  two	  of	  the	  background	  colours	  at	  a	  time.	  Prior	  to	  the	  final	  stage	  of	  the	  experiment,	  subjects’	  performance	  on	  the	  choice/encoding	  stage	  was	  again	  checked	   for	   inconsistencies.	  Subjects	  were	  allowed	  to	  progress	  to	  the	  next	  and	  final	  stage	  of	  the	  study	  if	  their	  verbal	  report	  and	  performance	  indicated	  consistent	  learning	  regarding	  the	   different	   background	   colours	   and	   the	   associated	   environmental	  threat	  (i.e.	  excluding	  subjects	  whose	  ranking	  of	  the	  background	  colours	  changed	  from	  the	  initial	  test	  to	  the	  second	  stage),	  active	  integration	  of	  information	   regarding	   the	   environmental	   threat	   and	   the	   number	   of	  tokens	   in	   their	   choices	   (i.e.	   excluding	   subjects	   who	   focused	   only	   on	  environmental	   threat	   in	   making	   their	   decision),	   and	   adequate	   use	   of	  accepting,	   rejecting	   and	   exploring	   in	   their	   overall	   performance	   (i.e.	  excluding	   subjects	   who	   failed	   to	   explore	   entirely).	   We	   additionally	  excluded	  subjects	  who	  accepted/rejected	  gambles	  randomly	  across	  the	  4x4	  task	  space,	  or	  who	  could	  not	  verbally	  explain	  how	  information	  from	  the	   environmental	   threat	   and	   number	   of	   activated	   tokens	   should	   be	  combined	   to	   estimate	   p(ActBomb).	   Such	   strict	   screening	   procedures	  were	  employed	  so	  as	  to	  ensure	  that	  subjects	  whose	  data	  were	  included	  in	   the	   final	   analysis	   had	   reasonably	   similar	   estimates	   of	   p(ActBomb)	  across	   the	   4x4	   task	   space,	   so	   as	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	   psychological	  variables	   that	   were	   described	   in	   the	   analysis	   (Figure	   7-­‐1B;	   see	   later	  sections	  for	  more	  detail)	  were	  reasonably	  accurate.	  All	  decisions	  about	  whether	  each	  subject	  was	  performing	  the	  task	  sufficiently	  well	  to	  merit	  inclusion	  or	  not	  were	  made	  before	  subjects	  had	  completed	  the	  memory	  test,	  and	  thus	  were	  not	  based	  on	  the	  subjects’	  memory	  performance	  at	  all.	  	  Subjects	   who	   performed	   sufficiently	   well	   up	   to	   the	   choice/encoding	  stage	  of	   the	  experiment	  were	   invited	  to	  participate	   in	  the	   last	  stage	  of	  the	   experiment,	  which	   comprised	   of	   a	   surprise	  memory	   test.	   Subjects	  were	   randomly	   assigned	   at	   this	   point	   to	   completing	   the	  memory	   test	  immediately,	   or	   after	   a	   five-­‐day	   delay,	   but	   the	   procedures	   were	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identical	   for	  both	  groups.	   In	  the	  memory	  test,	  subjects	  saw	  384	  object	  pictures	  on	  a	   computer	   screen	   (256	  of	  which	   they	  had	   seen	  before	   in	  Stage	  3	  of	  the	  experiment,	  128	  of	  which	  were	  new),	  and	  for	  each	  object	  had	   to	  decide	  whether	   it	  was	  old	   (i.e.	   if	   they	  had	  seen	   it	  before	   in	   the	  experiment)	   or	   new.	   If	   the	   object	  was	   deemed	   to	   be	   old,	   participants	  were	  then	  asked	  if	  they	  “Knew”	  or	  “Remembered”	  the	  object.	  Following	  this	   judgment,	   participants	   were	   asked	   to	   indicate	   whether	   their	  memory	   for	   the	   object	  was	   “strong”	   or	   “weak”.	  We	   followed	   standard	  procedures	   in	   instructing	   participants	   about	   remember	   and	   know	  judgments	  (Tulving,	  1985);	  specifically,	  participants	  were	  instructed	  to	  give	   a	   ‘Remember’	   response	   if	   they	   could	   recollect	   any	   other	   details	  from	  when	   they	   had	   initially	   seen	   the	   object,	   and	   were	   instructed	   to	  respond	  with	  ‘Know’	  if	  they	  could	  not	  recollect	  any	  other	  details	  about	  the	   object,	   and	   merely	   had	   a	   sense	   of	   it	   being	   familiar.	   Detailed	  instructions	   regarding	   this	   distinction	   were	   relayed	   to	   participants,	  along	   with	   examples	   of	   each	   memory	   type	   as	   one	   would	   encounter	  them	   in	   daily	   life,	   to	   ensure	   that	   participants	   understood	   how	   they	  should	   respond	   in	   the	   task.	   Lastly,	   participants	   then	   had	   to	   indicate	  which	   quadrant	   of	   the	   screen	   they	   had	   previously	   seen	   the	   object	   in	  (associative	  memory),	  if	  they	  had	  earlier	  indicated	  that	  object	  to	  be	  old.	  Associative	  memory	  scores	  were	  not	  subject	  to	  full	  analysis	  because	  the	  mean	   overall	   accuracy	   levels	   were	   at	   chance	   (<25%	   accuracy).	   All	  responses	  in	  this	  stage	  of	  the	  experiment	  were	  self-­‐paced.	  
Characterization	   of	   task	   space	   	   	   	   As	   in	   the	   original	   study,	   we	  characterized	   the	   4x4	   task	   space	   in	   terms	   of	   several	   task-­‐related	  variables	   that	   might	   be	   tracked	   at	   a	   psychological	   or	   neural	   level	  (Figure	   7-­‐1b).	   These	   variables	  were	   as	   follows:	   environmental	   threat,	  number	   of	   activated	   tokens,	   p(ActBomb),	   the	   uncertainty	   or	   entropy	  associated	  with	  this	  probability:	  𝐻 p ActBomb=  –   p ActBomb × log   p ActBomb      − 1− p ActBomb ×log  (1− p ActBomb )	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(Strange	  et	  al.,	  2005),	  value-­‐scaled	  uncertainty	  (uncertainty	  multiplied	  by	   magnitude	   of	   money	   available	   to	   win,	   i.e.	   number	   of	   activated	  tokens),	   and	   expected	   value	   of	   accepting	   the	   gamble,	   which	   was	  calculated	  as:	  EV = −8  ×  p ActBomb +     n  ×(1− p ActBomb )	  where	  n	  is	  the	  number	  of	  tokens.	  These	  task-­‐related	  variables	  served	  as	  the	  starting	  point	  with	  which	  to	  construct	  the	  computational	  models.	  	  	  7.3.3:	  Behavioural	  modelling	  	  
	  We	   employed	   behavioural	   modelling	   in	   order	   to	   examine	   what	  variables	   determined	   whether	   or	   not	   subjects	   chose	   to	   explore	   from	  trial	   to	  trial.	  The	  model	  space	  was	  defined	  by	   first	  calculating	  the	  true	  expected	   values	   of	   accepting,	   reject	   and	   exploring,	   and	   then	  parameterizing	  seven	  separate	  possible	  sources	  of	  suboptimal	  influence	  over	  these	  values.	  Optimally,	  the	  values	  were	  calculated	  as	  follows:	  	  𝑉 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 = 𝑎  ×(−8)+ 1− 𝑎 ×𝑛	  𝑉(𝑅𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡) = 0	  𝑉 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 𝑝 𝑆𝑒𝑒 ×𝑉 𝑆𝑒𝑒       +       𝑝 𝑁𝑜  𝑆𝑒𝑒 ×𝑉 𝑁𝑜  𝑆𝑒𝑒 + 𝑐	  	  
𝑝 𝑆𝑒𝑒 =   12𝑎	  𝑉 𝑆𝑒𝑒 = 0	  
𝑝 𝑁𝑜  𝑆𝑒𝑒 = 1−     12𝑎	  𝑉 𝑁𝑜  𝑆𝑒𝑒 =   𝑘×(−12)+     1− 𝑘 ×𝑛	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  if	  >0	  = 0	   	   otherwise	  (gamble	  rejected)	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where	  a	   is	  the	  probability	  of	  an	  activated	  bomb	  [p(ActBomb)],	  n	   is	  the	  number	  of	  activated	  tokens,	   ‘See’	  describes	  the	  state	  of	  having	  seen	  an	  activated	  bomb	  during	  exploration	  (and	  whose	  value	   is	  0	  because	   it	   is	  assumed	   that	   a	   participant	  would	   reject	   such	   a	   gamble	   at	   the	   second	  stage),	   ‘No	   see’	   describes	   not	   having	   seen	   an	   activated	   bomb	   during	  exploration,	   c	   is	   the	   cost	   of	   exploring	   (objectively	   equivalent	   to	   -­‐2	  tokens),	   and	  k	   is	   the	  posterior	  probability	  of	   an	  activated	  bomb	  given	  that	   exploration	   does	   not	   reveal	   an	   activated	   bomb	   (calculated	   using	  Bayes	  rule).	  	  Potential	   sources	   of	   in-­‐optimality	  were	   identified	  by	   considering	  both	  errors	   in	   optimal	   calculation	   as	   well	   as	   descriptive	   psychological	  tendencies	  that	  could	  interfere	  with	  optimal	  performance.	  These	  seven	  parameterized	  sources	  of	  inoptimality	  were	  as	  follows:	  	  Parameter	   Description	  
m	   Distortion	  to	  k	  [estimate	  of	  p(ActBomb	  |	  No	  See)],	   i.e.	  k	  =	  
km;	   Allows	   for	   inoptimal	   calculation	   of	   posterior	  probabilities	  
j	   Power	   law	   distortion	   to	   Environmental	   Threat,	   i.e.	  EnvThreat	   =	   EnvThreat	   j.	   All	   task-­‐related	   quantities	   are	  adjusted	   to	   conform	   to	   this	   updated	   quantification	   of	  EnvThreat.	  	  	  
i	   Bonus	   to	   V(	   Accept	   |	   No	   See);	   indexes	   general,	  perseverative	   tendency	   to	   accept	   gambles	   after	  exploration	   reveals	   a	   lack	   of	   a	   bomb	   [rather	   than	  accurately	   integrating	   the	   null	   information	   into	   an	  updated	  estimate	  of	  p(ActBomb)	  ]	  
f	   Perceived	  magnitude	  of	   the	   fixed	   loss	   (objectively	  equals	  to	  -­‐8	  tokens)	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e	   Perceived	  cost	  of	  exploration	  	  
w	   Bonus	   to	   V(Explore),	   quantifying	   the	   impact	   that	   task-­‐related	   variables	   (e.g.	   uncertainty)	   have	   on	   V(Explore).	  Thus,	   this	   describes	   an	   exploration	   bonus	   that	   varies	  across	   the	   4x4	   task	   space.	   Different	   versions	   of	   this	   w	  parameter	  were	  included	  in	  the	  model	  space,	  as	  separate	  models,	   to	   quantify	   variable	   exploration	   bonuses	   that	  related	  to	  different	  task	  related	  variables.	  	  	  Different	   versions	   of	   the	   w	   parameter	   were	   included	   (in	   different	  models)	   in	   the	  model	   space	   so	   as	   to	   allow	  us	   to	   examine	  which	   task-­‐related	   variables	   drove	   exploration	   across	   the	   4x4	   task	   space	   in	   our	  subjects.	  All	  variables	  considered	  for	  the	  variable	  exploration	  bonus	  w	  are	  shown	  in	  Figure	  7-­‐1b,	  and	  are	  as	  follows:	  	  
u	   Uncertainty	  regarding	  p(ActBomb)	  
v	   Value	  gained	  from	  exploration,	  calculated	  as:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  v	  =	  optimal	  V(Explore)	  	  -­‐	  EV	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  if	  	  EV	  >0	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  =	  optimal	  V(Explore)	  	  -­‐	  	  0	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  otherwise	  	  
o	   Value-­‐scaled	  uncertainty,	  calculated	  as:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  o	  =	  𝐻 p ActBomb     ×𝑛	  
y	   Binomial	  variance	  in	  p(ActBomb),	  calculated	  as:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  y	  =	  p(ActBomb)	  	  ×  	  [	  1-­‐	  p(ActBomb)	  ]	  
s	   Standard	  deviation	  of	  outcome	  (EV)	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Comparison	  of	  models	  with	   the	  different	  versions	  of	   this	  w	  parameter	  thus	   allowed	   us	   to	   identify	   task-­‐related	   quantities	   that	   influenced	   the	  likelihood	   of	   exploration	   across	   the	   4x4	   task	   space	   (i.e.	   from	   trial	   to	  trial).	   Note	   as	   well	   that	   the	   model	   space	   included	   models	   that	   that	  omitted	   this	   w	   parameter	   entirely;	   if	   such	   a	   model	   won,	   alternative	  procedures	   would	   have	   been	   necessary	   to	   determine	   which	   task-­‐related	  variables	  were	  important	  in	  driving	  exploration.	  The	  likelihood	  of	   subjects’	   observed	   choice	   under	   each	   of	   the	   candidate	  models	  was	  first	   calculated,	   and	  maximum	   likelihood	   estimation	  was	   then	  used	   to	  estimate	   parameters	   values	   on	   a	   subject-­‐by-­‐subject	   basis.	   To	   predict	  choice	   from	   the	   values	   of	   each	   option,	   the	   probabilities	   of	   accepting,	  rejecting	   and	   exploring	   on	   each	   trial	   were	   calculated	   via	   a	   softmax	  function:	  	  p Choice =   ε  +        1−     3  ×  ε× 𝑒!  ×!(!"#$%&)𝑒!  ×!(!""#$%) +   𝑒!  ×!(!"#"$%) +   𝑒!  ×!(!"#$%&')	  	  where	  β	  is	  the	  inverse	  temperature	  parameter	  of	  the	  softmax	  function	  (that	   governs	   the	   stochasticity	  of	   choice	   as	   a	   function	  of	   value),	   and	   ε	  describes	   the	   irreducible	   stochasticity	   in	   choice.	   The	   ε	   parameter	   is	  integrated	   into	   the	   typical	   softmax	   function	   as	   a	   fixed	   probability	   of	  making	  each	  choice,	  and	  the	  original	  p(Choice)	  (as	  would	  be	  calculated	  without	  the	  ε	  parameter)	  is	  scaled	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  sum	  of	  p(Accept),	  p(Reject)	  and	  p(Explore)	  sums	   to	  1.	  Both	  β	  and	  ε	  are	   free	  parameters	  that	   are	   fit	   to	   each	   subject’s	   observed	   choice	   in	   the	   model-­‐fitting	  procedure.	   Because	   the	   models	   were	   not	   nestable,	   separate	   models	  were	   included	   for	   all	   possible	   combinations	   of	   all	   8	   free	   parameters	  (without	   combining	  different	  versions	  of	   the	  w	  parameter),	  producing	  384	   individual	  models	   in	   total,	  which	  were	   all	   allowed	   to	   compete	  on	  even	  footing	  with	  each	  other.	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Model	   estimation	   was	   implemented	   using	   a	   hierarchical	   type	   II	  Bayesian	  (random	  effects)	  procedure	  that	  used	  maximum	  likelihood	  to	  fit	   simple	  parameterized	  distributions	   for	  higher-­‐level	   statistics	  of	   the	  parameters	  (Guitart-­‐Masip	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  Huys	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  Models	  were	  compared	  using	  the	  integrated	  Bayesian	  information	  criterion	  (iBIC),	  in	  which	  small	   iBIC	  values	   indicate	  a	  model	  that	   fits	  the	  data	  better	  after	  penalizing	  for	  the	  number	  of	  parameters	  (to	  prevent	  over-­‐fitting;	  Huys	  et	   al.,	   2011).	   Model	   fitting	   was	   implemented	   separately	   for	   the	  immediate	  and	  delayed	  memory	  test	  group.	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7.4:	  Results	  	  	  7.4.1:	  Behavioural	  choice	  during	  encoding	  task	  	  The	  percentage	  of	  accepting,	  rejecting	  and	  exploring	  across	  the	  4x4	  task	  space	  is	  shown	  in	  Figure	  7-­‐2A.	  As	  in	  the	  initial	  experiment	  (Chapter	  6),	  the	   selected	   subjects	   successfully	   integrated	   information	   from	   the	  environmental	  threat	  and	  the	  number	  of	  tokens	  in	  their	  choice,	  and	  the	  trade-­‐off	  between	  accepting	  and	  rejecting	  in	  particular	  appears	  to	  track	  p(ActBomb)	   (Figure	  7-­‐1B).	   The	  percentage	  of	   accepting,	   rejecting	   and	  exploring	   overall	   did	   not	   differ	   between	   the	   two	   delay	   conditions	  (Figure	  7-­‐2B;	  all	  p>0.3).	  Additionally,	  we	  conducted	  a	  mixed	  2	  x	  4	  x	  4	  ANOVA	   (condition	   x	   environmental	   threat	   x	   no.	   tokens)	   on	   the	  percentage	  of	  accepting,	  rejecting	  and	  exploring	  responses	  in	  each	  cell	  of	  the	  4x4	  task	  space,	  to	  compare	  the	  distribution	  of	  accepting,	  rejecting	  and	   exploring	   in	   the	   two	   conditions.	   For	   all	   three	   response	   types,	  significant	  effects	  of	  environmental	   threat,	  no.	   tokens	  and	   interactions	  between	   these	   two	   factors	   were	   observed	   (see	   Table	   7-­‐1	   for	   all	  statistics).	  However,	  no	  main	  effects	  or	  interactions	  involving	  the	  delay	  condition	   were	   observed.	   As	   such,	   subjects	   in	   both	   delay	   conditions	  appeared	  to	  integrate	  information	  from	  both	  environmental	  threat	  and	  no.	   tokens	   in	   making	   the	   decision	   to	   accept,	   reject	   and	   explore,	   but	  there	  was	  no	   significant	   difference	   in	  how	   the	   two	   groups	  of	   subjects	  approached	  this	  integration	  of	  information	  in	  making	  their	  choice.	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Figure	  7-­‐2:	  Behavioural	  choice.	  Distributions	  of	  accepting,	  rejecting	  and	  exploring	  across	  the	  4x4	  task	  space,	  for	  each	  memory	  test	  condition	  (A).	  Grey	  crosses	  indicate	  cells	  that	  were	  included	  in	  the	  analysis	  comparing	  memory	  for	  objects	  on	  explore	  vs	  non-­‐explore	   trials	   (see	   main	   text	   for	   detail).	   The	   overall	   amount	   of	   accepting,	  rejecting	   and	   exploring	   did	   not	   significantly	   differ	   between	   the	   immediate	   and	  delayed	  memory	  test	  conditions	  (B).	  We	  used	  behavioural	  modelling	  to	  characterize	  choice	  across	  the	  4x4	  task	  space	  (BICs	  for	  entire	  model	  space	  shown	  in	  C),	  and	  the	  winning	  model	  (BIC	  indicated	  by	  the	  red	  arrows)	  reproduced	  the	  observed	  patterns	  of	  choice	  fairly	  accurately	  (D).	  All	  error	  bars	  are	  +/-­‐	  1	  SE.	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Table	  7-­‐1:	  Effect	  of	  task-­‐related	  variables	  on	  choice	  	   %	  Accept	   %	  Reject	   %	  Explore	  Env	  Threat	   F(3,69)=	  137.71,	  p<0.001	  ***	   F(3,69)=	  121.33,	  p<0.001	  ***	   F(3,69)=	  19.28,	  p<0.001	  ***	  No.	  tokens	   F(3,69)=	  120.00	  ,	  p<0.001	  ***	   F(3,69)=	  34.16,	  p<0.001	  ***	   F(3,69)=	  40.11,	  p<0.001	  ***	  Env	  Threat	  x	  No.	  Tokens	   F(9,69)=	  16.83,	  p<0.001	  ***	   F(9,69)=	  17.85,	  p=0.001	  ***	   F(9,69)=	  15.82,	  p<0.001	  ***	  Condition	   nsf	   nsf	   nsf	  Environmental	  threat	  x	  Condition	   nsf	   nsf	   nsf	  No.	  Tokens	  x	  Condition	   nsf	   nsf	   nsf	  Env	  Threat	  	  x	  No.	  Tokens	  x	  Condition	   nsf	   nsf	   Nsf	  	  
Behavioural	  modelling	   	   	   	  The	  winning	  models	  were	  defined	  as	   those	  that	   had	   the	   best	   iBIC	   value,	   in	   the	   entire	   model	   space	   (Figure	   7-­‐2c,	  indicated	  by	  red	  arrows).	  In	  the	  winning	  behavioural	  models,	  the	  values	  (quantified	  in	  terms	  of	  tokens)	  were	  calculated	  as	  follows:	  	  𝑉(𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡) = 𝑎  ×𝑓 + 1− 𝑎 ×𝑛	  𝑉(𝑅𝑒𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡) = 0	  𝑉 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 𝑝 𝑆𝑒𝑒 ×𝑉 𝑆𝑒𝑒       +       𝑝 𝑁𝑜  𝑆𝑒𝑒 ×𝑉 𝑁𝑜  𝑆𝑒𝑒 	  	  	   	   +  𝑒 + 𝑣  ×  𝑤	  
𝑎 = 𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡!   ×𝑛8	  
𝑝 𝑆𝑒𝑒 =   12𝑎	  𝑉 𝑆𝑒𝑒 = 0	  
𝑝 𝑁𝑜  𝑆𝑒𝑒 = 1−     12𝑎	  𝑉 𝑁𝑜  𝑆𝑒𝑒 = 𝑘!  ×𝑓    +     1− 𝑘! ×𝑛	   	  	  	  	  	  	  if	  >0	                                        = 0	   	   	   otherwise	  (gamble	  rejected)	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Where	  a	  is	  the	  subjective	  probability	  of	  an	  activated	  bomb,	  j	  is	  a	  power-­‐law	  distortion	  on	  the	  perceived	  environmental	  threat,	  f	  is	  the	  perceived	  magnitude	  of	  the	  fixed	  loss	  (which	  objectively	  equal	  -­‐12	  tokens),	  n	  is	  the	  number	   of	   activated	   tokens	   on	   that	   trial,	   ‘See’	   describes	   the	   state	   of	  having	  seen	  an	  activated	  bomb	  during	  exploration	  (and	  whose	  value	  is	  0	   in	   the	   experimental	   condition	   because	   it	   is	   assumed	   that	   a	   subject	  would	   reject	   the	   gamble	   at	   the	   second	   stage),	   ‘No	   see’	   describes	   not	  having	   seen	   an	   activated	   bomb	   during	   exploration,	   e	   is	   the	   perceived	  net	   cost	   of	   exploring,	   o	   is	   value-­‐scaled	   uncertainty	   regarding	   the	  probability	  of	  an	  activated	  bomb	  (uncertainty	  ×	  n),	  w	  is	  an	  exploration	  bonus	   that	   quantifies	   the	   impact	   that	   value-­‐scaled	   uncertainty	   has	   on	  V(Explore),	   k	   is	   the	   posterior	   probability	   of	   an	   activated	   bomb	   given	  that	   exploration	   does	   not	   reveal	   an	   activated	   bomb	   (calculated	   using	  Bayes	   rule),	   and	   m	   is	   a	   power	   law	   distortion	   of	   k	   (i.e.	   describing	  suboptimal	   calculation	   of	   the	   posterior	   probability).	   The	   winning	  models	  predicted	  the	  observed	  choice	  fairly	  accurately	  (pseudo	  r2=0.54	  and	   0.52,	   in	   the	   immediate	   and	   delayed	   memory	   test	   groups	  respectively),	   and	   behaviour	   simulated	   from	   the	   model-­‐predicted	  values	  mirrored	   the	   overall	   pattern	   of	   observed	   behaviour	   (Figure	   7-­‐2D).	  	  The	   results	   from	   the	   modelling	   indicate	   that	   exploratory	   choice	   was	  most	   sensitive	   to	   the	   value-­‐scaled	   uncertainty	   variable,	   out	   of	   all	   the	  options	   considered,	   in	   both	   the	   immediate	   and	   delayed	   memory	   test	  group.	   As	   such,	   we	   focused	   on	   the	   hypothesis	   that	   value-­‐scaled	  uncertainty	  may	  significantly	  influence	  memory	  later	  on	  in	  our	  analysis.	  	  	  7.4.2:	  Effect	  of	  exploratory	  choice	  on	  subsequent	  memory	  	  Overall	   memory	   performance	   in	   shown	   in	   Table	   7-­‐2.	   We	   were	  interested	   to	   examine	   how	   memory	   was	   influenced	   by	   spontaneous	  choice	   as	   well	   as	   other	   psychological	   learning-­‐related	   quantities	   that	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influence	  choice.	  To	  examine	  the	  effect	  of	  exploration	  on	  choice,	  we	  first	  defined	  a	  portion	  of	  the	  4	  x	  4	  task	  space	  (i.e.	  a	  number	  of	  cells)	  in	  which	  subjects	  both	  explored	  and	  omitted	  exploration	  sufficiently	   frequently	  as	   to	   allow	   for	   comparison	  of	   ‘explored’	  with	   ‘non-­‐explored’	   trials.	   By	  limiting	  our	   analysis	   to	   this	   subset	  of	   the	   task	   space,	  we	  were	   able	   to	  compare	  memory	  for	  stimuli	  encountered	  in	  the	  context	  of	  an	  ‘explore’	  decision	   compared	   to	   a	   ‘non-­‐explore’	   decision,	   while	   controlling	   as	  much	  as	  we	  could	  for	  the	   learning-­‐related	  variables	  that	  varied	  across	  the	  task	  space.	  
Table	  7-­‐2:	  Overall	  memory	  performance	  	  	  	  































Mean	   0.60	   0.39	   0.30	   0.31	   0.26	   0.13	  















	   Mean	   0.44	   0.23	   0.22	   0.22	   0.18	   0.06	  SD	   0.13	   0.13	   0.12	   0.09	   0.12	   0.07	  	  Including	  only	  cells	  in	  which	  subjects	  explored	  between	  25%	  and	  50%	  of	   the	   time	   (cells	  marked	  with	  grey	   crosses	   in	  Figure	  7-­‐2A)	  gave	  us	   a	  mean	  of	  35.67	  (SD=14.57)	  ‘explored’	  trials	  and	  49.58	  (SD=15.07)	  ‘non-­‐explored’	  trials	  in	  the	  immediate	  memory	  test	  condition,	  and	  a	  mean	  of	  33.31	  (SD=10.62)	  ‘explored’	  trials	  and	  49.46	  (SD=	  9.90)	  ‘non-­‐explored’	  trials	  in	  the	  delayed	  memory	  test	  condition.	  We	  examined	  memory	  for	  objects	   encountered	   on	   trials	   in	   which	   subjects	   eventually	   chose	   to	  explore,	   compared	   to	   memory	   for	   objects	   on	   trials	   in	   which	   subjects	  opted	   not	   to	   explore	   (i.e.	   in	   which	   they	   accepted	   or	   rejected	   the	  gamble).	  Contrary	   to	  our	   expectations,	  we	  did	  not	   find	  any	   significant	  differences	   in	   any	   of	   the	   memory	   measures	   examined,	   in	   either	   the	  immediate	   memory	   test	   group	   or	   the	   delayed	   (‘explore’	   vs	  ‘accept/reject’	  trials	  compared	  with	  paired	  t-­‐test,	  all	  p>0.2;	  Figure	  7-­‐3).	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As	   such,	  we	   found	  no	  evidence	   to	   suggest	   that	   the	  decision	   to	   explore	  
significantly	  influenced	  subsequent	  memory.	  	  	   7.4.3:	  Effect	  of	  exploration-­‐related	  variables	  on	  subsequent	  memory	  	  In	  addition	   to	  examining	  how	  memory	  was	  affected	  by	   the	  decision	   to	  explore,	   we	   were	   interested	   in	   how	   memory	   was	   affected	   by	  psychological	   quantities	   that	   underlie	   exploratory	   choice.	   We	  capitalized	  on	  our	  ability	  to	  characterize	  the	  4	  x	  4	  task	  space	  in	  terms	  of	  several	  of	  these	  variables	  (Figure	  7-­‐1B),	  such	  as	  environmental	  threat,	  the	  number	  of	  activated	  tokens,	  p(ActBomb),	  uncertainty,	  value-­‐scaled	  uncertainty	  (uncertainty	  multiplied	  by	  magnitude	  of	  money	  available	  to	  win,	   i.e.	   number	  of	   activated	   tokens),	   and	  expected	  value	  of	   accepting	  the	  gamble	  (EV).	  Of	  all	  these	  variables,	  we	  were	  particularly	  interested	  
Figure	   7-­‐3:	   Effect	   of	   exploratory	   choice	   on	   subsequent	   recall.	   No	   significant	  differences	   were	   found	   comparing	   memory	   for	   objects	   that	   were	   encountered	   in	   the	  context	  of	  an	  explore	  versus	  a	  non-­‐explore	  (accept/reject)	  choice,	  for	  any	  of	  the	  memory	  measures	   tested.	  This	  was	   the	   case	  both	   for	  memory	   that	  was	   tested	   immediately	  after	  encoding	  (top),	  as	  well	  as	  memory	  that	  was	  tested	  after	  a	  five-­‐day	  delay	  (bottom).	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in	   the	   hypothesis	   that	   value-­‐scaled	   uncertainty	   might	   modulate	  subsequent	  memory,	  given	  that	  this	  variable	  appeared	  to	  be	  important	  in	  driving	  the	  decision	  to	  explore	  in	  this	  task.	  We	  built	  a	  general	  linear	  model	  to	  predict	  memory	  performance	  that	  included	  other	  fundamental	  variables	   that	   subjects	  might	   track	   across	   the	   4x4	   task	   space,	   such	   as	  environmental	   threat,	   the	   number	   of	   activated	   tokens,	   p(Loss),	   EV,	  uncertainty,	   value-­‐scaled	   uncertainty	   and	   outcome	   magnitude.	  Additionally,	  we	  included	  regressors	  that	  categorized	  trials	  in	  terms	  of	  the	   eventual	   decision	  made	   (reject	   or	   explore,	  with	   accepting	   used	   as	  the	  baseline	  because	  subjects	  accepted	  most	  often	  in	  the	  task).	  Analysis	  proceeded	   in	  two	  stages.	  First,	   the	   logistic	  regression	  model	  was	   fit	   to	  each	  subject’s	  individual	  trial-­‐wise	  data	  (i.e.	  beta	  parameters	  estimated	  on	  a	  subject-­‐wise	  basis),	  as	  follows:	  	  𝑦 = 𝑠 +   𝑏!" ∙ 𝑐𝑟  +   𝑏!" ∙ 𝑐𝑒 + 𝑏! ∙ 𝑒 +   𝑏! ∙ 𝑛  +   𝑏! ∙ 𝑝  +   𝑏! ∙ 𝑢 +   𝑏! ∙ 𝑜+   𝑏!" ∙ 𝐸𝑉 +   𝑏!"#$%&' ∙ 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒  +   𝜀	  where	   s	   is	   the	   subject-­‐level	   baseline,	   cr	   is	   the	   choice	   to	   reject	   rather	  than	   accept	   (binary	   coded),	   ce	   is	   the	   choice	   to	   explore	   rather	   than	  accept	   (binary	   coded),	   e	   is	   environmental	   threat,	   n	   is	   the	   number	   of	  tokens,	  p	  is	  p(ActBomb),	  u	  is	  uncertainty,	  o	  is	  value-­‐scaled	  uncertainty,	  and	  EV	  is	  expected	  value	  and	  ε	  is	  residual	  error.	  The	  dependent	  variable	  
y	  was	  a	  binary	  variable	  indicating	  the	  success	  or	  failure	  of	  the	  memory	  response	  at	  subsequent	  test	  (converted	  to	  a	  probability	  of	  a	  hit	  or	  miss,	  using	   the	   logistic	   regression).	  For	  example,	   the	  analysis	  of	   ‘remember’	  responses	  coded	  each	  trial	  with	  a	  1	  for	  objects	  that	  elicited	  a	  remember	  response	   at	   subsequent	  memory	   test,	   and	   a	   0	   otherwise.	   All	  memory	  measures	   (recognition	   hits,	   confident	   recognition	   hits,	   remember,	  know,	  sure	  remember,	  sure	  know)	  were	  analysed	  independently,	  using	  the	   same	   underlying	   logistic	   general	   linear	   model.	   After	   fitting	   the	  regression	   model	   to	   each	   subject’s	   individual	   trial-­‐wise	   data,	   one-­‐sample	  t-­‐tests	  were	  used	  to	  test	  for	  deviations	  from	  the	  null	  hypothesis	  (separately	  for	  each	  memory	  measure):	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𝐻!:            𝑏!" = 𝑏!" =   𝑏! = 𝑏! = 𝑏! = 𝑏! = 𝑏!   = 𝑏!" = 𝑏!"#$%&' = 0	  All	  predictive	  regressions	  were	  scaled	  (at	  the	  subject-­‐wise	  level)	  so	  that	  their	   absolute	   values	   ranged	   between	   0	   and	   1,	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	  distortion	   of	   the	   beta	   estimates	   when	   looking	   across	   the	   different	  psychological	   variables.	   Nevertheless,	   because	   individual	   units	   of	   the	  different	  psychological	  variables	  were	  not	  semantically	  comparable,	  we	  avoided	   interpreting	   differences	   in	   the	  mean	   beta	   estimates	   between	  the	  different	  psychological	  variables.	  	  	  




Table	  7-­‐3:	  Effects	  of	  psychological	  variables	  on	  immediate	  memory	  	  









Reject	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
Choice	  –	  
Explore	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
Env	  Threat	   -­‐	   -­‐	   t(12)=	  2.4,	  	  p=0.035	  *	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
No.	  Tokens	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
p(Loss)	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
Uncertainty	   t(12)=	  -­‐3.35,	  	  p=0.006	  **	   t(12)=	  -­‐2.81,	  	  p=0.017	  *	   t(12)=	  -­‐4.03,	  	  p=0.002	  **	   -­‐	   t(12)=	  -­‐2.73,	  	  p=0.020	  *	   -­‐	  








	   	  
Figure	   7-­‐4:	   Effect	   of	   learning-­‐related	   quantities	   on	   immediate	   memory.	  Value-­‐scaled	   uncertainty	   significantly	   improved	   overall	   recognition,	   as	   well	   as	  the	  likelihood	  that	  an	  object	  would	  be	  ‘remembered’	  as	  being	  old	  (as	  opposed	  to	  merely	   being	   recognized	   as	   familiar).	   Additionally,	   uncertainty	   and	  environmental	   threat	   both	   influenced	   the	   likelihood	   that	   an	   object	   would	   be	  remembered	  (negatively	  and	  positively,	  respectively).	  All	  error	  bars	  are	  +/-­‐	  1	  SE.	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Delayed	   memory	   test	   	   	   We	   repeated	   this	   analysis	   separately	   on	   the	  data	  from	  the	  delayed	  memory	  test	  group.	  Because	  analysis	  of	  the	  sure-­‐know	   responses	   returned	   unreliable	   parameter	   estimates	   (i.e.	   often	  >500	   or	   <-­‐500,	   likely	   due	   to	   the	   sparseness	   of	   sure-­‐know	   responses	  after	  the	  five-­‐day	  delay),	  analysis	  of	  this	  memory	  measure	  was	  omitted	  for	  the	  delayed	  memory	  test	  group.	  Although	  we	  had	  initially	  expected	  that	  we	  might	   find	   exploration-­‐related	  memory	   effects	   at	   delayed	   but	  not	   immediate	   memory	   test,	   value-­‐scaled	   uncertainty	   did	   not	   have	   a	  significant	   effect	   on	   subsequent	   memory,	   on	   any	   of	   the	   memory	  measures	  examined	  (Table	  7-­‐4,	  Figure	  7-­‐5).	  Instead,	  the	  only	  significant	  effects	  found	  were	  related	  to	  the	  decision	  to	  reject	  gambles.	  Objects	  that	  were	  encountered	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  ‘reject’	  decision	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  confidently	  recognized	  as	  well	  as	  confidently	  remembered,	  after	  a	  five-­‐day	   delay.	  	  	  	  	  	  
Table	  7-­‐4:	  Effects	  of	  psychological	  variables	  on	  delayed	  memory	  	  




Remember	   Know	   Sure	  
remember	  
Choice	  –	  
Reject	   -­‐	   t(13)=	  2.25,	  	  p=0.044	  *	   -­‐	   -­‐	   t(13)=	  2.52,	  	  p=0.027	  *	  
Choice	  –	  
Explore	  	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
Env	  Threat	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
No.	  Tokens	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
p(Loss)	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
Uncertainty	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
EV	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	  
Value-­‐
scaled	  
uncertainty	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	   -­‐	  Dashes	  indicate	  non-­‐significant	  results	  (p>0.05)	  	   7.4.4:	  Exploration-­‐related	  memory	  effects	  and	  choice	  	  	  A	   last	  possibility	  we	  explored	  was	  the	  possibility	   that	   the	  exploration-­‐related	  memory	   effects	  may	   have	   been	   related	   to	   exploration-­‐related	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choices	  on	  the	  task	   itself.	  We	  restricted	  this	  analysis	   to	   the	   immediate	  memory	  test	  group	  alone,	  since	  no	  significant	  effects	  were	  observed	  in	  the	   delayed	   memory	   test	   group.	   We	   correlated	   the	   subject-­‐level	  parameter	   estimates	  with	   the	  overall	  probability	  of	   exploring	  on	  each	  trial,	   as	   well	   as	   with	   the	   probability	   of	   accepting	   a	   gamble	   in	   which	  subjects	   had	   explored	   and	   failed	   to	   see	   a	   bomb.	   This	   latter	   variable	  indexes	   the	   extent	   to	  which	   subjects	   are	   strategically	   exploring,	   since	  subjects	  should	  only	  pay	  for	  the	  additional	  information	  if	  they	  intend	  to	  utilize	   it	   in	   their	   second-­‐stage	   choice.	   Using	   this	   between-­‐subjects	  analysis,	   we	   failed	   to	   find	   any	   significant	   correlations	   between	   the	  extent	   to	   which	   value-­‐scaled	   uncertainty	   impacted	   memory	   and	  subjects’	   propensity	   to	   utilize	   exploration	   strategically,	   for	   any	   of	   the	  memory	  measures	  tested	  (all	  p>0.1).	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Figure	   7-­‐5:	   Effect	   of	   learning-­‐related	   quantities	   on	   delayed	  
memory.	   Unexpectedly,	   value-­‐scaled	   uncertainty	   did	   not	   significantly	  influence	   memory	   when	   tested	   after	   a	   five-­‐day	   delay.	   Instead,	   objects	  that	  were	   encountered	   in	   the	   context	   of	   a	   ‘reject’	   decision	  were	  more	  likely	   to	  be	   confidently	   recognized	  as	  well	   as	   confidently	   remembered.	  	  All	  error	  bars	  are	  +/-­‐	  1	  SE.	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7.5:	  Discussion	  	  	  In	   this	   study,	   we	   set	   out	   to	   examine	   the	   effects	   of	   spontaneous	  exploration	   on	   memory.	   Additionally,	   we	   were	   interested	   in	   how	  memory	  would	  be	  affected	  by	  trial-­‐to-­‐trial	  changes	  in	  the	  informational	  quantities	   that	   drive	   strategic	   choice.	  While	  we	   found	   no	   evidence	   to	  suggest	   that	   the	   decision	   to	   explore	   itself	   significantly	   modulated	  memory,	   both	   uncertainty	   and	   value-­‐scaled	   uncertainty	   significantly	  influenced	   recollective	   aspects	   of	   recognition	   at	   immediate	   memory	  test,	   without	   impacting	   familiarity-­‐based	   memory.	   While	   greater	  uncertainty	   was	   associated	   with	   poorer	   subsequent	   recall,	   greater	  value-­‐scaled	   uncertainty	   was	   associated	   with	   an	   improved	   memory.	  Additionally,	   increasing	   environmental	   threat	   was	   associated	   with	   a	  greater	   likelihood	   that	   that	   the	   object	   would	   be	   classified	   as	   having	  been	  ‘remembered’	  rather	  than	  ‘known’	  to	  be	  old.	  While	  we	  had	  initially	  hypothesized	   that	   the	  effects	  of	  exploration	  on	  memory	  might	  emerge	  at	  delayed	  but	  not	  immediate	  memory	  test,	  this	  pattern	  was	  not	  found:	  value-­‐scaled	   uncertainty,	   which	   influenced	   trial-­‐to-­‐trial	   decision	   to	  explore,	   modulated	   memory	   at	   immediate	   test,	   but	   not	   at	   delayed.	  Instead,	   objects	   encountered	   in	   the	   context	   of	   a	   ‘reject’	   decision	  were	  more	   likely	   to	   be	   confidently	   recognized	   as	   well	   as	   confidently	  remembered,	  when	  memory	  was	  tested	  after	  a	  five-­‐day	  delay.	  Value-­‐scaled	  uncertainty	  –	   the	  product	  of	  uncertainty	  and	  the	  number	  of	  tokens	  on	  each	  trial	  –	  describes	  a	  heuristic	  index	  of	  the	  usefulness	  of	  exploration,	   taking	   into	   account	   both	   the	   information	   gain	   (i.e.	  uncertainty)	   as	  well	   as	   the	   potential	   payoff	   for	   a	   correct	   decision	   (i.e.	  no.	   tokens).	   Our	   finding	   that	   value-­‐scaled	   uncertainty	   was	   associated	  with	   better	   subsequent	   memory	   (after	   controlling	   for	   all	   other	  psychological	   variables)	   is	   interesting	   given	   that	   the	   results	   from	   our	  behavioural	  modelling	  indicate	  that	  value-­‐scaled	  uncertainty	  was	  key	  in	  influencing	   the	   decision	   to	   explore	   or	   not,	   from	   trial	   to	   trial.	   While	  several	   previous	   studies	   have	   examined	   the	   effect	   of	   exploration	   on	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memory,	   none	   have,	   to	   our	   knowledge,	   sought	   to	   separate	   memory	  effects	  that	  are	  related	  to	  the	  act	  of	  exploration	  versus	  the	  psychological	  variables	   that	   influence	   subjects’	   active	   decisions	   to	   explore.	   It	   is	  important	  to	  address	  this	  distinction	  in	  order	  for	  us	  to	  determine	  how	  memory	   is	   affected	   by	   exploration	   in	   the	   real	   world,	   given	   that	  exploration	  is	  often	  a	  decision	  that	  an	  animal	  undertakes	  in	  response	  to	  its	  environment	  and	  motivations,	  rather	  than	  a	  situation	  that	  the	  animal	  is	  passively	  confronted	  with	  (i.e.	  without	  any	  need	  for	  an	  active	  decision	  on	   the	   animal’s	   part).	   Experimental	   studies	   of	   exploratory	   choice	   and	  information	   sampling	   have	   shown	   that	   exploration	   is	   deployed	   in	   a	  highly	  strategic	  manner	  (Badre	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  Daw	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Frank	  et	  al.,	   2009;	  Gottlieb,	   2012;	  Gottlieb	   et	   al.,	   2013;	  Wilson	   et	   al.,	   2014).	  As	  such,	   exploration	   may	   comprise	   at	   least	   three	   different	   components	  that	   could	   potentially	   influence	   memory:	   changes	   in	   the	   decision	  variables	  that	  drive	  exploratory	  choice,	  behavioural	  engagement	  during	  exploring	   (i.e.	   the	   behavioural	   decision	   to	   explore),	   and	   the	   novelty	  exposure	   or	   information	   gain	   that	   results	   from	   exploration.	   In	   this	  study,	   we	   have	   made	   a	   first	   attempt	   to	   separate	   the	   memory	   effects	  stemming	   from	   the	   first	   two	   of	   these	   components,	   by	   examining	  memory	  for	  objects	  encountered	  during	  choice,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  task	  in	  which	  decision	  variables	  (e.g.	  value-­‐scaled	  uncertainty)	  are	  static	  and	  well-­‐known	   to	   subjects.	   The	   evidence	   presented	   here	   suggests	   that	  exploration	  improves	  memory	  because	  it	  influences	  the	  cognitive	  mode	  that	   subjects	   enter	   into	   as	   they	   approach	   conditions	   under	   which	  exploration	  is	  subjectively	  attractive.	  From	  an	  adaptive	  point	  of	  view,	  preferentially	  remembering	  what	  one	  encounters	   during	   information	   gathering	   is	   a	   useful	   quality,	   as	   it	  enhances	   the	   animal’s	   ability	   to	   use	   the	   newly	   gained	   information	   to	  adjust	   ongoing	   behaviour.	   One	   interesting	   possibility	   that	   we	  considered	   is	   that	   the	   extent	   of	   the	   memory	   benefit	   caused	   might	  correlate	  with	  the	  ability	  of	  subjects	  to	  strategically	  utilize	  information	  from	   exploration.	   Although	   we	   did	   not	   observe	   this	   in	   the	   current	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dataset,	   this	   may	   have	   been	   because	   the	   experiment	   utilized	   a	   static	  gamble	  space	  on	  which	  subjects	  were	  highly	  pre-­‐trained.	  A	  fairer	  test	  of	  this	  possibility	  would	  be	  to	  use	  a	  task	  that	  necessitates	  ongoing	  learning	  (e.g.	   with	   fluctuating	   reward	   probabilities),	   as	   it	   would	   allow	   one	   to	  determine	  if	  better	  memory	  for	  stimuli	  encountered	  during	  exploration	  is	  related	  to	  the	  ability	  to	  adjust	  ongoing	  behaviour	  in	  a	  flexible	  way.	  	  	  Because	  we	  did	  not	  combine	  the	  behavioural	  paradigm	  with	  functional	  imaging,	   we	   are	   unable	   to	   determine	  which	   neural	   regions	  may	   have	  produced	   the	   observed	  memory	   effects.	  However,	  we	  noted	   that	   both	  uncertainty	   and	   value-­‐scaled	   uncertainty	   significantly	   impacted	  ‘remember’	   type	   memories,	   without	   influencing	   familiarity-­‐based	  recognition,	   which	   is	   suggestive	   of	   a	   role	   for	   the	   hippocampus	   in	  producing	   the	   observed	   pattern	   of	   memory	   effects.	   Recollection	   is	  thought	  to	  involve	  active	  hippocampal-­‐dependent	  retrieval	  processes	  in	  which	   qualitative	   or	   associative	   details	   of	   an	   episode	   are	   accessed	  (Diana	   et	   al.,	   2007;	   Montaldi	   and	   Mayes,	   2010;	   Yonelinas,	   2001).	  Consistent	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  hippocampal	  role,	  the	  hippocampus,	  along	  with	   the	   SN/VTA,	   has	   been	   found	   to	   show	   anticipatory	   responses	   to	  novelty	   (Wittmann	   et	   al.,	   2007).	   The	   emergence	   of	  memory	   effects	   at	  immediate	  memory	  test	  rather	  than	  at	  delayed	  is	  inconsistent	  with	  our	  initial	  hypothesis	  that	  exploration	  might	  influence	  memory	  via	  effects	  of	  dopamine	   on	   consolidation.	   Rather,	   it	   seems	   more	   likely	   that	   the	  observed	   memory	   benefits	   may	   have	   been	   caused	   by	   enhanced	  encoding	  mechanisms,	   for	   example,	   increased	   attentional	   engagement	  or	  arousal,	  mediated	  by	  noradrenaline	  or	  acetylcholine.	  Exploration	  of	  a	  novel	   environment	   has	   been	   shown	   to	   result	   in	   increased	  noradrenergic	   and	   acetylcholinergic	   transmission	   (Giovannini	   et	   al.,	  2001;	   Sara	   et	   al.,	   1994),	   and	   both	   of	   these	   neuromodulatory	   systems	  have	  been	   implicated	   in	   the	   formation	  of	  memory	   (Barry	   et	   al.,	   2012;	  Cahill	   and	   McGaugh,	   1998;	   Hasselmo,	   1999;	   Klukowski	   and	   Harley,	  1994)	  and	  balancing	  the	  tradeoff	  between	  exploration	  and	  exploitation	  (Aston-­‐Jones	  and	  Cohen,	  2005;	  Cohen	  et	  al.,	  2007;	  Yu	  and	  Dayan,	  2005).	  
198	  
	  
Aside	   from	   value-­‐scaled	   uncertainty,	   uncertainty	   per	   se	  was	   found	   to	  have	   a	   net	   negative	   effect	   on	   memory	   at	   immediate	   test	   (i.e.	   after	  variance	  that	  relating	  uniquely	  to	  value-­‐scaled	  uncertainty	  is	  removed).	  The	   idea	   that	   uncertainty	  may	   have	   a	   negative	   effect	   on	  memory	   has	  important	   implications	   for	   future	   work	   attempting	   to	   disentangle	  memory	   effects	   that	   relate	   to	   uncertainty	   versus	   the	   motivation	   to	  explore,	   especially	   given	   that	   uncertainty	   is	   typically	   thought	   to	   be	   a	  major	  decision	  variable	  that	  motivates	  exploratory	  choices	  (Badre	  et	  al.,	  2012;	   Dayan	   and	   Sejnowski,	   1996;	   Frank	   et	   al.,	   2009).	   If	   uncertainty	  and	   exploratory	   motivations	   have	   opposite	   effects	   on	   memory	   (after	  controlling	   for	   shared	   variance	   between	   the	   two),	   then	   experimental	  paradigms	   in	   which	   exploration	   is	   driven	   exclusively	   by	   uncertainty	  may	  be	  unsuitable	  for	  pulling	  these	  effects	  apart.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  our	  ability	  to	  observe	  the	  effect	  of	  uncertainty	  and	  value-­‐scaled	  uncertainty	  on	   our	   data	  may	  have	  depended	   somewhat	   on	   the	   lack	   of	   a	   complete	  overlap	   between	   these	   two	   variables	   in	   our	   experimental	   design.	  Regarding	   the	   negative	   effect	   of	   uncertainty	   on	   memory	   per	   se,	   one	  possibility	   is	   that	   the	   lack	   of	   a	   clear	   outcome	   prediction	   (that	   was	  additionally	  unlikely	  to	  be	  resolved	  via	  exploration)	  may	  have	  served	  to	  distract	   subjects	   from	   attentive	   encoding	   of	   the	   objects	   at	   hand.	  Another	  interesting,	  if	  speculative,	  idea,	  is	  that	  gambles	  with	  a	  clear	  and	  predictable	  outcome	  (i.e.	  gambles	  associated	  with	  low	  uncertainty)	  may	  provide	   subjects	   with	   a	   distinct	   context	   cue	   that	   allows	   for	   better	  encoding,	   relative	   to	   gambles	   with	   uncertain	   outcomes,	   which	   fail	   to	  provide	   a	   clear	   schematic	   context	   for	   object	   encoding.	   Clearly,	   more	  specifically	   designed	   experimental	   tests	   of	   this	   possibility	   would	   be	  necessary	   to	   determine	   its	   plausibility.	   A	   second	   incidental	   finding	  noted	   here	   was	   that	   objects	   encountered	   in	   the	   context	   of	   a	   ‘reject’	  decision	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  remembered	  at	  delayed	  test,	  but	  not	  at	  immediate.	  This	  finding	  is	  somewhat	  consistent	  with	  previous	  data	  that	  points	   towards	   improved	  memory	   for	   stimuli	   that	   are	   encountered	   in	  an	  aversive	  context	  (Bisby	  and	  Burgess,	  2013).	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  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  form	  of	  exploration	  we	  employed	  in	  this	  study	   relates	   to	   a	   particular	   strategic	   process,	   in	   which	   subjects	  explicitly	   decide	   whether	   it	   is	   worthwhile	   or	   not	   to	   seek	   additional	  information,	   on	   each	   trial.	   Other	   experimenters	   have	   validly	  approached	   exploration	   as	   an	   increase	   in	   choice	   randomness	   (Daw	  et	  al.,	  2005;	  Wilson	  et	  al.,	  2014),	  whereas	  others	  still	  have	  focused	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  exploration	   (i.e.	  novelty	  exposure),	  disregarding	   the	   internal	  computations	   that	   an	   agent	   might	   make	   in	   determining	   whether	   to	  explore	   or	   not	   (e.g.	   by	   forcing	   subjects	   to	   explore	   an	   environment;	  Schomaker	   et	   al.,	   2014).	   Such	   operationalizations	   of	   exploration	   are	  bound	  to	  differ	  greatly	  in	  psychological	  quality,	  both	  from	  each	  other	  as	  well	   as	   from	   the	   methods	   employed	   here.	   As	   such,	   what	   we	   have	  demonstrated	  here	  is	  that,	  in	  a	  scenario	  where	  exploration	  is	  an	  explicit	  strategic	   choice	   undertaken	   by	   subjects,	   the	   effects	   of	   exploration	   on	  memory	   are	   related	   less	   to	   the	   act	   of	   exploring,	   and	   more	   to	   the	  cognitive	   mode	   that	   subjects	   enter	   into	   when	   they	   are	   approaching	  conditions	   that	   make	   for	   fruitful	   exploration.	   Given	   that	   age-­‐related	  differences	   in	  exploratory	  behaviour	  have	  been	  noted	   in	   the	   literature	  (Mata	   et	   al.,	   2013;	   Spaniol	   et	   al.,	   2013),	   it	   would	   be	   interesting	   for	  future	   work	   to	   focus	   on	   the	   question	   of	   how	   the	   interplay	   between	  exploration	   and	   subsequent	   memory	   may	   also	   change	   across	   the	  lifespan.	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Chapter	  8:	  Discussion	  	  	  This	  thesis	  began	  with	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  hippocampus	  is	  best	  described	  in	  terms	  of	   its	  representational	  and	  computational	  capacities,	  and	  that	  it	   plays	   a	   role	   beyond	   the	   domains	   of	   episodic	   memory	   and	   spatial	  processing.	   The	   experiments	   in	   Chapter	   4	   and	   5	   looked	   at	   the	  representations	   of	   objects	   in	   context,	   examining	   how	   such	   context	  embedding	   relates	   to	   memory	   and	   reward	   processing.	   Chapter	   6	  examined	   whether	   hippocampal	   contributions	   to	   anxiety	   related	   to	  exploration	   or	   avoidance,	   and	   Chapter	   7	   used	   the	   novel	   paradigm	  developed	   in	   Chapter	   6	   to	   examine	   the	   effects	   of	   exploration	   on	  subsequent	   recall.	   In	   the	   following	   sections,	   I	   will	   briefly	   review	   the	  findings	   within	   the	   broader	   context	   of	   hippocampal	   contributions	   to	  cognition,	  as	  well	  as	  discuss	  potential	  limitations	  and	  avenues	  for	  future	  work.	  	  
	  
8.1:	  Hippocampal	  representations	  of	  context	  	  Chapters	  4	  and	  5	  demonstrate	  that	  memory	  for	  embedded	  objects	  can	  be	  influenced	  by	  the	  background	  context,	   in	  addition	  to	  attributes	  that	  relate	   to	   the	   focal	   objects	   themselves.	   In	   Chapter	   4,	   recollection	   of	  neutral	  objects	  was	  improved	  by	  the	  inclusion	  of	  an	  explicit	  background	  picture	  (compared	   to	  a	  blank	  black	  background)	   that	  had	  been	  paired	  with	   both	   rewarding	   and	   neutral	   objects.	   In	   Chapter	   5,	   we	  demonstrated	   that	  memory	   for	  an	  embedded	  object	  was	   improved	  by	  the	  inclusion	  of	  a	  reward-­‐predicting	  context	  picture	  in	  the	  background,	  but	   only	   if	   that	   context	   picture	   was	   perceptually	   similar	   to	   a	   neutral	  context	  picture.	  In	  Chapter	  5,	  we	  also	  found	  that	  successful	  learning	  regarding	  a	  similar-­‐rewarded	   context	   was	   associated	   with	   selective	   reward-­‐related	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responding	   of	   the	   SN/VTA,	   which	   did	   not	   generalize	   to	   the	   similar-­‐neutral	   context	   (despite	   the	   perceptual	   similarity).	   We	   also	   noted	   a	  difference	   in	   the	   strength	   of	   the	   reward-­‐related	   response	   in	   the	  SN/VTA,	   which	   was	   more	   greatly	   activated	   in	   response	   to	   similar-­‐rewarding	   contexts	   compared	   to	   dissimilar-­‐rewarding	   ones.	   This	  finding	  was	  unexpected,	  and	  may	  go	  some	  way	  towards	  explaining	  why	  contextual	   modulation	   of	   memory	   was	   observed	   in	   the	   similar	  condition,	  but	  not	  the	  dissimilar.	  This	  difference	   in	  the	  reward-­‐related	  response	  of	   the	  SN/VTA	  seems	  unlikely	   to	  be	  due	   to	  an	  asymmetry	   in	  the	   extent	   of	   reward	   conditioning,	   given	   that	   both	   context	   pairs	  were	  well	   conditioned	   prior	   to	   the	   encoding	   stage	   of	   the	   experiment	   and	  demonstrated	   similar	   levels	   of	   reward	   conditioning	   (as	   indexed	   by	  reward-­‐related	   RT	   speeding	   in	   each	   of	   the	   similarity	   conditions).	  Undetected	   differences	   in	   context	   condition,	   or	   the	   use	   of	   different	  strategies	   in	   the	   similar	   and	   dissimilar	   condition,	   cannot	   be	   entirely	  ruled	  out,	  however.	  One	  other	  possibility	  that	  is	  suggested	  by	  our	  data	  is	   that	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   perceptual	   stimuli	   –	   and,	   subsequently,	   the	  perceptual	   processing	   pathways	   involved	   –	   may	   play	   a	   role	   in	  determining	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  reward-­‐related	  response	  in	  regions	  like	  the	   SN/VTA.	   Indeed,	   the	   hippocampus	   is	   thought	   exert	   particular	  influence	  on	  the	  SN/VTA	  (Lisman	  and	  Grace,	  2005),	  though	  no	  studies	  have	  yet	  directly	  compared	  reward-­‐related	  responding	  that	  is	  driven	  by	  representations	   that	   are	   supported	   at	   different	   levels	   of	   the	   visual	  processing	  hierarchy.	  	  	  
8.2:	  The	  hippocampus	  in	  anxiety	  	  In	   Chapter	   6,	   we	   developed	   a	   novel	   paradigm	   to	   tease	   apart	  hippocampal	   contributions	   to	   avoidance	   and	   exploration.	   This	  distinction	   is	   an	   important	   one	   because	   the	   dominant	   idea	   regarding	  hippocampal	   contributions	   to	   anxiety	   asserts	   that,	   in	   situations	   of	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approach-­‐avoidance	   conflict	   (i.e.	   where	   frank	   approach	   or	   avoidance	  would	   be	   an	   unsatisfactory	   response),	   the	   hippocampus	   inhibits	  approach	   responses	   and	   initiates	   exploration	   (Gray	   and	  McNaughton,	  2000).	  Avoidant	  and	  exploratory	  aspects	  of	  the	  anxious	  response	  have	  in	  so	  been	  conflated	  both	  theoretically	  and	  empirically	  to	  date,	  with	  the	  latter	   confusion	   further	   stemming	   from	   the	   practical	   difficulty	   of	  separating	   avoidance	   and	   risk	   assessment	   (which	   both	   involve	  behavioural	   freezing)	   in	   rodents.	   By	   capitalizing	   on	   the	   greater	  psychological	  specificity	  afforded	  to	  researchers	  who	  study	  humans,	  we	  were	   able	   to	   demonstrate	   that	   the	   hippocampus	   is	   associated	   with	  avoidance	   rather	   than	   exploration	   in	   an	   approach-­‐avoidance	   context.	  Additionally,	   we	   were	   able	   to	   rule	   out	   the	   possibility	   that	   the	  hippocampus	  merely	  represents	  the	  behavioural	  context	  in	  anxiety	  (i.e.	  with	   the	  aversive	  component	  being	   implemented	  by	  some	  other	  brain	  region,	   like	   the	   amygdala),	   by	   using	   an	   explicitly	   non-­‐spatial	   task	   and	  controlling	   for	   the	   incidental	   use	   of	   spatial	   strategies	   by	   including	   a	  control	   condition,	   which	   differed	   from	   the	   experimental	   condition	  solely	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  aversive	  element.	  	  A	   significant	   outstanding	   question	   concerns	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   the	  hippocampus	   plays	   role	   in	   behavioural	   inhibition	   and	   avoidance	   in	   a	  
non-­‐approach-­‐avoidance	   context	   (i.e.	   where	   frank	   avoidance	   is	  sufficient).	   While	   we	   included	   an	   element	   of	   approach-­‐avoidance	  conflict	  in	  our	  experimental	  design	  (i.e.	  where	  increasing	  the	  number	  of	  activated	  tokens	  resulted	   in	  both	  an	   increase	   in	  the	  magnitude	  of	  gain	  and	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  probability	  of	  loss),	  we	  were	  not	  able	  to	  explicitly	  quantify	  and	  thus	  compare	  the	  approach	  and	  avoidant	  tendencies	  in	  our	  task.	   Animal	  models	   emphasize	   approach-­‐avoidance	   conflict	   as	   key	   to	  eliciting	  anxiety	  in	  rodents,	  who	  have	  to	  venture	  out	  in	  open	  spaces	  to	  find	   food,	   but	   are	   then	   liable	   at	   every	   point	   to	   be	   endangered	  themselves.	  While	  this	  conceptualization	  of	  anxiety	  is	  sensible	  for	  prey	  animals,	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   such	   underlying	   mechanisms	   are	  important	   to	   human	   anxiety	   has	   yet	   to	   be	   established.	   Further	  works	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must	  establish	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  human	  hippocampus	  is	  involved	  in	  frank	  avoidance.	  	  While	  the	  low	  spatial	  resolution	  of	  our	  data	  (3mm	  isotropic)	  precludes	  firm	  conclusions	   regarding	  specific	   subfields	  processes,	  our	   results	  do	  point	   towards	   hippocampal	   subfield	   interactions	   as	   a	   possible	   circuit	  mechanism	  via	  which	  avoidance	  signalling	  may	  emerge.	  One	  possibility	  is	  that	  the	  hippocampus’s	  role	  in	  an	  approach-­‐avoidance	  context	  relates	  to	   the	   hippocampus’	   ability	   to	   overcome	   interference.	   Pattern	  separation	  is	  often	  thought	  of	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  need	  to	  store	  overlapping	  neural	  patterns	  sufficiently	  separately	  as	  to	  minimize	  the	  potential	   for	  cross-­‐interference.	   Situations	   that	   engender	   approach-­‐avoidance	  conflict	   may	   require	   an	   animal	   to	   represent	   the	   positively-­‐	   and	  negatively-­‐valenced	   elements	   within	   the	   experience	   separately	   from	  each	  other,	  so	  that	  the	  relative	  merits	  of	  avoidant	  and	  approach	  actions	  may	  be	  evaluated	  without	  mutual	   interference.	  The	   importance	  of	   the	  hippocampus	   for	   overcoming	   interference	   between	   motor	   responses	  has	  been	  noted	  previously	  in	  the	  literature	  	  (though	  not	  in	  the	  context	  of	  approach-­‐avoidance	   conflict;	   Bannerman	   et	   al.,	   2012,	   2014),	   but	   the	  details	  of	  how	  the	  hippocampal	  circuit	  could	  support	  this	  function	  have	  yet	   to	  be	  elaborated,	  and	  these	   latter	  efforts	  have	  not	  explicitly	   linked	  the	   overcoming	   of	   interference	   to	   the	   hippocampus’	   ability	   to	  orthogonalize	   neural	   patterns.	  Within	   this	   framework,	   the	   element	   of	  approach-­‐avoidance	   conflict	   should	   be	   key	   to	   the	   hippocampus’	  involvement	   in	   anxiety,	   since	   such	   situations	   engender	   incompatible	  and	  mutually	  interfering	  impulses	  that	  need	  to	  be	  orthogonalized	  in	  the	  brain.	  	  Another	  non-­‐mutually-­‐exclusive	  possibility	  that	  fits	  better	  with	  the	  data	  reported	   in	   Chapter	   6	   is	   that	   the	   hippocampal	   circuit	   may	   serve	   to	  detect	   situations	   in	   which	   an	   avoidant	   response	   is	   necessary.	  Specifically,	   the	  CA1	   sub-­‐region	  may	   act	   as	   a	   ‘detector’	   that	   compares	  inputs	  that	  it	  receives	  from	  CA3	  and	  elsewhere,	  and	  produces	  an	  active	  response	   that	   effectively	   signals	   the	  need	   for	   avoidant	   action	   to	  other	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regions	   in	   the	  brain.	  One	   intriguing	   aspect	   of	   the	  data	   in	  Chapter	  6	   is	  that	   different	   sub-­‐regions	   of	   the	   hippocampus	   appeared	   to	   show	  different	  patterns	  of	  activation:	  while	  the	  inferior	  anterior	  hippocampal	  regions	   of	   the	   hippocampus	   distinguished	   between	   rejecting	   in	   a	  potentially	   aversive	   vs	   neutral	   condition,	   superior	   anterior	   regions	   of	  the	   hippocampus	   failed	   to	   show	   such	   discrimination.	   This	   pattern	   of	  activation,	   apparent	   on	   both	   the	   left	   and	   right	   hippocampus,	   is	  intriguing	  because	  the	  clusters	  correspond	  roughly	  to	  the	  CA1	  and	  CA3	  subfields	   respectively.	   Models	   of	   CA1	   function	   within	   the	   memory	  literature	  have	  proposed	  that	  CA1	  compares	  inputs	  from	  the	  entorhinal	  cortex	  with	   output	   from	   CA3	   (Hasselmo	   and	   Schnell,	   1994;	   Hasselmo	  and	  Wyble,	   1997;	   Hasselmo	   et	   al.,	   1996),	   	  which	   allows	   for	   a	   novelty	  signal	  to	  emerge	  in	  CA1.	  In	  anxiety,	  the	  CA1	  subregion	  may	  similarly	  act	  to	  detect	   convergent	   inputs	   that	   signal	   aversive	   conditions,	   e.g.	   if	   CA1	  firing	  is	  potentiated	  by	  convergent	  inputs	  from	  CA3	  and	  the	  amygdala.	  	  
8.3:	  Exploration	  and	  its	  effects	  on	  memory	  	  Another	  major	  focus	  of	  the	  work	  in	  this	  thesis	  concerns	  exploration.	  In	  Chapter	   6,	   we	   had	   considered	   that	   the	   hippocampus	   may	   have	   been	  important	  for	  generating	  exploratory	  impulses	  (Gray	  and	  McNaughton,	  2000).	  This	  hypothesis	  was	   somewhat	   consistent	  with	   the	  notion	   that	  the	   hippocampus	   may	   generally	   be	   involved	   in	   detecting	   novelty	  (Kumaran	   and	   Maguire,	   2007,	   2009),	   which	   is	   experienced	   as	   an	  outcome	   of	   exploration	   or	   information	   gathering.	   Contrary	   to	   this	  expectation,	   however,	   we	   found	   only	   evidence	   of	   hippocampal	  
deactivation	   when	   subjects	   opted	   to	   explore	   (Chapter	   6).	   Instead,	  exploration	  engaged	  a	  network	  of	  regions	  in	  the	  frontal	  cortex,	  parietal	  cortex	   and	   striatum.	   These	   regions	   (particularly	   the	   rostrolateral	  frontopolar	   cortex	   and	   the	   parietal	   cortex)	   have	   typically	   been	  implicated	   in	   value-­‐based	   decision	   making	   and	   exploration	   that	   is	  operationalized	  as	  a	   trade-­‐off	  with	  exploitative	   (i.e.	  value-­‐maximising)	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choices	  (Badre	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  Daw	  et	  al.,	  2005,	  2006;	  Furl	  and	  Averbeck,	  2011).	   One	   outstanding	   (and	   speculative)	   possibility	   is	   that	   relative	  deactivation	   of	   the	   hippocampus	   may	   be	   an	   important	   neural	   signal	  that	   triggers	   information	   gathering.	   Within	   this	   framework,	   a	   lack	   of	  clear,	   episodic-­‐like	   outcome	   representations	   (mediated	   by	   the	  hippocampus)	  may	  signal	  a	  need	  for	  further	   information	  seeking,	  with	  this	   latter	   process	   coordinated	   by	   frontal	   and	   parietal	   regions	   of	   the	  brain.	  	  Considerable	   interest	   lies	   in	   the	   theoretical	   question	   of	  what,	   exactly,	  drives	  exploration.	  This	  thesis	  has	  focused	  on	  a	  form	  of	  exploration	  that	  is	   spontaneous	   and	   driven	   by	   internal	   cognitive	   and	   motivational	  processes	   of	   an	   agent,	   as	   opposed	   to	   exploration	   that	   is	   elicited	   by	  external	   stimuli.	   In	   this	   alternative	   view,	   exploration	   is	   triggered	   by	  external	   circumstances	   of	   novelty,	   producing	   a	   behavioural	   orienting	  response	  (Chong	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Escera	  et	  al.,	  2000;	  Tarbi	  et	  al.,	  2011)	  as	  well	   as	   a	   wide	   cascade	   of	   psychological	   and	   neural	   changes	   (most	  notably	   in	   the	   noradrenaline	   and	   dopamine	   systems;	   see	   Schomaker	  and	   Meeter,	   2015,	   for	   recent	   review).	   	   Within	   exploration	   that	   is	  internally	   driven,	   information	   seeking	   can	   take	   many	   psychological	  forms,	   and	   these	   different	   forms	   of	   exploration	   have	   not	   been	   clearly	  distinguished	  in	  the	  literature.	  Within	  the	  anxiety	  literature,	  exploration	  is	   framed	   as	   risk	   assessment,	   in	   which	   an	   animal	   seeks	   to	   gain	  information	  regarding	  the	  potential	  presence	  of	  a	  threat,	  in	  response	  to	  a	   situation	   in	   which	   neither	   frank	   approach	   or	   avoidance	   are	  appropriate.	  Clearly	  this	   is	   fairly	  different	  (most	  obviously,	   in	  valence)	  from	  the	  way	  it	  is	  framed	  in	  the	  explore-­‐exploit	  or	  foraging	  paradigms,	  in	  which	  exploration	  is	  a	  means	  of	  strategically	  reducing	  uncertainty	  or	  discovering	   potentially	   rewarding	   alternative.	   It	   is	   worth	   noting,	  however,	   that	   our	   ‘risk-­‐assessment’	   operationalization	   of	   exploration	  does	   indeed	   implicate	   similar	   regions	   as	   these	   explore-­‐exploit	   studies	  do	  (i.e.	  parietal	  and	  frontal	  cortex),	  which	  points	  towards	  these	  regions	  as	  being	   important	   for	  some	  shared	  processes	   that	  are	   involved	  when	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subjects	   seek	   to	   gain	   new	   information.	   Different	   still	   from	   these	  characterizations	   is	   exploration	   that	   seeks	   to	   maximise	   exposure	   to	  novelty	   (Düzel	   et	   al.,	   2010),	   which,	   while	   harder	   to	   characterize	   in	  terms	  of	  a	  value-­‐maximisation	  framework,	  has	  been	  framed	  as	  carrying	  intrinsic	  value	  (known	  as	  a	  novelty	  bonus;	  Kakade	  &	  Dayan,	  2002).	  The	  question	  of	  what	  drives	  exploration	  is	  a	  deep	  theoretical	  issue.	  Focusing	  specifically	   on	   a	   form	  of	   exploration	   that	   corresponds	  most	   closely	   to	  risk	   assessment,	   we	   thus	   considered	   many	   competing	   hypotheses	  regarding	  which	  task-­‐related	  quantities	  would	  most	  strongly	   influence	  trial-­‐to-­‐trial	   decisions	   to	   explore	   (reflected	   in	   the	   large	   model	   space	  considered	   in	   Chapters	   6	   and	   7).	   While	   uncertainty	   was	   found	   to	   be	  important	  in	  defining	  the	  propensity	  to	  explore	  in	  both	  Chapter	  6	  and	  7,	  the	   subjects	   in	  Chapter	  7	  were	  additionally	   sensitive	   to	   the	  payoff	   for	  the	  information	  gain,	  in	  deciding	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  explore	  from	  trial	  to	  trial.	  	  Using	   this	   characterization,	   we	   were	   also	   interested	   to	   examine	   the	  effect	   of	   exploration	   on	   memory.	   Within	   work	   that	   examines	   how	  exploration	   affects	   memory	   (which	   is	   fairly	   divorced	   from	   the	  reinforcement-­‐learning	   literature),	   exploration	   is	   similarly	   ill-­‐defined;	  while	  some	  researchers	  operationalize	  exploration	  as	  mere	  exposure	  to	  a	   new	   environment	   (Schomaker	   et	   al.,	   2014),	   others	   emphasize	   the	  need	   for	   active	   (rather	   than	  passive)	   exploratory	   choices	   (Plancher	   et	  al.,	   2013;	   Voss	   et	   al.,	   2011a).	   Again,	   these	   two	   approaches	   differ	  significantly	  to	  those	  we	  employed	  in	  Chapter	  6	  and	  7.	  In	  our	  task,	  we	  focused	   not	   on	   agency,	   but	   on	   the	   explicit	   decision	   to	   seek	   new	  information	   before	   making	   a	   strategic	   choice.	   In	   contrast	   to	   existing	  studies,	   we	   found	   no	   effects	   of	   exploratory	   choice	   on	   the	   subsequent	  recall.	   Instead,	  we	   found	   that	  memory	  was	   influenced	  by	  value-­‐scaled	  uncertainty,	   the	   theoretical	  quantity	   that	  exploratory	  choice	  was	  most	  sensitive	  to	  in	  our	  task	  space	  (i.e.	  from	  trial	  to	  trial).	  This	  approach,	  and	  our	   pattern	   of	   results,	   represents	   a	   subtly	   different	   way	   of	   thinking	  about	  how	  exploration	  impacts	  memory,	  which	  emphasizes	  exploration	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as	  an	  active	  strategic	  choice,	  and	  aims	  to	  separate	  memory	  effects	  that	  relate	   to	   exploring	  per	   se	   from	  memory	   effects	   that	   relate	   to	   external	  quantities	   that	   drive	   exploration	   in	   the	   first	   place.	   The	   behavioural	  results	   presented	   here	   indicate	   that	   preparatory	   rather	   than	  behavioural	   (e.g.	   action-­‐related)	   aspects	   of	   exploration	   are	   capable	   of	  potentiating	   memory,	   and	   provoke	   further	   questions:	   what	   are	   the	  psychological	   and	   neural	   mechanisms	   that	   underlie	   these	   memory	  effects,	   and	   do	   these	   memory	   effects	   relate	   to	   subjects’	   ability	   to	  strategically	   or	   successfully	   employ	   exploration?	   Such	   questions	  represent	  an	  interesting	  potential	  avenue	  for	  future	  work.	  	  	  
8.4:	  Final	  remarks	  	  It	  is	  an	  exciting	  time	  to	  be	  curious	  about	  the	  brain,	  and	  an	  exciting	  time	  to	   be	   involved	   in	   hippocampal	   research.	   Experimentalists	   are	  increasingly	   in	   touch	   with	   computational	   ideas	   about	   how	   the	  hippocampal	   circuit	   could	   support	   cognition,	   and	   increasingly	  sophisticated	   methodological	   techniques	   are	   continuously	   being	  developed	   to	   aid	   us	   in	   our	   study	   of	   the	   human	   hippocampus.	   Much	  attention	  has	   turned	   towards	   the	  role	  of	  hippocampal	  representations	  beyond	  memory	  retention,	  and	  a	   further	  question	  that	   few	  in	  the	  field	  have	   begun	   to	   approach	   concerns	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   the	   medial	  temporal	   lobe	   is	   involved	   in	   constructing	   and	   maintaining	  representations	   of	   an	   entirely	   abstract	   nature.	   The	   hippocampus	  appears	   to	   be	   uniquely	   able	   to	   represent	   information	   that	   is	  multidimensional	  in	  nature,	  which	  may	  make	  it	  particularly	  suitable	  to	  representing	  three-­‐dimensional	  physical	  space.	  To	  what	  extent	   is	  such	  circuitry	   recruited	   when	   cognition	   requires	   an	   animal	   to	   represent	  multi-­‐dimensional	  information	  in	  other	  modalities?	  Greater	  scrutiny	  of	  the	  hippocampus’	   representational	   capabilities	   in	   such	  non-­‐traditional	  domains	   will	   surely	   be	   important	   to	   our	   efforts	   to	   discover	   how	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hippocampal	   representations	   and	   hippocampal	   circuitry	   are	   recruited	  to	  support	  disparate	  forms	  of	  cognitive	  function.	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